On a Pragmatic Theory of Meaning and Knowledge

• Autor(a) principal: Hilpinen, Risto
• Data de Publicação: 2013
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13197
• topic: Ação; Investigação; Conhecimento; Significação; Peirce; Pragmatismo; Preceito; Action; Inquiry; Knowledge; Meaning; Peirce; Pragmatism; Precept

According to C. S. Peirce, there are two ways of explaining what a sign (an expression or a concept) means, namely, a definition and a precept. A precept tells the interpreters of a sign what the sign means by prescribing what they have to do in order to find or become acquainted with an object of the sign. A precept for a concept specifies how an interpreter can determine whether the concept is applicable to a given situation or object. Peirce accepted the scholastic definition of truth, according to which a proposition is true if and only if its subject and predicate refer to the same thing, and applied this analysis to complex as well as singular propositions. However, this account does not tell how an interpreter can become acquainted with the objects of the predicate “true,” that is, true propositions: it is not a good precept for the concept of truth. On the other hand, the so-called pragmatic conception of truth, truth as the limit or end of inquiry, can be regarded as a precept for truth, or as a general form of such a precept. The requirement that concepts should have precepts attached to them is a version of Peirce’s principle of pragmatism. (Concepts without precepts are meaningless.) The availability of precepts should make it possible for an interpreter (inquirer) to determine whether a concept is applicable to a given situation, or whether a given proposition is true. Thus the principle of pragmatism is closely related to the principle knowability, according to which any truth should be knowable. Some formulations of the principle of knowability lead to a paradox. The paper discusses several forms of the principle of knowability, and it is argued that the existence of precept for a proposition entails only a relatively weak form of the principle.