UNDERSTANDING ALCA

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Netto, Antônio Delfim
Data de Publicação: 2008
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
eng
spa
Título da fonte: RAM. Revista de Administração Mackenzie
Texto Completo: https://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/article/view/12
Resumo: Brazil needs to relearn quickly how to think its future to be able to point with clarity what the national interests of its citizens are, and defend them in discussions to join the Americas Free Trade Area (ALCA). Accomplishing this task will require the mobilization of academia, businessmen, workers and representatives of the Legislative, the Judiciary and the Executive Powers. This involvement is necessary when it comes to defining the conditions under which we enter into a partnership with the hegemonic power that now controls the world economy. Or, won't we? First, we must understand that ALCA is a United States production system's thinking, which sees in it the possibility to consolidate and expand their business across America. American history shows a country with remarkable ability to envision the future. They are what they are because since its foundation, they carefully looked after their interests; and the American interests are the sum of the interests of its citizens, its agriculture, its industry and its domestic and foreign trade. Up to the present, U.S. law favors itself above all others and their interests are also above everybody's else. The U.S. rush to constitute ALCA is just another step in the pristine desire, born with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 to build a prime hunting ground for their interests. The proposition that "any zone of free trade increases the welfare of its participants" is not part of economics: it is pure manifestation of the ideological hegemony thought built by a certain "American science". This is smuggled to the underdeveloped world in the minds of some scholars mesmerized by the pursuit of success and recognition of their masters. We must look to the United States and see what they did; not what they recommend we do. A first good read would be the famous Report on Manufactures that one of the founding fathers, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, submitted to Congress in 1791. In it are the tasteful arguments that have underpinned a whole protection policy of the nascent U.S. industry. Its principles had enormous influence in determining the economic policies that produced the country's development. The opening of the U.S. domestic market, several grid limitations and restrictions aside, is something very new. We just have to remember that around the Second World War in the 1930s, customs revenue was the most important item of tax collection as North America. US competitors self-destroyed during the war and the US imposed a "world order" through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, now WTO) that remain under their control. They were also generous with losers as well as their partners in victory by launching the Marshall Plan. They also allowed the three major opponents (Germany, Italy and Japan) to receive the blessings of an undervalued exchange rate that strongly encouraged the reconstruction of their economies from 1950 until practically 1970. Therefore, au contraire of certain current line of thought, the United States should not be hated. They should be admired and imitated ... Those who know that geography and history affect the transformation of economic theory into economic policy, also know that no country today has the degree of freedom that the United States enjoyed to perform its remarkable growth. Brazil is in a similar position to the U.S. in 1900, but inserted in the political and economic structure conditioned by the new "world order" prevailing in the beginning of this 21st century. Brazil is being pushed toward ALCA. Time is running out and our ability to sustain our position with solid arguments is not being built. We cannot leave it to the bureaucrats, even the most competent. We cannot fail to force a broad discussion with Academia, the private sector and Congress. Fortunately there are some initiatives in this direction: the chairman of the House of Representatives, Mr. Aécio Neves, recently approved the formation of a nonpartisan commission, which will convene at the beginning of the second semester for a series of public hearings in which the idea is to deepen the discussion on ALCA. It is the opportunity for different sectors of society to come forward and present their arguments regarding the desirability (or not) and the conditions of our participation, protecting the interests of citizens and industrial sectors. Our diplomats are extremely competent, but it is not their place to design trade integration policies. It is up to society and the Congress, with the support of academia and the experience of the private sector, to deepen this analysis and try to understand what will become of the Brazilian economy within ALCA. Strictly speaking, one cannot be either for or against, since there are few studies about it. In fact, we do not have the necessary information. Maybe we're being unfair, but we do not believe that the Brazilian government has a serious, professional study, about the consequences for the economy of its integration into the ALCA. And what's worse, we do not have an adversarial academia able to shed light on the problem under different theoretical and empirical perspectives. The idea that under any circumstances, an association for free trade is completely beneficial is not only a scientific proposition: it is a manifestation of religious faith. There are, however, some practical issues to be preliminarily addressed, as claimed in a welcome speech by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso during the meeting of heads of state held in April in Quebec. The first one is the need to regulate the U.S. antidumping law, without which our participation in ALCA may be undesirable. Even Alan Greenspan admits that there "are often imposed (measures) on behalf of trade justice, but they are frequently used to prevent competition." Therefore the President is justified in defending the sharing of the management of the problem: "let us not go into that game as a country that has no voice or that has a colony mentality. As if it was a favor for us to join ALCA. It's not. It's business, tit for tat...". The President referred also to non-tariff restrictions (labor, health and environmental) that often introduce a veiled protectionism under the guise of low fares. At that point, his speech coincided with President Bush, with a different perspective, condemning the "self-defeating protectionism" that lurks behind those restrictions. There is no guarantee that practical consequences can be draw from these discourses, but as one can see, there is ample room to define important preliminary issues to our entry into ALCA.
