Science Beyond the Self: Remarks on Charles S. Peirce’s Social Epistemology

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Waal, Cornelis de
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13591
Resumo: For Peirce, science is decidedly a social enterprise. However, since Peirce defined science broadly as “the devoted, well-considered, life pursuit of knowledge,” what he said of science applies by and large to the acquisition and assessment of knowledge in general. In this paper I aim to shed light on Peirce’s social epistemology by examining his views on scientific inquiry in the light of his philosophy of mind. I will argue that how Peirce recasts key concepts such as self, mind, thought, and person, has deep repercussions for how to interpret inquiry and assess its end product. The argument I present combines Peirce’s notion of the scientific method as the fourth and most stable manner of fixing our beliefs developed in the late 1870s in Popular Science Monthly, with his notion of the self as he expressed in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy a decade earlier.
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spelling Science Beyond the Self: Remarks on Charles S. Peirce’s Social EpistemologyCiência Além do Ego: Observações sobre a Epistemologia Social de Charles S. PeirceDescartes. (Social) EpistemologyMindPeircePersonSelfScienceThoughtDescartesEpistemologia (social)MentePeircePessoaSelfPensamentoFor Peirce, science is decidedly a social enterprise. However, since Peirce defined science broadly as “the devoted, well-considered, life pursuit of knowledge,” what he said of science applies by and large to the acquisition and assessment of knowledge in general. In this paper I aim to shed light on Peirce’s social epistemology by examining his views on scientific inquiry in the light of his philosophy of mind. I will argue that how Peirce recasts key concepts such as self, mind, thought, and person, has deep repercussions for how to interpret inquiry and assess its end product. The argument I present combines Peirce’s notion of the scientific method as the fourth and most stable manner of fixing our beliefs developed in the late 1870s in Popular Science Monthly, with his notion of the self as he expressed in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy a decade earlier.Para Peirce, a ciência é decididamente um empreendimento social. Entretanto, uma vez que Peirce definiu ciência de modo genérico como “a busca permanente, dedicada e ponderada do conhecimento”, o que ele disse da ciência se aplica, grosso modo, à aquisição e avaliação de conhecimento em geral. Neste trabalho, pretendo fazer alguns comentários sobre a epistemologia de Peirce, analisando suas opiniões vis-à-vis a investigação científica à luz da sua filosofia da mente. Argüirei como a forma pela qual Peirce redefine conceitos-chave como ego, mente, pensamento e pessoa têm repercussões profundas na interpretação da investigação e avaliação do seu produto final. O argumento que apresento combina a noção de Peirce sobre o método científico como a quarta e mais estável maneira de fixar nossas crenças, desenvolvida no final da década de 1870 em Popular Science Monthly, com sua noção de ego como expressa no Journal of Speculativa Philosophy, uma década antes.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2018-06-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13591Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 7 No. 1 (2006); 149-164Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 7 n. 1 (2006); 149-1642316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13591/10101Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessWaal, Cornelis de2018-06-30T20:48:01Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13591Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2018-06-30T20:48:01Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Science Beyond the Self: Remarks on Charles S. Peirce’s Social Epistemology
Ciência Além do Ego: Observações sobre a Epistemologia Social de Charles S. Peirce
title Science Beyond the Self: Remarks on Charles S. Peirce’s Social Epistemology
spellingShingle Science Beyond the Self: Remarks on Charles S. Peirce’s Social Epistemology
Waal, Cornelis de
Descartes. (Social) Epistemology
Mind
Peirce
Person
Self
Science
Thought
Descartes
Epistemologia (social)
Mente
Peirce
Pessoa
Self
Pensamento
title_short Science Beyond the Self: Remarks on Charles S. Peirce’s Social Epistemology
title_full Science Beyond the Self: Remarks on Charles S. Peirce’s Social Epistemology
title_fullStr Science Beyond the Self: Remarks on Charles S. Peirce’s Social Epistemology
title_full_unstemmed Science Beyond the Self: Remarks on Charles S. Peirce’s Social Epistemology
title_sort Science Beyond the Self: Remarks on Charles S. Peirce’s Social Epistemology
author Waal, Cornelis de
author_facet Waal, Cornelis de
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Waal, Cornelis de
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Descartes. (Social) Epistemology
Mind
Peirce
Person
Self
Science
Thought
Descartes
Epistemologia (social)
Mente
Peirce
Pessoa
Self
Pensamento
topic Descartes. (Social) Epistemology
Mind
Peirce
Person
Self
Science
Thought
Descartes
Epistemologia (social)
Mente
Peirce
Pessoa
Self
Pensamento
description For Peirce, science is decidedly a social enterprise. However, since Peirce defined science broadly as “the devoted, well-considered, life pursuit of knowledge,” what he said of science applies by and large to the acquisition and assessment of knowledge in general. In this paper I aim to shed light on Peirce’s social epistemology by examining his views on scientific inquiry in the light of his philosophy of mind. I will argue that how Peirce recasts key concepts such as self, mind, thought, and person, has deep repercussions for how to interpret inquiry and assess its end product. The argument I present combines Peirce’s notion of the scientific method as the fourth and most stable manner of fixing our beliefs developed in the late 1870s in Popular Science Monthly, with his notion of the self as he expressed in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy a decade earlier.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-06-30
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13591
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13591
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13591/10101
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 7 No. 1 (2006); 149-164
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 7 n. 1 (2006); 149-164
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
_version_ 1803387421267591168

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