The problem of the epistemic character of norms and values in the Putnam-Habermas’ debate: A response from the theory of normativity of Clarence Irving Lewis

• Autor(a) principal: Sánchez García, Victoria Paz
• Data de Publicação: 2018
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/38082
• topic: Clarence Irving Lewis; Debate entre Habermas-Putnam; Normas; Objetividade; Valores; Clarence Irving Lewis; Habermas-Putnam’s debate; Norms; Objectivity; Values.

The question of the relationship between normativity and valuation and its embedment in rational discourse is one of the most relevant problems in contemporary philosophy and is clearly unfolded in all its complexities in the paradigmatic debate held by Hilary Putnam and Jürgen Habermas during the first decade of the 21st century. From positions that vindicate the tradition of American pragmatism, the philosophers discuss the objectivity of value and normative judgments defending, with significant differences, a cognitivist position. The present contribution will address this discussion with the purpose of presenting Clarence Irving Lewis’ conceptualist pragmatism as an alternative and fruitful position with resources to engage with some of the main issues discussed by Putnam and Habermas. My aim is to show the way Lewis accounts for the cognitive character of norms and values while maintaining, at the same time, a significant demarcation between both concepts. I will argue that this distinction is pragmatic ‑ not epistemic ‑, and that this allows the pragmatist to defend a cognitivism that can articulate a non-reductionist naturalism regarding values with a rationalist conception of norms; a position that could avoid some of the objections that face Putnam and Habermas.