id MACKENZIE_8a3bff42877268b6307e917ed10c2e67
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.editorarevistas.mackenzie.br:article/12
network_acronym_str MACKENZIE
network_name_str RAM. Revista de Administração Mackenzie
repository_id_str
spelling UNDERSTANDING ALCAPensar a AlcaBrazil needs to relearn quickly how to think its future to be able to point with clarity what the national interests of its citizens are, and defend them in discussions to join the Americas Free Trade Area (ALCA). Accomplishing this task will require the mobilization of academia, businessmen, workers and representatives of the Legislative, the Judiciary and the Executive Powers. This involvement is necessary when it comes to defining the conditions under which we enter into a partnership with the hegemonic power that now controls the world economy. Or, won't we? First, we must understand that ALCA is a United States production system's thinking, which sees in it the possibility to consolidate and expand their business across America. American history shows a country with remarkable ability to envision the future. They are what they are because since its foundation, they carefully looked after their interests; and the American interests are the sum of the interests of its citizens, its agriculture, its industry and its domestic and foreign trade. Up to the present, U.S. law favors itself above all others and their interests are also above everybody's else. The U.S. rush to constitute ALCA is just another step in the pristine desire, born with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 to build a prime hunting ground for their interests. The proposition that "any zone of free trade increases the welfare of its participants" is not part of economics: it is pure manifestation of the ideological hegemony thought built by a certain "American science". This is smuggled to the underdeveloped world in the minds of some scholars mesmerized by the pursuit of success and recognition of their masters. We must look to the United States and see what they did; not what they recommend we do. A first good read would be the famous Report on Manufactures that one of the founding fathers, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, submitted to Congress in 1791. In it are the tasteful arguments that have underpinned a whole protection policy of the nascent U.S. industry. Its principles had enormous influence in determining the economic policies that produced the country's development. The opening of the U.S. domestic market, several grid limitations and restrictions aside, is something very new. We just have to remember that around the Second World War in the 1930s, customs revenue was the most important item of tax collection as North America. US competitors self-destroyed during the war and the US imposed a "world order" through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, now WTO) that remain under their control. They were also generous with losers as well as their partners in victory by launching the Marshall Plan. They also allowed the three major opponents (Germany, Italy and Japan) to receive the blessings of an undervalued exchange rate that strongly encouraged the reconstruction of their economies from 1950 until practically 1970. Therefore, au contraire of certain current line of thought, the United States should not be hated. They should be admired and imitated ... Those who know that geography and history affect the transformation of economic theory into economic policy, also know that no country today has the degree of freedom that the United States enjoyed to perform its remarkable growth. Brazil is in a similar position to the U.S. in 1900, but inserted in the political and economic structure conditioned by the new "world order" prevailing in the beginning of this 21st century. Brazil is being pushed toward ALCA. Time is running out and our ability to sustain our position with solid arguments is not being built. We cannot leave it to the bureaucrats, even the most competent. We cannot fail to force a broad discussion with Academia, the private sector and Congress. Fortunately there are some initiatives in this direction: the chairman of the House of Representatives, Mr. Aécio Neves, recently approved the formation of a nonpartisan commission, which will convene at the beginning of the second semester for a series of public hearings in which the idea is to deepen the discussion on ALCA. It is the opportunity for different sectors of society to come forward and present their arguments regarding the desirability (or not) and the conditions of our participation, protecting the interests of citizens and industrial sectors. Our diplomats are extremely competent, but it is not their place to design trade integration policies. It is up to society and the Congress, with the support of