A fundamentação da moral no limite da razão em Kant
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2008 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional PUCRS |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3401 |
Resumo: | The thesis of the foundation of morality at the “boundaries of reason” in Kant is essentially grounded upon three principles: initially, the conception of noumena as a limit-concept and its respective determination of reason’s boundaries through the speculative-regulatory use of transcendental ideas; secondly, the defense of practical freedom; and, finally, Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason. In order to develop argumentation which supports such thesis it is examined concepts presented throughout the critical thinking which apparently do not undergo any criticism, but which, according to Kant, constitute the own “nature” of the human reason, such as “necessity” and “interest” of reason. It is defended the integration of these “dynamic” elements of reason in the discussion of central arguments of the Kant thinking not only to contribute to a better understanding of the Kant proposal of a rational foundation of morality, but also sets a “good term” concerning the “unity of reason”, having in mind that a moral principle demands such unity. It is emphasized Kant’s view according to which the determination of knowledge limits can only be grasped by something external to the very field of possible experience, that is, by transcendental ideas, necessary ideas of reason, and that in the determination of the limits of knowledge reason “sees around itself” an “empty space” in which “the moral ideas find a place out of the speculating field”.This “empty space” is examined, it is the only place where the moral ideas can occupy, that shows itself as a factor responsible not only for the “fragility” but also for the strength of Kant’s view in favor of a pure practical principle, and, specially, for the coherence of the entirety of Kant’s thinking. The fragility of moral arguments is shown as Kant has to justify a principle without any external resource to the very principle, and the strength of these very arguments is manifest in the fact that they are constituted in such a way as to “show” morality in its “essence”. |
id |
PUCR_3a28b753518e7d14e2490c7305f43240 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:meriva.pucrs.br:10923/3401 |
network_acronym_str |
PUCR |
network_name_str |
Repositório Institucional PUCRS |
repository_id_str |
2753 |
spelling |
Dejeanne, Solange de MoraesHamm, Christian2013-08-07T18:55:27Z2013-08-07T18:55:27Z2008http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3401The thesis of the foundation of morality at the “boundaries of reason” in Kant is essentially grounded upon three principles: initially, the conception of noumena as a limit-concept and its respective determination of reason’s boundaries through the speculative-regulatory use of transcendental ideas; secondly, the defense of practical freedom; and, finally, Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason. In order to develop argumentation which supports such thesis it is examined concepts presented throughout the critical thinking which apparently do not undergo any criticism, but which, according to Kant, constitute the own “nature” of the human reason, such as “necessity” and “interest” of reason. It is defended the integration of these “dynamic” elements of reason in the discussion of central arguments of the Kant thinking not only to contribute to a better understanding of the Kant proposal of a rational foundation of morality, but also sets a “good term” concerning the “unity of reason”, having in mind that a moral principle demands such unity. It is emphasized Kant’s view according to which the determination of knowledge limits can only be grasped by something external to the very field of possible experience, that is, by transcendental ideas, necessary ideas of reason, and that in the determination of the limits of knowledge reason “sees around itself” an “empty space” in which “the moral ideas find a place out of the speculating field”.This “empty space” is examined, it is the only place where the moral ideas can occupy, that shows itself as a factor responsible not only for the “fragility” but also for the strength of Kant’s view in favor of a pure practical principle, and, specially, for the coherence of the entirety of Kant’s thinking. The fragility of moral arguments is shown as Kant has to justify a principle without any external resource to the very principle, and the strength of these very arguments is manifest in the fact that they are constituted in such a way as to “show” morality in its “essence”.A tese da fundamentação da moral no “limite da razão” em Kant apóia-se principalmente em três argumentos: na concepção dos noumena como conceito-limite e respectiva determinação dos limites da razão pelo uso especulativo-regulativo das idéias transcendentais; na defesa da liberdade prática; e na doutrina kantiana do Facto da Razão. Para o desenvolvimento da argumentação, exploram-se conceitos presentes no pensamento crítico que aparentemente não são submetidos a qualquer crítica, mas que, segundo Kant, constituem a própria “natureza” da razão humana, tais como o de “necessidade” e “interesse” da razão. Defende-se a integração destes elementos “dinâmicos” da razão na discussão de argumentos centrais do pensamento kantiano não só no intuito de contribuir para uma melhor compreensão da proposta kantiana de uma fundamentação racional da moralidade, mas, principalmente, para chegar a um “bom termo” acerca da “unidade da razão”, tendo em vista que a justificação de um princípio moral puro exige tal unidade. Enfatiza-se a posição de Kant de que a determinação dos limites do conhecimento só pode realizar-se por algo externo ao próprio campo da experiência possível, isto é, por idéias transcendentais, idéias necessárias da razão, e que justamente, na determinação dos limites do conhecimento, a razão “vê ao redor de si” um “espaço vazio” no qual “as idéias morais encontram um lugar fora do campo da especulação”. Examina-se este “lugar vazio”, único lugar que as idéias morais podem ocupar, que se mostra como fator responsável tanto pela “fragilidade” quanto pela força dos argumentos de Kant em prol de um princípio prático puro, e, principalmente, pela coerência do pensamento kantiano no seu todo.A fragilidade dos argumentos morais mostra-se na medida em que, com eles, Kant tem de justificar um princípio sem qualquer recurso externo ao próprio princípio, e a força destes mesmos argumentos manifesta-se no fato de serem constituídos de tal modo que “mostram” a moral na sua “essência”.Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000401132-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 802388 bytes, checksum: 514208b0aeab6ad3b7f7646277fd7e9a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do SulPorto AlegreFILOSOFIA ALEMÃKANT, IMMANUEL - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃORAZÃO (FILOSOFIA)A fundamentação da moral no limite da razão em Kantinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisPontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do SulFaculdade de Filosofia e Ciências HumanasPrograma de Pós-Graduação em FilosofiaDoutorado2008porreponame:Repositório Institucional PUCRSinstname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)instacron:PUC_RSinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTEXT000401132-Texto+Completo-0.pdf.txt000401132-Texto+Completo-0.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain737481http://meriva.pucrs.br:8080/jspui/bitstream/10923/3401/3/000401132-Texto%2BCompleto-0.pdf.txt86e726eb9eab49dda7ba1ac8592d52e5MD53ORIGINAL000401132-Texto+Completo-0.pdfTexto Completoapplication/pdf802388http://meriva.pucrs.br:8080/jspui/bitstream/10923/3401/1/000401132-Texto%2BCompleto-0.pdf514208b0aeab6ad3b7f7646277fd7e9aMD51LICENSElicense.txttext/plain601http://meriva.pucrs.br:8080/jspui/bitstream/10923/3401/2/license.txt3d470ad030ca6782c9f44a1fb7650ec0MD5210923/34012017-09-28 09:40:36.432oai:meriva.pucrs.br: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Repositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://repositorio.pucrs.br/oai/request?verb=Identifyopendoar:27532017-09-28T12:40:36Repositório Institucional PUCRS - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)false |
dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
A fundamentação da moral no limite da razão em Kant |
title |
A fundamentação da moral no limite da razão em Kant |
spellingShingle |
A fundamentação da moral no limite da razão em Kant Dejeanne, Solange de Moraes FILOSOFIA ALEMÃ KANT, IMMANUEL - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO RAZÃO (FILOSOFIA) |
title_short |
A fundamentação da moral no limite da razão em Kant |
title_full |
A fundamentação da moral no limite da razão em Kant |
title_fullStr |
A fundamentação da moral no limite da razão em Kant |
title_full_unstemmed |
A fundamentação da moral no limite da razão em Kant |
title_sort |
A fundamentação da moral no limite da razão em Kant |
author |
Dejeanne, Solange de Moraes |
author_facet |
Dejeanne, Solange de Moraes |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Dejeanne, Solange de Moraes |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Hamm, Christian |
contributor_str_mv |
Hamm, Christian |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
FILOSOFIA ALEMÃ KANT, IMMANUEL - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO RAZÃO (FILOSOFIA) |
topic |
FILOSOFIA ALEMÃ KANT, IMMANUEL - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO RAZÃO (FILOSOFIA) |
description |
The thesis of the foundation of morality at the “boundaries of reason” in Kant is essentially grounded upon three principles: initially, the conception of noumena as a limit-concept and its respective determination of reason’s boundaries through the speculative-regulatory use of transcendental ideas; secondly, the defense of practical freedom; and, finally, Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason. In order to develop argumentation which supports such thesis it is examined concepts presented throughout the critical thinking which apparently do not undergo any criticism, but which, according to Kant, constitute the own “nature” of the human reason, such as “necessity” and “interest” of reason. It is defended the integration of these “dynamic” elements of reason in the discussion of central arguments of the Kant thinking not only to contribute to a better understanding of the Kant proposal of a rational foundation of morality, but also sets a “good term” concerning the “unity of reason”, having in mind that a moral principle demands such unity. It is emphasized Kant’s view according to which the determination of knowledge limits can only be grasped by something external to the very field of possible experience, that is, by transcendental ideas, necessary ideas of reason, and that in the determination of the limits of knowledge reason “sees around itself” an “empty space” in which “the moral ideas find a place out of the speculating field”.This “empty space” is examined, it is the only place where the moral ideas can occupy, that shows itself as a factor responsible not only for the “fragility” but also for the strength of Kant’s view in favor of a pure practical principle, and, specially, for the coherence of the entirety of Kant’s thinking. The fragility of moral arguments is shown as Kant has to justify a principle without any external resource to the very principle, and the strength of these very arguments is manifest in the fact that they are constituted in such a way as to “show” morality in its “essence”. |
publishDate |
2008 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2008 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2013-08-07T18:55:27Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2013-08-07T18:55:27Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3401 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3401 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul Porto Alegre |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul Porto Alegre |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Institucional PUCRS instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) instacron:PUC_RS |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
instacron_str |
PUC_RS |
institution |
PUC_RS |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional PUCRS |
collection |
Repositório Institucional PUCRS |
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv |
http://meriva.pucrs.br:8080/jspui/bitstream/10923/3401/3/000401132-Texto%2BCompleto-0.pdf.txt http://meriva.pucrs.br:8080/jspui/bitstream/10923/3401/1/000401132-Texto%2BCompleto-0.pdf http://meriva.pucrs.br:8080/jspui/bitstream/10923/3401/2/license.txt |
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv |
86e726eb9eab49dda7ba1ac8592d52e5 514208b0aeab6ad3b7f7646277fd7e9a 3d470ad030ca6782c9f44a1fb7650ec0 |
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv |
MD5 MD5 MD5 |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional PUCRS - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1817559037413163008 |