Representations of Imaginary, Nonexistent, or Nonfigurative Objects
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13552 |
Resumo: | According to the logical positivists, signs (words and pictures) of imaginary beings have no referent (Goodman). The semiotic theory behind this assumption is dualistic and Cartesian: signs vs. nonsigns as well as the mental vs. the material world are in fundamental opposition. Peirce’s semiotics is based on the premise of the sign as a mediator between such opposites: signs do not refer to referents, they represent objects to a mind, but the object of a sign can be existent or nonexistent, a feeling or an idea, something merely imaginary or even something false. The paper examines the nature of imaginary, nonexistent, and nonfigurative objects, such as unicorns, phoenixes, or nonrepresentative paintings, and shows why verbal or visual representations of imaginary beings and even nonfigurative paintings, which seem to represent nothing, are fully developed signs with a variety of objects determining their representation. |
id |
PUC_SP-15_c064453bb69b5c4f545681b920b88eed |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13552 |
network_acronym_str |
PUC_SP-15 |
network_name_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Representations of Imaginary, Nonexistent, or Nonfigurative ObjectsRepresentações de Objetos Imaginários, Não-existentes ou Não-figurativosRepresentaçãoObjeto do signoReferenteFigurasCharles S. PeirceNelson GoodmanRepresentationObject of the signReferentPicturesCharles S. PeirceNelson GoodmanAccording to the logical positivists, signs (words and pictures) of imaginary beings have no referent (Goodman). The semiotic theory behind this assumption is dualistic and Cartesian: signs vs. nonsigns as well as the mental vs. the material world are in fundamental opposition. Peirce’s semiotics is based on the premise of the sign as a mediator between such opposites: signs do not refer to referents, they represent objects to a mind, but the object of a sign can be existent or nonexistent, a feeling or an idea, something merely imaginary or even something false. The paper examines the nature of imaginary, nonexistent, and nonfigurative objects, such as unicorns, phoenixes, or nonrepresentative paintings, and shows why verbal or visual representations of imaginary beings and even nonfigurative paintings, which seem to represent nothing, are fully developed signs with a variety of objects determining their representation.De acordo com os positivistas lógicos, signos (palavras e figuras) de seres imaginários não têm referentes (Goodman). A teoria semiótica por trás dessa assunção é dualista e cartesiana: signos e não-signos, assim como também mundo mental e mundo material estão em franca oposição. A semiótica de Peirce é baseada na premissa do signo como mediador entre esses opostos: signos não se referem a referentes, eles representam objetos a uma mente, mas o objeto de um signo pode ser existente ou não-existente, um sentimento ou uma idéia, algo meramente imaginário ou até mesmo falso. O artigo examina a natureza de objetos imaginários, não-existentes e não figurativos, tais como unicórnios, fênixes ou pinturas não-representativas, mostrando por que representações verbais ou visuais de seres imaginários e até mesmo pinturas não-representativas, que parecem não representar nada, são signos completamente desenvolvidos com uma variedade de objetos que determina sua representação.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-02-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13552Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 7 No. 2 (2006); 277-291Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 7 n. 2 (2006); 277-2912316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13552/10068Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessNöth, Winfried2024-07-01T13:09:36Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13552Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:36Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Representations of Imaginary, Nonexistent, or Nonfigurative Objects Representações de Objetos Imaginários, Não-existentes ou Não-figurativos |
title |
Representations of Imaginary, Nonexistent, or Nonfigurative Objects |
spellingShingle |
Representations of Imaginary, Nonexistent, or Nonfigurative Objects Nöth, Winfried Representação Objeto do signo Referente Figuras Charles S. Peirce Nelson Goodman Representation Object of the sign Referent Pictures Charles S. Peirce Nelson Goodman |
title_short |
Representations of Imaginary, Nonexistent, or Nonfigurative Objects |
title_full |
Representations of Imaginary, Nonexistent, or Nonfigurative Objects |
title_fullStr |
Representations of Imaginary, Nonexistent, or Nonfigurative Objects |
title_full_unstemmed |
Representations of Imaginary, Nonexistent, or Nonfigurative Objects |
title_sort |
Representations of Imaginary, Nonexistent, or Nonfigurative Objects |
author |
Nöth, Winfried |
author_facet |
Nöth, Winfried |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Nöth, Winfried |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Representação Objeto do signo Referente Figuras Charles S. Peirce Nelson Goodman Representation Object of the sign Referent Pictures Charles S. Peirce Nelson Goodman |
topic |
Representação Objeto do signo Referente Figuras Charles S. Peirce Nelson Goodman Representation Object of the sign Referent Pictures Charles S. Peirce Nelson Goodman |
description |
According to the logical positivists, signs (words and pictures) of imaginary beings have no referent (Goodman). The semiotic theory behind this assumption is dualistic and Cartesian: signs vs. nonsigns as well as the mental vs. the material world are in fundamental opposition. Peirce’s semiotics is based on the premise of the sign as a mediator between such opposites: signs do not refer to referents, they represent objects to a mind, but the object of a sign can be existent or nonexistent, a feeling or an idea, something merely imaginary or even something false. The paper examines the nature of imaginary, nonexistent, and nonfigurative objects, such as unicorns, phoenixes, or nonrepresentative paintings, and shows why verbal or visual representations of imaginary beings and even nonfigurative paintings, which seem to represent nothing, are fully developed signs with a variety of objects determining their representation. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-02-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13552 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13552 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13552/10068 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 7 No. 2 (2006); 277-291 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 7 n. 2 (2006); 277-291 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1803387421243473920 |