academia and the experience of the private sector, to deepen this analysis and try to understand what will become of the Brazilian economy within ALCA. Strictly speaking, one cannot be either for or against, since there are few studies about it. In fact, we do not have the necessary information. Maybe we're being unfair, but we do not believe that the Brazilian government has a serious, professional study, about the consequences for the economy of its integration into the ALCA. And what's worse, we do not have an adversarial academia able to shed light on the problem under different theoretical and empirical perspectives. The idea that under any circumstances, an association for free trade is completely beneficial is not only a scientific proposition: it is a manifestation of religious faith. There are, however, some practical issues to be preliminarily addressed, as claimed in a welcome speech by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso during the meeting of heads of state held in April in Quebec. The first one is the need to regulate the U.S. antidumping law, without which our participation in ALCA may be undesirable. Even Alan Greenspan admits that there "are often imposed (measures) on behalf of trade justice, but they are frequently used to prevent competition." Therefore the President is justified in defending the sharing of the management of the problem: "let us not go into that game as a country that has no voice or that has a colony mentality. As if it was a favor for us to join ALCA. It's not. It's business, tit for tat...". The President referred also to non-tariff restrictions (labor, health and environmental) that often introduce a veiled protectionism under the guise of low fares. At that point, his speech coincided with President Bush, with a different perspective, condemning the "self-defeating protectionism" that lurks behind those restrictions. There is no guarantee that practical consequences can be draw from these discourses, but as one can see, there is ample room to define important preliminary issues to our entry into ALCA.O Brasil precisa reaprender rapidamente a pensar o seu futuro para poder apontar com clareza quais os interesses nacionais de seus cidadãos, que devem ser defendidos nas discussões para o ingresso na Associação de Livre Comércio das Américas. A realização dessa tarefa vai exigir a mobilização do pensamento acadêmico, dos empresários, dos trabalhadores e das representações do Legislativo e do Judiciário e do Poder Executivo. Esse envolvimento é necessário porque se trata de definir em que condições vamos entrar em uma parceria com o poder hegemônico que hoje comanda a economia mundial. Ou, não vamos? É preciso entender, inicialmente, que a Alca é um desejo do sistema produtivo dos Estados Unidos, que vê nela a possibilidade de consolidar e ampliar seus negócios em toda a América. A história norte-americana mostra um país com notável capacidade de pensar o futuro. Os Estados Unidos são o que são porque, desde a sua fundação, cuidaram duramente dos seus interesses. E os interesses norte-americanos são a soma dos interesses de seus cidadãos, de sua agricultura, de sua indústria e de seu comércio, no país e no exterior. Até hoje a lei norte-americana pretere todas as demais e seus interesses preterem todos os outros. A pressa norte-americana para constituir a Alca é apenas mais um passo no prístino desejo, nascido com a Doutrina Monroe em 1823, de construir um campo de caça privilegiado para os seus interesses. A proposição que “qualquer zona de livre comércio aumenta o bem-estar de seus participantes” não faz parte da ciência econômica: é pura manifestação do pensamento ideológico hegemônico construído por uma certa “ciência norte-americana”. Esta é contrabandeada para o mundo subdesenvolvido na cabeça de alguns bolsistas mesmerizados pela busca de sucesso e reconhecimento de seus mestres. Devemos olhar para os Estados Unidos e ver o que eles fizeram, não fazer o que eles recomendam. Uma primeira boa leitura seria o famoso Relatório Sobre as Manufaturas que um dos “pais fundadores”, o Secretário do Tesouro Alexander Hamilton, submeteu ao Congresso em 1791. Nele estão os primorosos argumentos que embasaram toda uma política de proteção à nascente indústria norte-americana. Seus princípios tiveram enorme influência na determinação das políticas econômicas que produziram o desenvolvimento do país. A abertura do mercado interno norte-americano, guardadas inúmeras limitações e restrições setorizadas, é coisa muito recente. Basta lembrar que até as proximidades da Segunda Guerra Mundial, na década de 1930, as receitas alfandegárias constituíam o item mais importante da arrecadação tributária norteamericana. Os competidores dos Estados Unidos destruíram-se na guerra e eles impuseram uma “ordem mundial” com o Fundo Monetário (FMI), o