Rorty’s neopragmatism
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13568 |
Resumo: | Rorty puts pragmatism in a new and revitalized rout. Inspired by Wittgenstein, Dewey and Heidegger, he criticizes the philosophic tradition centered in representation, showing that it is an obstacle to the “pragmatized culture.” In this kind of culture conversation and justification really matter, and the guide to knowledge is not the mind as mirror of nature, but cultural practices through which it is possible to obtain objective truth. Nevertheless, objective truth is not the central problem, nor the only aim of an epistemological procedure. It is obtained by the application of justification, in the contexts of normal discourse. Instead of asking for a unique algorithm, a solid foundation, we must open philosophy to conversation. The label “relativism” (considered as a danger to truth, to ethics and politics) is not appropriate to characterize Rorty’s thought. Indeed, he contests the relation scheme/content following Davidson. So truth does not depend upon the notion of scheme; idealism and relativism concern the systematic philosophy that claims for definite criteria for knowledge. If knowledge will be considered not as method to obtain truth, but as a part of a process that mostly get better comprehension of ourselves, then philosophy will have the role of auxiliary instrument to the humanity conversation and not of cultural judge. If mind will not be seen as a receptacle of ideas that represent reality, and be seen instead as element that compounds some of our activities, what is understood on basis of certain language games, then we will not need a science to decipher what we are. |
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Rorty’s neopragmatismO Neopragmatismo de R. RortyNeopragmatismCritic of the theory of representationJustificationConversationObjectivityNeopragmatismoCrítica do representacionismoJustificaçãoConversaçãoObjetividadeRorty puts pragmatism in a new and revitalized rout. Inspired by Wittgenstein, Dewey and Heidegger, he criticizes the philosophic tradition centered in representation, showing that it is an obstacle to the “pragmatized culture.” In this kind of culture conversation and justification really matter, and the guide to knowledge is not the mind as mirror of nature, but cultural practices through which it is possible to obtain objective truth. Nevertheless, objective truth is not the central problem, nor the only aim of an epistemological procedure. It is obtained by the application of justification, in the contexts of normal discourse. Instead of asking for a unique algorithm, a solid foundation, we must open philosophy to conversation. The label “relativism” (considered as a danger to truth, to ethics and politics) is not appropriate to characterize Rorty’s thought. Indeed, he contests the relation scheme/content following Davidson. So truth does not depend upon the notion of scheme; idealism and relativism concern the systematic philosophy that claims for definite criteria for knowledge. If knowledge will be considered not as method to obtain truth, but as a part of a process that mostly get better comprehension of ourselves, then philosophy will have the role of auxiliary instrument to the humanity conversation and not of cultural judge. If mind will not be seen as a receptacle of ideas that represent reality, and be seen instead as element that compounds some of our activities, what is understood on basis of certain language games, then we will not need a science to decipher what we are.Rorty leva adiante o pragmatismo, renovando-o. Inspirado em Wittgenstein, Dewey e Heidegger, ele critica a tradição filosófica centrada na representação como obstáculo à “cultura pragmatizada”. Nela vale a conversação, a justificação; o modelo para o conhecimento não é a mente como espelho da natureza, mas as práticas culturais por meio das quais é possível obter verdade objetiva. Mas essa não é o centro de um procedimento epistemológico, e sim resultado da aplicação de procedimentos justificados em contextos do discurso normal. Em vez de buscar um algoritmo comum, um fundamento sólido e inabalável, é preciso abrir a filosofia para a conversação. O rótulo de relativismo (visto como perigo para a verdade, para a ética, para a política) não é o mais apropriado para caracterizar seu pensamento; como Rorty põe em xeque a relação esquema-conteúdo, e nisso segue Davidson, a verdade não depende de esquema; o idealismo e o relativismo concernem mais aos filósofos sistemáticos que propõem critérios para o conhecimento. Se o conhecimento for visto não como método para chegar à Verdade, mas como parte de procedimentos que muitas vezes melhoram a compreensão que temos de nós, então à filosofia caberá o papel de auxiliar na conversação da humanidade e não de juiz cultural. Se a mente não for vista como cuba que contém idéias, que representa a realidade, mas como certo elemento usado para caracterizar algumas de nossas atividades, compreensível em certos jogos de linguagem, então não precisamos de uma ciência que nos decifre.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2018-06-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13568Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 7 No. 1 (2006); 13-24Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 7 n. 1 (2006); 13-242316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPporhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13568/10077Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAraújo, Inês Lacerda2018-06-30T20:48:01Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13568Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2018-06-30T20:48:01Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Rorty’s neopragmatism O Neopragmatismo de R. Rorty |
title |
Rorty’s neopragmatism |
spellingShingle |
Rorty’s neopragmatism Araújo, Inês Lacerda Neopragmatism Critic of the theory of representation Justification Conversation Objectivity Neopragmatismo Crítica do representacionismo Justificação Conversação Objetividade |
title_short |
Rorty’s neopragmatism |
title_full |
Rorty’s neopragmatism |
title_fullStr |
Rorty’s neopragmatism |
title_full_unstemmed |
Rorty’s neopragmatism |
title_sort |
Rorty’s neopragmatism |
author |
Araújo, Inês Lacerda |
author_facet |
Araújo, Inês Lacerda |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Araújo, Inês Lacerda |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Neopragmatism Critic of the theory of representation Justification Conversation Objectivity Neopragmatismo Crítica do representacionismo Justificação Conversação Objetividade |
topic |
Neopragmatism Critic of the theory of representation Justification Conversation Objectivity Neopragmatismo Crítica do representacionismo Justificação Conversação Objetividade |
description |
Rorty puts pragmatism in a new and revitalized rout. Inspired by Wittgenstein, Dewey and Heidegger, he criticizes the philosophic tradition centered in representation, showing that it is an obstacle to the “pragmatized culture.” In this kind of culture conversation and justification really matter, and the guide to knowledge is not the mind as mirror of nature, but cultural practices through which it is possible to obtain objective truth. Nevertheless, objective truth is not the central problem, nor the only aim of an epistemological procedure. It is obtained by the application of justification, in the contexts of normal discourse. Instead of asking for a unique algorithm, a solid foundation, we must open philosophy to conversation. The label “relativism” (considered as a danger to truth, to ethics and politics) is not appropriate to characterize Rorty’s thought. Indeed, he contests the relation scheme/content following Davidson. So truth does not depend upon the notion of scheme; idealism and relativism concern the systematic philosophy that claims for definite criteria for knowledge. If knowledge will be considered not as method to obtain truth, but as a part of a process that mostly get better comprehension of ourselves, then philosophy will have the role of auxiliary instrument to the humanity conversation and not of cultural judge. If mind will not be seen as a receptacle of ideas that represent reality, and be seen instead as element that compounds some of our activities, what is understood on basis of certain language games, then we will not need a science to decipher what we are. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-06-30 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13568 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13568 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13568/10077 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 7 No. 1 (2006); 13-24 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 7 n. 1 (2006); 13-24 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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1803387421251862528 |