The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter (Part 2)

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Lane, Robert
Data de Publicação: 2012
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11605
Resumo: This is the second of two papers that examine Charles Peirce's denial that human beings have a faculty of intuition. In the first paper, I argued that in its metaphysical aspect, Peirce's denial of intuition amounts to the doctrine that there is no determinate boundary between the internal world of the cognizing subject and the external world that the subject cognizes. In the present paper, I argue that, properly understood, the "objective idealism" of Peirce's 1890s cosmological series is a more general iteration of the metaphysical aspect of his earlier denial of intuition. I also consider whether Peirce continued to deny that there is a definite boundary between the internal and external worlds in the years after the cosmological series.
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spelling The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter (Part 2)A Incapacidade Final: Peirce sobre Intuição e Continuidade da Mente e Matéria (Parte 2)Charles PeirceIntuiçãoCogniçãoGeneralidadeIndeterminaçãoContinuidadeIdealismo ObjetivoCharles PeirceIntuitionCognitionGeneralityIndeterminacyContinuityObjective idealismThis is the second of two papers that examine Charles Peirce's denial that human beings have a faculty of intuition. In the first paper, I argued that in its metaphysical aspect, Peirce's denial of intuition amounts to the doctrine that there is no determinate boundary between the internal world of the cognizing subject and the external world that the subject cognizes. In the present paper, I argue that, properly understood, the "objective idealism" of Peirce's 1890s cosmological series is a more general iteration of the metaphysical aspect of his earlier denial of intuition. I also consider whether Peirce continued to deny that there is a definite boundary between the internal and external worlds in the years after the cosmological series.Este é o segundo de dois artigos que examinam a recusa de Charles Peirce de que o ser humano possui uma faculdade de intuição. No primeiro artigo, afirmei que, em seu aspecto metafísico, a recusa de Peirce da intuição chega-se à doutrina de que não há fronteira determinada entre o mundo interno do sujeito cognoscente e o mundo externo que o sujeito conhece. Neste artigo, afirmo que o "idealismo objetivo" da série cosmológica de 1890 de Peirce é um plano mais geral do aspecto metafísico de sua primeira negação da intuição. Também considero que Peirce continuou a recusar uma fronteira definida entre os mundos interno e externos anos após as séries cosmológicas.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2012-09-21info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11605Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2011); 237-256Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 2 (2011); 237-2562316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11605/9898Copyright (c) 2012 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLane, Robert2024-07-01T13:09:30Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/11605Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:30Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter (Part 2)
A Incapacidade Final: Peirce sobre Intuição e Continuidade da Mente e Matéria (Parte 2)
title The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter (Part 2)
spellingShingle The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter (Part 2)
Lane, Robert
Charles Peirce
Intuição
Cognição
Generalidade
Indeterminação
Continuidade
Idealismo Objetivo
Charles Peirce
Intuition
Cognition
Generality
Indeterminacy
Continuity
Objective idealism
title_short The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter (Part 2)
title_full The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter (Part 2)
title_fullStr The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter (Part 2)
title_full_unstemmed The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter (Part 2)
title_sort The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter (Part 2)
author Lane, Robert
author_facet Lane, Robert
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Lane, Robert
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Charles Peirce
Intuição
Cognição
Generalidade
Indeterminação
Continuidade
Idealismo Objetivo
Charles Peirce
Intuition
Cognition
Generality
Indeterminacy
Continuity
Objective idealism
topic Charles Peirce
Intuição
Cognição
Generalidade
Indeterminação
Continuidade
Idealismo Objetivo
Charles Peirce
Intuition
Cognition
Generality
Indeterminacy
Continuity
Objective idealism
description This is the second of two papers that examine Charles Peirce's denial that human beings have a faculty of intuition. In the first paper, I argued that in its metaphysical aspect, Peirce's denial of intuition amounts to the doctrine that there is no determinate boundary between the internal world of the cognizing subject and the external world that the subject cognizes. In the present paper, I argue that, properly understood, the "objective idealism" of Peirce's 1890s cosmological series is a more general iteration of the metaphysical aspect of his earlier denial of intuition. I also consider whether Peirce continued to deny that there is a definite boundary between the internal and external worlds in the years after the cosmological series.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-09-21
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11605
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11605
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11605/9898
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2012 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2012 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2011); 237-256
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 2 (2011); 237-256
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
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