Existência e aparelho psíquico: a crítica ontológica da psicanálise freudiana com base na analítica da existência de Martin Heidegger

• Autor(a) principal: Barretta, João Paulo F
• Data de Publicação: 2007
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da PUC_SP
• Texto Completo: https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/15637
• topic: Irritabilidade; Abertura fundamental; Heidegger, Martin -- 1889-1976 -- Critica e interpretacao; Freud, Sigmund -- 1856-1939 -- Critica e interpretacao; Ontologia; Psicanalise; Ontology; Irritability; Fundamental openness; Human experience; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::PSICOLOGIA

The main aim of this work is to iluminate Heidegger s ontological criticism of the freudian theory, which was collected by Medard Boss in the Zollikon s Seminars (1987). This criticism can only be understood in the light of the developments made by the philosopher in relation to Husserl s phenomenology. The main point is that Heidegger had investigated, in the 1920 s, the way of being of human beings, in order to have access to the fundamental question of the meaning of being in general (Seinsfrage). Such a procedure brought Heidegger to the development of a fundamental ontology which has psique as its subject matter. Therefore, he is able to approach phenomenologically something which is only implicit in the freudian theory. This one is concerned itself explicitly with certains pathologicals (neurotical symptoms) and non-pathologicals (dreams, misbehaviors, lapsos linguae etc) psiquic processes, on the base of which it developed a model of the mental functioning. Based on this common subject matter, Heidegger will criticize Freud for not having understood correctly the meaning of being of the psiquic, for having done an objetification, that means, for having understood it in the light of the unproper category of substance. Notwithstanding, both the philosopher nor the specialists after him, succeeded in identifying which substance is the psiquism in Freud s theory. What we intend to show is that for him it is an irritable substance. This is a caracterization that comes from the XIX century s physiology. Such a substance should further be understood in the light of physical (physicalism) and biological (darwinism) concepts. With this caracterization we were able then to contrast Freud s way of conceiving psiquism with Heidegger s proposal, that is to say, to contrast the concepts of irratable substance and fundamental openness. This can only be properly understood thou on the base of the differences in the way each one of the autors here in question understands what does it means to have an experience. The concept of experience plays, therefore, a decisive role, as we tried to show, in the determination of the being of the psiquic