The Meaning of Firstness in Schelling, Schopenhauer and Peirce

• Autor(a) principal: Ibri, Ivo Assad
• Data de Publicação: 2013
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/12979
• topic: Firstness; Freedom; Contemplation; Chance; Determinism; Absolute; Primeiridade; Liberdade; Contemplação; Acaso; Determinismo; Absoluto.

Notwithstanding the concept of firstness has been conceived by C. S.Peirce (1839-1914), its roots was already present in the past history ofphilosophy. Particularly, Schelling and Schopenhauer were thinkers whoworked out this concept, each one under their theoretical context ofphilosophical problems. Peirce is confessedly an heir of Schelling – his ownconcept of firstness, besides other Schellingean heritages he holds, is somehowinspired by the German thinker. However, when we consider Schopenhauer,firstness exclusively appears as an experience of contemplation, which is, toPeirce, only one dimension of the inner human experience under this category.In fact, Peirce’s conception goes further, extending and spreading it to theoutward world in the general form of Chance, while Schopenhauer keeps theKantean determinism, conceiving Nature under strict causality and necessity.This paper will try to show, then, similarities and differences among theseauthors on the concept of firstness, which, actually, has its common theoretical territory in the old classical idea of freedom, emphasizing, nevertheless, theextreme importance of it to all three philosophical systems.