Superextension, Modal Assertability, and Hypothetical Discernibility:: Bertrand Russell's theory of the content of speculative strategies and his compatibility with a coherentist solution
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/58724 |
Resumo: | We argue that Russell’s treatment of propositions containing non-existent denotations is the prelude of a strategy for discerning the predictive content of any proposition with descriptions (and incomplete symbols), insofar as its indeterminacy is classifiable as a possible extension. We argue, further, that Russell’s theory of propositional functions is dedicated to explaining the discernibility of hypothetical propositions, through representing (what we call) the superextension of assertoric modal propositions. The indeterminacy of the truth of hypothetical propositions is thus paired with a second- order classification condition, expressing its conjectural content as the projected scope of instantiation of a propositional function; which in turn is the superextension of a modal predicate. Russell’s theory is his non-pragmatic answer to the problem of assertability in unstable and uncertain conditions. It involves a sophisticated thesis about the discernibility of complex contents, such as those represented by analogical and approximate denotations (descriptions, fictions, etc.), which classify more than one possibility of instantiation in different modal and intensional contexts. We will conclude this article by testing the assumption that Russell’s theory favors a coherentist theory, seeing that as it admits assertability conditions that are super-mapped in a system, or that derive from different orders of referential layers. |
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Superextension, Modal Assertability, and Hypothetical Discernibility:: Bertrand Russell's theory of the content of speculative strategies and his compatibility with a coherentist solutionSuperextensão, assertabilidade modal e discernibilidade hipotética: a teoria de Bertrand Russell sobre o conteúdo de estratégias especulativas e sua compatibilidade com uma solução coerentista We argue that Russell’s treatment of propositions containing non-existent denotations is the prelude of a strategy for discerning the predictive content of any proposition with descriptions (and incomplete symbols), insofar as its indeterminacy is classifiable as a possible extension. We argue, further, that Russell’s theory of propositional functions is dedicated to explaining the discernibility of hypothetical propositions, through representing (what we call) the superextension of assertoric modal propositions. The indeterminacy of the truth of hypothetical propositions is thus paired with a second- order classification condition, expressing its conjectural content as the projected scope of instantiation of a propositional function; which in turn is the superextension of a modal predicate. Russell’s theory is his non-pragmatic answer to the problem of assertability in unstable and uncertain conditions. It involves a sophisticated thesis about the discernibility of complex contents, such as those represented by analogical and approximate denotations (descriptions, fictions, etc.), which classify more than one possibility of instantiation in different modal and intensional contexts. We will conclude this article by testing the assumption that Russell’s theory favors a coherentist theory, seeing that as it admits assertability conditions that are super-mapped in a system, or that derive from different orders of referential layers. Argumentamos que o tratamento de Russell de proposições contendo denotações inexistentes é o prelúdio de uma estratégia para discernir o conteúdo preditivo de qualquer proposição com descrições (e símbolos incompletos), na medida em que sua indeterminação é classificável como uma extensão possível. Argumentamos, ainda, que a teoria das funções proposicionais de Russell se dedica a explicar a discernibilidade de proposições hipotéticas, por meio da representação (o que chamamos) da superextensão de proposições modais assertóricas. A indeterminação da verdade de proposições hipotéticas é, assim, emparelhada com uma condição de classificação de segunda ordem, expressando seu conteúdo conjectural como o escopo projetado de instanciação de umafunção proposicional; que por sua vez é a superextensão de um predicado modal. A teoria de Russell é sua resposta não pragmática ao problema da assertabilidade em condições instáveis e incertas. Trata-se de uma tese sofisticada sobre a discernibilidade de conteúdos complexos, como aqueles representados por denotações analógicas e aproximadas (descrições, ficções etc.), que classificam mais de uma possibilidade de instanciação em diferentes contextos modais e intensionais. Concluiremos este artigo testando o pressuposto de que a teoria de Russell favorece uma teoria coerentista, visto que admite condições de assertibilidade que são supermapeadas em um sistema, ou que derivam de diferentes ordens de camadas referenciais. Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2022-11-18info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/5872410.23925/2316-5278.2022v23i1:e58724Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 23 No. 1 (2022): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; e58724Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 23 n. 1 (2022): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; e587242316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/58724/40967Copyright (c) 2022 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVollet, Lucas Ribeiro2023-01-23T11:50:17Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/58724Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2023-01-23T11:50:17Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Superextension, Modal Assertability, and Hypothetical Discernibility:: Bertrand Russell's theory of the content of speculative strategies and his compatibility with a coherentist solution Superextensão, assertabilidade modal e discernibilidade hipotética: a teoria de Bertrand Russell sobre o conteúdo de estratégias especulativas e sua compatibilidade com uma solução coerentista |
title |
Superextension, Modal Assertability, and Hypothetical Discernibility:: Bertrand Russell's theory of the content of speculative strategies and his compatibility with a coherentist solution |
spellingShingle |
Superextension, Modal Assertability, and Hypothetical Discernibility:: Bertrand Russell's theory of the content of speculative strategies and his compatibility with a coherentist solution Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro |
title_short |
Superextension, Modal Assertability, and Hypothetical Discernibility:: Bertrand Russell's theory of the content of speculative strategies and his compatibility with a coherentist solution |
title_full |
Superextension, Modal Assertability, and Hypothetical Discernibility:: Bertrand Russell's theory of the content of speculative strategies and his compatibility with a coherentist solution |
title_fullStr |
Superextension, Modal Assertability, and Hypothetical Discernibility:: Bertrand Russell's theory of the content of speculative strategies and his compatibility with a coherentist solution |
title_full_unstemmed |
Superextension, Modal Assertability, and Hypothetical Discernibility:: Bertrand Russell's theory of the content of speculative strategies and his compatibility with a coherentist solution |
title_sort |
Superextension, Modal Assertability, and Hypothetical Discernibility:: Bertrand Russell's theory of the content of speculative strategies and his compatibility with a coherentist solution |
author |
Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro |
author_facet |
Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro |
description |
We argue that Russell’s treatment of propositions containing non-existent denotations is the prelude of a strategy for discerning the predictive content of any proposition with descriptions (and incomplete symbols), insofar as its indeterminacy is classifiable as a possible extension. We argue, further, that Russell’s theory of propositional functions is dedicated to explaining the discernibility of hypothetical propositions, through representing (what we call) the superextension of assertoric modal propositions. The indeterminacy of the truth of hypothetical propositions is thus paired with a second- order classification condition, expressing its conjectural content as the projected scope of instantiation of a propositional function; which in turn is the superextension of a modal predicate. Russell’s theory is his non-pragmatic answer to the problem of assertability in unstable and uncertain conditions. It involves a sophisticated thesis about the discernibility of complex contents, such as those represented by analogical and approximate denotations (descriptions, fictions, etc.), which classify more than one possibility of instantiation in different modal and intensional contexts. We will conclude this article by testing the assumption that Russell’s theory favors a coherentist theory, seeing that as it admits assertability conditions that are super-mapped in a system, or that derive from different orders of referential layers. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-11-18 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/58724 10.23925/2316-5278.2022v23i1:e58724 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/58724 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.23925/2316-5278.2022v23i1:e58724 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/58724/40967 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 23 No. 1 (2022): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; e58724 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 23 n. 1 (2022): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; e58724 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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1803387422392713217 |