The winner’s curse in common value auctions: an experimental study on the Brazilian

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Vanzan, Danielle Mendes
Data de Publicação: 2008
Outros Autores: Avila, Marcos Gonçalves
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista Economia & Gestão
Texto Completo: http://periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/economiaegestao/article/view/1
Resumo: The “winner’s curse��? occurs when winning bidders of auctions systematically bid above the actual value of the objects and thereby systematically incur losses. In order to investigate the incidence of the winner’s curse in Brazil, we conducted an experiment consisting of a series of auctions of a fictitious object. The Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium model was adopted as the benchmark for the performance observed. The results provided partial support to the occurrence of the winner’s curse. No systematic losses occurred but the financial results in the auctions were significantly inferior to those predicted by the equilibrium model.
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spelling The winner’s curse in common value auctions: an experimental study on the Brazilianauctions systematicallybenchmark.The “winner’s curse��? occurs when winning bidders of auctions systematically bid above the actual value of the objects and thereby systematically incur losses. In order to investigate the incidence of the winner’s curse in Brazil, we conducted an experiment consisting of a series of auctions of a fictitious object. The Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium model was adopted as the benchmark for the performance observed. The results provided partial support to the occurrence of the winner’s curse. No systematic losses occurred but the financial results in the auctions were significantly inferior to those predicted by the equilibrium model.Editora PUC Minas2008-09-19info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/economiaegestao/article/view/1Revista Economia & Gestão; v. 8 n. 16 (2008): E&G - Jan/Abril (2008); 9-291984-66061678-8982reponame:Revista Economia & Gestãoinstname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (PUC Minas)instacron:PUC_MINSporhttp://periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/economiaegestao/article/view/1/1Vanzan, Danielle MendesAvila, Marcos Gonçalvesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-12-13T16:18:48Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/1Revistahttp://periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/economiaegestao/ONGhttp://periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/economiaegestao/oai||economiaegestao@pucminas.br|| marcrez@hotmail.com|| marcrez@hotmail.com1984-66061984-6606opendoar:2022-12-13T16:18:48Revista Economia & Gestão - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (PUC Minas)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The winner’s curse in common value auctions: an experimental study on the Brazilian
title The winner’s curse in common value auctions: an experimental study on the Brazilian
spellingShingle The winner’s curse in common value auctions: an experimental study on the Brazilian
Vanzan, Danielle Mendes
auctions systematically
benchmark.
title_short The winner’s curse in common value auctions: an experimental study on the Brazilian
title_full The winner’s curse in common value auctions: an experimental study on the Brazilian
title_fullStr The winner’s curse in common value auctions: an experimental study on the Brazilian
title_full_unstemmed The winner’s curse in common value auctions: an experimental study on the Brazilian
title_sort The winner’s curse in common value auctions: an experimental study on the Brazilian
author Vanzan, Danielle Mendes
author_facet Vanzan, Danielle Mendes
Avila, Marcos Gonçalves
author_role author
author2 Avila, Marcos Gonçalves
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Vanzan, Danielle Mendes
Avila, Marcos Gonçalves
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv auctions systematically
benchmark.
topic auctions systematically
benchmark.
description The “winner’s curse��? occurs when winning bidders of auctions systematically bid above the actual value of the objects and thereby systematically incur losses. In order to investigate the incidence of the winner’s curse in Brazil, we conducted an experiment consisting of a series of auctions of a fictitious object. The Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium model was adopted as the benchmark for the performance observed. The results provided partial support to the occurrence of the winner’s curse. No systematic losses occurred but the financial results in the auctions were significantly inferior to those predicted by the equilibrium model.
publishDate 2008
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2008-09-19
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/economiaegestao/article/view/1
url http://periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/economiaegestao/article/view/1
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/economiaegestao/article/view/1/1
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Editora PUC Minas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Editora PUC Minas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Economia & Gestão; v. 8 n. 16 (2008): E&G - Jan/Abril (2008); 9-29
1984-6606
1678-8982
reponame:Revista Economia & Gestão
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (PUC Minas)
instacron:PUC_MINS
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (PUC Minas)
instacron_str PUC_MINS
institution PUC_MINS
reponame_str Revista Economia & Gestão
collection Revista Economia & Gestão
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Economia & Gestão - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (PUC Minas)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||economiaegestao@pucminas.br|| marcrez@hotmail.com|| marcrez@hotmail.com
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