Banco Internacional para Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento (Bird) e o Acordo Geral de Tarifas e Comércio (Gatt, hoje OMC) que continuam sob seu controle. Foram também generosos com vencidos e com seus parceiros na vitória ao lançarem o Plano Marshall, por exemplo. E permitiram que os três maiores adversários (Alemanha, Itália e Japão) recebessem as bênçãos de uma taxa de câmbio subvalorizada que estimulou fortemente a reconstrução de suas economias de 1950 até praticamente 1970. Ao contrário, portanto, do que pensam os malresolvidos com a vida, os Estados Unidos não devem ser odiados. Devem ser admirados e imitados... Os que sabem que a Geografia e a História condicionam a transformação da teoria econômica em política econômica, também sabem que nenhum país tem hoje o grau de liberdade que os Estados Unidos gozaram para realizar o seu extraordinário desenvolvimento. O Brasil está numa posição parecida com a dos Estados Unidos em 1900, mas inserido na estrutura política e econômica condicionada pela nova “ordem mundial” vigente nesse início de século 21. O Brasil está sendo empurrado para a Alca. O tempo vai se esgotando, e nossa capacidade para sustentar com argumentos sólidos nossa posição não está sendo construída. Não é possível deixar isso nas mãos dos burocratas, mesmo os mais competentes. Não é possível deixar de forçar uma discussão ampla com a Academia, com o setor privado e com o Congresso. Felizmente já surgem algumas iniciativas nessa direção: o presidente da Câmara Federal, deputado Aécio Neves, recém-aprovou a formação de uma comissão suprapartidária, que se reunirá no início deste segundo semestre para uma série de audiências públicas em que se pretende aprofundar a discussão sobre a Alca. É a oportunidade para que os diferentes setores da sociedade se manifestem e apresentem seus argumentos quanto à conveniência (ou não) e sobre as condições de nossa participação, resguardando os interesses dos cidadãos e dos setores produtivos nacionais. Nossos diplomatas são extremamente competentes, mas não lhes cabe formular a política de integração comercial. Cabe à sociedade e ao Congresso, com o suporte da inteligência acadêmica de que dispomos e da experiência do setor privado, aprofundar essa análise e tentar entender o que será a economia brasileira dentro da Alca. A rigor, não se pode ser nem a favor nem contra, por-que dispomos de poucos estudos a respeito. De fato, não temos as informações necessárias. Talvez estejamos sendo injustos, mas não acreditamos que o governo disponha de um estudo sério, profissional, sobre as conseqüências para a economia brasileira de sua integração na Alca. E, o que é pior, não dispomos de um contraditório acadêmico capaz de lançar luz sobre o problema sob as mais diversas perspectivas teóricas e empíricas. A idéia de que, em quaisquer circunstâncias, uma associação de livre comércio só traz benefícios não é uma proposição científica: é uma manifestação de fé religiosa. Existem, não obstante, algumas questões de natureza prática que devem ser resolvidas preliminarmente, como reclamou, num feliz discurso, o presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso na reunião de Chefes de Estado realizada em abril em Quebec. A primeira delas é a necessidade de regular a legislação antidumping norte-americana, sem o que nossa participação na Alca pode ser indesejável. Até Alan Greenspan reconhece que “muitas vezes são impostas (medidas) em nome da justiça comercial, mas freqüentemente o são para impedir a competição”. Por isso justifica-se a afirmação do presidente ao defender a administração compartilhada do problema: “não vamos entrar nesse jogo como um país que não tem voz ou com mentalidade colonizada. Como se fosse um favor para nós entrar na Alca. Não é. É negócio, toma lá, dá cá...”. O presidente referiu-se, também, às restrições não-tarifárias (trabalhistas, sanitárias e ambientais) que freqüentemente introduzem um protecionismo velado sob a cobertura de baixas tarifas. Nesse ponto, seu discurso coincide com o do presidente Bush, com uma perspectiva diferente, condenando o “protecionismo autodestruidor” que se esconde por detrás daquelas restrições. Não há garantia de que se possam extrair conseqüências práticas desses discursos, mas, como se vê, há um amplo espaço para se definir importantes questões preliminares ao nosso ingresso na Alca.Editora Mackenzie2008-06-25info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/article/view/12Revista de Administração Mackenzie; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2001)Revista de Administração Mackenzie; Vol. 2 Núm. 1 (2001)Revista de Administração Mackenzie (Mackenzie Management Review); v. 2 n. 1 (2001)1678-69711518-6776reponame:RAM. Revista de Administração