A epistemologia do testemunho : visão reducionista

• Autor(a) principal: Brito, Patrick Roger Michel Almeida de
• Data de Publicação: 2012
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da PUC_RS
• Texto Completo: http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/2905
• topic: FILOSOFIA - TEORIAS; REDUCIONISMO; TESTEMUNHOS; HUME, DAVID - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO; FRICKER, ELIZABETH - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO; GRAHAM, PETER J. - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA

This paper will address the Epistemology of Testimony in view of the reductionist theory, taking into perspective the debate between it and Anti-reductionism about the role of testimony in justification of belief. Thus, we will try promoting an investigation of the epistemic possibilities of the testimony that the reductionist point of view, seems to have no relevance as transindividual element in the formation of belief. At first, as general objective, we will investigate the nature and origin of reductionism, from historical reasons the role of testimony in the justification of beliefs according to the thought of David Hume. In the second chapter we will review the Local reductionist version proposed by Elizabeth Fricker, his notion of prima facie reliability alternative to a priori Anti-reductionist, as well as his conception of the epistemic role of testimony in the justification of belief based on it. In contrast, we will bring the criticism of Peter J. Graham regarding the exclusion of testimony as a relevant epistemic factor to justification. Graham proposes a combination of independent and testimonial grounds for the justification of testimonial belief, stating that the testimony is not a secondary or irrelevant in the justification and acquisition of beliefs.