Italian coalitions and electoral promises: assessing the democratic performance of the Prodi I and Berlusconi II governments

• Autor(a) principal: Moury, C.
• Data de Publicação: 2011
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
• Texto Completo: https://ciencia.iscte-iul.pt/public/pub/id/2039; http://hdl.handle.net/10071/9919
• topic: Coalition governance; Electoral pledges; Institutions; Italian political parties

Italian party coalitions (from both the centre-left and the centre-right) have enacted an average of 57% of the pledges included in their common manifestos. In relative terms, Italian political parties keep their electoral promises much less than parties governing in single-party government, but slightly outperform those that form post-electoral coalitions. Although this finding contradicts the widespread pessimism about Italy's performance, it also illustrates that there is no significant advantage to bipolarism and the existence of a common programme as opposed to situations where coalitions are formed after the elections. This might explain Italians' dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their country.