A dogmática das restrições a direitos fundamentais

• Autor(a) principal: Lucredi, Gustavo
• Data de Publicação: 2012
• Tipo de documento: Trabalho de conclusão de curso
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da PUC_SP
• Texto Completo: https://repositorio.pucsp.br/jspui/handle/handle/30101
• topic: CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::DIREITO::DIREITO PUBLICO::DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL; Direitos fundamentais; Restrições; Argumentação jurídica; Hermenêutica; Fundamental rights; Restrictions; Legal argumentation; Hermeneutics

Fundamental rights, due to the singularity of the semantic and axiological content that is founded in their legal dispositions, are endowed with a unique normative structure. The interpretation and application of the deontic operators transmitted by them requires, therefore, a different hermeneutical approach, that do not satisfies itself with the logical premises of the syllogistic reasoning, typical of the subsumption method. This assumption comes from the plurality of legal positions represented by fundamental rights, which as a result of their vast scope and multiple forms end up colliding with one and another. In order to remedy this situation, in such a way to preserve at maximum degree the restricted fundamental right and, at the same time, to promote at optimum degree the satisfaction of the other, it is necessary to use a suitable theoretical model, compatible with the fundamental rights dogmatic approach. The study that we intend to develop must have thereby a dogmatic point of view, which presupposes a methodology that addresses the analytical, empirical and normative dimensions. Following such orientation, it appears that the problematic involving the argumentative onus generated by the phenomenon of limiting clauses can be better apprehended and, as a consequence, justified by a legal discourse substantiated in congruent propositions