The Pragmatics of explanation: Remarks on van Fraassen’s theory of why-questions

• Autor(a) principal: Cani, Renato Cesar
• Data de Publicação: 2016
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/30211
• topic: Pragmatics of Explanation; Bas van Fraassen; Why-questions; Asymmetry; Realism.; Pragmática da Explicação; Bas van Franssen; Questões-por-quê; Assimetria; Realismo.

In this article, my aim is to analyze Bas van Fraassen’s pragmatic solution to two of the traditional problems concerning scientific explanation, namely, rejection and asymmetry. According to his view, an explanation is an answer to some request for information. The emergence of a question, as well as the evaluation of the explanations adduced, depends on considerations about contextual factors. In addition, I will evaluate the pertinence of objections raised by Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon against van Fraassen’s account. I will argue that their charge is not sound, for it actually misunderstands the role played by context in van Fraassen’s account. Although Salmon’s and Kitcher’s realist commitments motivate the point made by them, I will hold that a pragmatic account of explanation does not commit one to an anti-realist approach to science.