Incidência da lei, norma, ideal e superego: fundamentos para um diálogo entre direito e psicanálise

• Autor(a) principal: Daud, Rafael Rocha
• Data de Publicação: 2013
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da PUC_SP
• Texto Completo: https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/17025
• topic: Psicanálise; Lei; Interdisciplinariedade; Incidência da lei; Norma; Ideal; ideal-de-eu; Superego; Legalidade; Panóptico; Psychoanalysis; Law; Interdisciplinarity; Incidence of law; Norm; Ego-ideal; Legality; Panopticon; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::PSICOLOGIA::PSICOLOGIA SOCIAL

The interdisciplinary field defined by psychoanalytic and juridical practises and their mutual interactions is necessarily a disputed field, raising problems and disagreements either political, ideological and theoretical. On the one hand we find a colonization of psychoanalysis by law, mainly when the later builds on natural law conceptions which make in a broad sense coincident both human nature and the fundamental rights inherent to it. On the other hand, we find a colonization of law by psychoanalysis, which may build on conceptions less strict theoretically but apt to be used in juridical practise whenever it faces aporiae which are not of normative nature, but due to society and its conflicts. I propose to use some base categories, namely, incidence of law, norm, ideal and superego, as means of establishing a promising conversation between the two disciplines, and less subjected to vices and prejudices prevalent with so much persistence in this field. I face the controversy of accomodating the social and the individual, resuming the freudian text so as to find once again the social in the individual, and the individual in the social, casting aside the schematic opposition between the two and searching for the proper mechanisms that permits transition between the one and the other, building on aforementioned categories. Norm, as juridical and general category, serves to accuse the metaphoric nature of the notion of Law as foundation of subjectivity, and replaces the later as recourse, although needed, for the subject to resort to when dealing with the vicissitudes and anguishes of being in the world, allowing for more or less autonomy in face of symptoms and inhibitions. Therefore, there is no correspondence between norms of society and of the subject, since there is not a norm of the subject that isn t internalized from norms obtained in his social context. The process of this internalization, for its part, built upon identification phenomena, implies modes of generational transmission of such norms, by means of which, not as much of their substance is transmitted as is their incidence models themselves, which perpetuate, at the same time yielding to the discontents inherent to culture and enabling significant modifications in normative contents that reign over civilization at each given place and moment