Mackenzieinstname:Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (MACKENZIE)instacron:MACKENZIEporengspahttps://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/article/view/12/12https://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/article/view/12/2098https://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/article/view/12/2099Copyright (c) 2015 Revista de Administração Mackenzieinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessNetto, Antônio Delfim2011-01-14T16:39:30Zoai:ojs.editorarevistas.mackenzie.br:article/12Revistahttps://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/PUBhttps://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/oairevista.adm@mackenzie.br1678-69711518-6776opendoar:2024-04-19T17:00:22.096377RAM. Revista de Administração Mackenzie - Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (MACKENZIE)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv UNDERSTANDING ALCA
Pensar a Alca
title UNDERSTANDING ALCA
spellingShingle UNDERSTANDING ALCA
Netto, Antônio Delfim
title_short UNDERSTANDING ALCA
title_full UNDERSTANDING ALCA
title_fullStr UNDERSTANDING ALCA
title_full_unstemmed UNDERSTANDING ALCA
title_sort UNDERSTANDING ALCA
author Netto, Antônio Delfim
author_facet Netto, Antônio Delfim
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Netto, Antônio Delfim
description Brazil needs to relearn quickly how to think its future to be able to point with clarity what the national interests of its citizens are, and defend them in discussions to join the Americas Free Trade Area (ALCA). Accomplishing this task will require the mobilization of academia, businessmen, workers and representatives of the Legislative, the Judiciary and the Executive Powers. This involvement is necessary when it comes to defining the conditions under which we enter into a partnership with the hegemonic power that now controls the world economy. Or, won't we? First, we must understand that ALCA is a United States production system's thinking, which sees in it the possibility to consolidate and expand their business across America. American history shows a country with remarkable ability to envision the future. They are what they are because since its foundation, they carefully looked after their interests; and the American interests are the sum of the interests of its citizens, its agriculture, its industry and its domestic and foreign trade. Up to the present, U.S. law favors itself above all others and their interests are also above everybody's else. The U.S. rush to constitute ALCA is just another step in the pristine desire, born with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 to build a prime hunting ground for their interests. The proposition that "any zone of free trade increases the welfare of its participants" is not part of economics: it is pure manifestation of the ideological hegemony thought built by a certain "American science". This is smuggled to the underdeveloped world in the minds of some scholars mesmerized by the pursuit of success and recognition of their masters. We must look to the United States and see what they did; not what they recommend we do. A first good read would be the famous Report on Manufactures that one of the founding fathers, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, submitted to Congress in 1791. In it are the tasteful arguments that have underpinned a whole protection policy of the nascent U.S. industry. Its principles had enormous influence in determining the economic policies that produced the country's development. The opening of the U.S. domestic market, several grid limitations and restrictions aside, is something very new. We just have to remember that around the Second World War in the 1930s, customs revenue was the most important item of tax collection as North America. US competitors self-destroyed during the war and the US imposed a "world order" through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, now WTO) that remain under their control. They were also generous with losers as well as their partners in victory by launching the Marshall Plan. They also allowed the three major opponents (Germany, Italy and Japan) to receive the blessings of an undervalued exchange rate that strongly encouraged the reconstruction of their economies from 1950 until practically 1970. Therefore, au contraire of certain current line of thought, the United States should not be hated. They should be admired and imitated ... Those who know that geography and history affect the transformation of economic theory into economic policy, also know that no country today has the degree of freedom that the United States enjoyed to perform its remarkable growth. Brazil is in a similar position to the U.S. in 1900, but inserted in the political and economic structure conditioned by the new "world order" prevailing in the beginning of this 21st century. Brazil is being pushed toward ALCA. Time