The explanatory gap: the pragmatic deconstruction of a myth

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Araújo, Arthur
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/38075
Resumo: This paper presents the proposal to address the problem of an explanatory gap in the philosophy of mind. As an alternative to traditional approaches, I analyze the meaning of the explanatory gap according to James’s pragmatism in consonance with the perspective of ordinary language philosophy of Ryle, Austin, and Wittgenstein. As a strategy for developing the paper proposal, I try to show that the explanatory gap results from a misunderstanding on the uses of the psychological terms. The result is an obsessive insistence in entifying the meaning of ‘mind’ and the belief that some psychological terms mean a type of entity existing beyond their uses. Such belief takes the form of a foundationalist view understanding of the mental. What I try to show finally, and also in consonance with recent enactivist perspectives, is that the meaning of the psychological terms has nothing to do with the existence of (non-physical or physical) entities. The belief in such entities as a condition for meaning the psychological terms reveals a philosophical myth derived from the acceptance of the explanatory gap. The proposal of the paper is the philosophical demystification of the explanatory gap.
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spelling The explanatory gap: the pragmatic deconstruction of a mythA lacuna explicativa: a desconstrução pragmática de um mitoDeconstructionExplanatory gapMythPragmatism.DesconstruçãoLacuna explicativaMitoPragmatismo.This paper presents the proposal to address the problem of an explanatory gap in the philosophy of mind. As an alternative to traditional approaches, I analyze the meaning of the explanatory gap according to James’s pragmatism in consonance with the perspective of ordinary language philosophy of Ryle, Austin, and Wittgenstein. As a strategy for developing the paper proposal, I try to show that the explanatory gap results from a misunderstanding on the uses of the psychological terms. The result is an obsessive insistence in entifying the meaning of ‘mind’ and the belief that some psychological terms mean a type of entity existing beyond their uses. Such belief takes the form of a foundationalist view understanding of the mental. What I try to show finally, and also in consonance with recent enactivist perspectives, is that the meaning of the psychological terms has nothing to do with the existence of (non-physical or physical) entities. The belief in such entities as a condition for meaning the psychological terms reveals a philosophical myth derived from the acceptance of the explanatory gap. The proposal of the paper is the philosophical demystification of the explanatory gap.Este artigo apresenta a proposta de abordar o problema da lacuna explicativa na filosofia da mente. De modo alternativo às abordagens tradicionais, analiso o significado da lacuna explicativa segundo o pragmatismo de James em consonância com a perspectiva da filosofia da linguagem comum de Ryle, Austin e Wittgenstein. Como estratégia de desenvolvimento da proposta do artigo, procuro mostrar que a lacuna explicativa resulta de uma má compreensão dos usos dos termos psicológicos. O resultado é uma obsessiva insistência em entificar o significado de ‘mente’ e a crença de que alguns termos psicológicos significam um tipo de entidade existindo além dos nossos usos dos termos psicológicos. Tal crença assume a forma de uma compreensão da visão fundacionalista do mental. O que procuro mostrar finalmente, e também em consonância com as recentes perspectivas enativistas, é que o significado dos termos psicológicos nada tem a ver com a existência de entidades (não-físicas ou físicas). A crença em tais entidades, como condição de significação dos termos psicológicos, revela um mito filosófico derivado da aceitação da lacuna explicativa. A proposta do artigo é a desmitificação filosófica da lacuna explicativa.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2018-09-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/3807510.23925/2316-5278.2018v19i1p13-34Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 19 No. 1 (2018); 13-34Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 19 n. 1 (2018); 13-342316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/38075/26470Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAraújo, Arthur2018-09-06T15:15:11Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/38075Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2018-09-06T15:15:11Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The explanatory gap: the pragmatic deconstruction of a myth
A lacuna explicativa: a desconstrução pragmática de um mito
title The explanatory gap: the pragmatic deconstruction of a myth
spellingShingle The explanatory gap: the pragmatic deconstruction of a myth
Araújo, Arthur
Deconstruction
Explanatory gap
Myth
Pragmatism.
Desconstrução
Lacuna explicativa
Mito
Pragmatismo.
title_short The explanatory gap: the pragmatic deconstruction of a myth
title_full The explanatory gap: the pragmatic deconstruction of a myth
title_fullStr The explanatory gap: the pragmatic deconstruction of a myth
title_full_unstemmed The explanatory gap: the pragmatic deconstruction of a myth
title_sort The explanatory gap: the pragmatic deconstruction of a myth
author Araújo, Arthur
author_facet Araújo, Arthur
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Araújo, Arthur
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Deconstruction
Explanatory gap
Myth
Pragmatism.
Desconstrução
Lacuna explicativa
Mito
Pragmatismo.
topic Deconstruction
Explanatory gap
Myth
Pragmatism.
Desconstrução
Lacuna explicativa
Mito
Pragmatismo.
description This paper presents the proposal to address the problem of an explanatory gap in the philosophy of mind. As an alternative to traditional approaches, I analyze the meaning of the explanatory gap according to James’s pragmatism in consonance with the perspective of ordinary language philosophy of Ryle, Austin, and Wittgenstein. As a strategy for developing the paper proposal, I try to show that the explanatory gap results from a misunderstanding on the uses of the psychological terms. The result is an obsessive insistence in entifying the meaning of ‘mind’ and the belief that some psychological terms mean a type of entity existing beyond their uses. Such belief takes the form of a foundationalist view understanding of the mental. What I try to show finally, and also in consonance with recent enactivist perspectives, is that the meaning of the psychological terms has nothing to do with the existence of (non-physical or physical) entities. The belief in such entities as a condition for meaning the psychological terms reveals a philosophical myth derived from the acceptance of the explanatory gap. The proposal of the paper is the philosophical demystification of the explanatory gap.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-06
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/38075
10.23925/2316-5278.2018v19i1p13-34
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/38075
identifier_str_mv 10.23925/2316-5278.2018v19i1p13-34
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/38075/26470
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 19 No. 1 (2018); 13-34
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 19 n. 1 (2018); 13-34
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
_version_ 1803387421813899265

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