The Role of Revision in Dewey’s Inquiry and Ethics

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Livet, Pierre
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13251
Resumo: According to Dewey inquiry proceeds from uncertainty to integration and control. Even if Dewey pays attention to the incompleteness of nature, to the modification and revision of primary generalizations by more elaborated conceptions, to the necessity of introducing changes in the world in order to carry an experimental inquiry, to the possibility of re-determine the interdependent constituents in a “transaction”, he seems not to be aware of the instability that this process of revision implies: we do not know in advance whether a newly undertaken revision is a progress or a waste of time. If we accept this consequence of pragmatism, how can we be confident in the truth of our beliefs, if we know in advance that most of them are to be revised, and that even if our belief is by chance a really true one, it could be reasonable some day to pay attention to some counter-argument that would induce us to revise it. How can be maintained the practical force of an obligation, if all norms are to be revised someday, and if we never know whether our favorite norms are really not been revised? The stability that pragmatism seems to aim at could be obtained by studying the relation between two opposite revisions, where some properties of symmetry and fairness can be required and defined, in a “transactional” fashion that is reminiscent of Dewey. When these properties are not satisfied, it will be true forever that we are and will be entitled to require a revision of the situation. But then, the core of pragmatism is the revolt against what is unfair, a negative content. On the contrary, Dewey has always insisted upon the positive effect of negative situations, seeing failure as learning and negation as positive determination.
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spelling The Role of Revision in Dewey’s Inquiry and EthicsO papel da revisão na investigação e ética em DeweypragmatismDeweyinquiryrevisionethicsdemocracytransactionpragmatismoDeweyinquiriçãorevisãoéticademocraciatransaçãoAccording to Dewey inquiry proceeds from uncertainty to integration and control. Even if Dewey pays attention to the incompleteness of nature, to the modification and revision of primary generalizations by more elaborated conceptions, to the necessity of introducing changes in the world in order to carry an experimental inquiry, to the possibility of re-determine the interdependent constituents in a “transaction”, he seems not to be aware of the instability that this process of revision implies: we do not know in advance whether a newly undertaken revision is a progress or a waste of time. If we accept this consequence of pragmatism, how can we be confident in the truth of our beliefs, if we know in advance that most of them are to be revised, and that even if our belief is by chance a really true one, it could be reasonable some day to pay attention to some counter-argument that would induce us to revise it. How can be maintained the practical force of an obligation, if all norms are to be revised someday, and if we never know whether our favorite norms are really not been revised? The stability that pragmatism seems to aim at could be obtained by studying the relation between two opposite revisions, where some properties of symmetry and fairness can be required and defined, in a “transactional” fashion that is reminiscent of Dewey. When these properties are not satisfied, it will be true forever that we are and will be entitled to require a revision of the situation. But then, the core of pragmatism is the revolt against what is unfair, a negative content. On the contrary, Dewey has always insisted upon the positive effect of negative situations, seeing failure as learning and negation as positive determination.Segundo Dewey, a investigação procede da incerteza à integração e ao controle. Mesmo Dewey prestando atenção à incompletude da natureza, à modificação e revisão das generalizações por concepções mais elaboradas, à necessidade de introduzir mudanças no mundo de forma que conduza a uma investigação experimental, à possibilidade de re-determinar os constituintes interdependentes em uma “transação”, ele parece não estar consciente da instabilidade que esse processo de revisão implica: nós não sabemos de antemão se uma nova revisão realizada é um progresso ou uma perda de tempo. Se aceitarmos essa conseqüência do pragmatismo, como podemos estar confiantes na veracidade de nossas crenças, já que sabemos de antemão que a maior parte delas deverá ser revisada? E mesmo se nossa crença for efetivamente verdadeira, poderia ser razoável algum dia prestar atenção a algum contra-argumento que poderia induzir-nos a revisá-la. Como pode ser mantida a força prática de uma obrigação, se todas as normas deverão ser revisadas algum dia, e se nunca sabemos se nossas normas favoritas não estão efetivamente sendo revisadas? A estabilidade que o pragmatismo parece buscar poderia ser obtida estudando-se a relação entre duas revisões opostas, em que algumas propriedades de simetria e justiça podem ser requeridas e definidas, em uma maneira “transacional” ao modo de Dewey. Quando essas propriedades não são satisfeitas, será verdadeiro para sempre que nós estamos e seremos encarregados de requerer uma revisão da situação. Mas, então, o centro do pragmatismo é a revolta contra o que é injusto, um conteúdo negativo. Ao contrário, Dewey sempre insistiu sobre o efeito positivo das situações negativas, enxergando o erro como aprendizado e a negação como determinação positiva.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13251Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; No. 3 (2002); 53-63Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; n. 3 (2002); 53-632316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13251/9766Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLivet, Pierre2024-07-01T13:09:31Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13251Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:31Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Role of Revision in Dewey’s Inquiry and Ethics
O papel da revisão na investigação e ética em Dewey
title The Role of Revision in Dewey’s Inquiry and Ethics
spellingShingle The Role of Revision in Dewey’s Inquiry and Ethics
Livet, Pierre
pragmatism
Dewey
inquiry
revision
ethics
democracy
transaction
pragmatismo
Dewey
inquirição
revisão
ética
democracia
transação
title_short The Role of Revision in Dewey’s Inquiry and Ethics
title_full The Role of Revision in Dewey’s Inquiry and Ethics
title_fullStr The Role of Revision in Dewey’s Inquiry and Ethics
title_full_unstemmed The Role of Revision in Dewey’s Inquiry and Ethics
title_sort The Role of Revision in Dewey’s Inquiry and Ethics
author Livet, Pierre
author_facet Livet, Pierre
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Livet, Pierre
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv pragmatism
Dewey
inquiry
revision
ethics
democracy
transaction
pragmatismo
Dewey
inquirição
revisão
ética
democracia
transação
topic pragmatism
Dewey
inquiry
revision
ethics
democracy
transaction
pragmatismo
Dewey
inquirição
revisão
ética
democracia
transação
description According to Dewey inquiry proceeds from uncertainty to integration and control. Even if Dewey pays attention to the incompleteness of nature, to the modification and revision of primary generalizations by more elaborated conceptions, to the necessity of introducing changes in the world in order to carry an experimental inquiry, to the possibility of re-determine the interdependent constituents in a “transaction”, he seems not to be aware of the instability that this process of revision implies: we do not know in advance whether a newly undertaken revision is a progress or a waste of time. If we accept this consequence of pragmatism, how can we be confident in the truth of our beliefs, if we know in advance that most of them are to be revised, and that even if our belief is by chance a really true one, it could be reasonable some day to pay attention to some counter-argument that would induce us to revise it. How can be maintained the practical force of an obligation, if all norms are to be revised someday, and if we never know whether our favorite norms are really not been revised? The stability that pragmatism seems to aim at could be obtained by studying the relation between two opposite revisions, where some properties of symmetry and fairness can be required and defined, in a “transactional” fashion that is reminiscent of Dewey. When these properties are not satisfied, it will be true forever that we are and will be entitled to require a revision of the situation. But then, the core of pragmatism is the revolt against what is unfair, a negative content. On the contrary, Dewey has always insisted upon the positive effect of negative situations, seeing failure as learning and negation as positive determination.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-01-09
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13251
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13251
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13251/9766
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; No. 3 (2002); 53-63
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; n. 3 (2002); 53-63
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
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reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
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