is running out and our ability to sustain our position with solid arguments is not being built. We cannot leave it to the bureaucrats, even the most competent. We cannot fail to force a broad discussion with Academia, the private sector and Congress. Fortunately there are some initiatives in this direction: the chairman of the House of Representatives, Mr. Aécio Neves, recently approved the formation of a nonpartisan commission, which will convene at the beginning of the second semester for a series of public hearings in which the idea is to deepen the discussion on ALCA. It is the opportunity for different sectors of society to come forward and present their arguments regarding the desirability (or not) and the conditions of our participation, protecting the interests of citizens and industrial sectors. Our diplomats are extremely competent, but it is not their place to design trade integration policies. It is up to society and the Congress, with the support of academia and the experience of the private sector, to deepen this analysis and try to understand what will become of the Brazilian economy within ALCA. Strictly speaking, one cannot be either for or against, since there are few studies about it. In fact, we do not have the necessary information. Maybe we're being unfair, but we do not believe that the Brazilian government has a serious, professional study, about the consequences for the economy of its integration into the ALCA. And what's worse, we do not have an adversarial academia able to shed light on the problem under different theoretical and empirical perspectives. The idea that under any circumstances, an association for free trade is completely beneficial is not only a scientific proposition: it is a manifestation of religious faith. There are, however, some practical issues to be preliminarily addressed, as claimed in a welcome speech by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso during the meeting of heads of state held in April in Quebec. The first one is the need to regulate the U.S. antidumping law, without which our participation in ALCA may be undesirable. Even Alan Greenspan admits that there "are often imposed (measures) on behalf of trade justice, but they are frequently used to prevent competition." Therefore the President is justified in defending the sharing of the management of the problem: "let us not go into that game as a country that has no voice or that has a colony mentality. As if it was a favor for us to join ALCA. It's not. It's business, tit for tat...". The President referred also to non-tariff restrictions (labor, health and environmental) that often introduce a veiled protectionism under the guise of low fares. At that point, his speech coincided with President Bush, with a different perspective, condemning the "self-defeating protectionism" that lurks behind those restrictions. There is no guarantee that practical consequences can be draw from these discourses, but as one can see, there is ample room to define important preliminary issues to our entry into ALCA.
publishDate 2008
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2008-06-25
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/article/view/12
url https://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/article/view/12
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
eng
spa
language por
eng
spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/article/view/12/12
https://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/article/view/12/2098
https://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/RAM/article/view/12/2099
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2015 Revista de Administração Mackenzie
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2015 Revista de Administração Mackenzie
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Editora Mackenzie
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Editora Mackenzie
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista de Administração Mackenzie; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2001)
Revista de Administração Mackenzie; Vol. 2 Núm. 1 (2001)
Revista de Administração Mackenzie (Mackenzie Management Review); v. 2 n. 1 (2001)
1678-6971
1518-6776
reponame:RAM. Revista de Administração Mackenzie
instname:Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (MACKENZIE)
instacron:MACKENZIE
instname_str Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (MACKENZIE)
instacron_str MACKENZIE
institution MACKENZIE
reponame_str RAM. Revista de Administração Mackenzie
collection RAM. Revista de Administração Mackenzie
repository.name.fl_str_mv RAM. Revista de Administração Mackenzie - Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (MACKENZIE)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revista.adm@mackenzie.br
_version_ 1796794715718287360