Outcome and process accountability in negotiation: a motivated processing approach

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Simões, E.
Data de Publicação: 2011
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10071/14310
Resumo: Past research indicate that negotiators under outcome accountability, compared to non-accountable ones, are more prone to competitive behavior which leads to suboptimal agreements, even when there is the possibility of obtaining higher joint gain. However, recent research showed that negotiators under process accountability made more accurate estimates of the other party’s preferences and interests and obtained higher joint gain than the non-accountable counterparts. Moreover, there’s some evidence that equality in gain sharing may be moderated by social motives. The current study with professional negotiators (N = 88) focus on the effects of both outcome and process accountability on the negotiation processes in a prosocial climate. Results indicate that accountable negotiators tend to maximize the agreement’s value, thus suggesting a positive influence of the interaction of these two variables on the negotiation’s outcomes and processes. Non-accountable negotiators and negotiators held accountable only for outcome tend to get lower gains than those obtained by the negotiators under process accountability, although they are prone to divide gains more equitably. Theoretical implications of these results as well as its consequences for the negotiation practice in organizations are discussed.
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spelling Outcome and process accountability in negotiation: a motivated processing approachNegotiationAccountabilitySocial motivationInformation processingPast research indicate that negotiators under outcome accountability, compared to non-accountable ones, are more prone to competitive behavior which leads to suboptimal agreements, even when there is the possibility of obtaining higher joint gain. However, recent research showed that negotiators under process accountability made more accurate estimates of the other party’s preferences and interests and obtained higher joint gain than the non-accountable counterparts. Moreover, there’s some evidence that equality in gain sharing may be moderated by social motives. The current study with professional negotiators (N = 88) focus on the effects of both outcome and process accountability on the negotiation processes in a prosocial climate. Results indicate that accountable negotiators tend to maximize the agreement’s value, thus suggesting a positive influence of the interaction of these two variables on the negotiation’s outcomes and processes. Non-accountable negotiators and negotiators held accountable only for outcome tend to get lower gains than those obtained by the negotiators under process accountability, although they are prone to divide gains more equitably. Theoretical implications of these results as well as its consequences for the negotiation practice in organizations are discussed.Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação da Universidade de Coimbra.2017-08-30T17:04:59Z2011-01-01T00:00:00Z20112019-05-16T15:20:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10071/14310eng0871-465710.14195/1647-8606_55_18Simões, E.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-09T17:39:49Zoai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/14310Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:18:21.769215Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Outcome and process accountability in negotiation: a motivated processing approach
title Outcome and process accountability in negotiation: a motivated processing approach
spellingShingle Outcome and process accountability in negotiation: a motivated processing approach
Simões, E.
Negotiation
Accountability
Social motivation
Information processing
title_short Outcome and process accountability in negotiation: a motivated processing approach
title_full Outcome and process accountability in negotiation: a motivated processing approach
title_fullStr Outcome and process accountability in negotiation: a motivated processing approach
title_full_unstemmed Outcome and process accountability in negotiation: a motivated processing approach
title_sort Outcome and process accountability in negotiation: a motivated processing approach
author Simões, E.
author_facet Simões, E.
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Simões, E.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Negotiation
Accountability
Social motivation
Information processing
topic Negotiation
Accountability
Social motivation
Information processing
description Past research indicate that negotiators under outcome accountability, compared to non-accountable ones, are more prone to competitive behavior which leads to suboptimal agreements, even when there is the possibility of obtaining higher joint gain. However, recent research showed that negotiators under process accountability made more accurate estimates of the other party’s preferences and interests and obtained higher joint gain than the non-accountable counterparts. Moreover, there’s some evidence that equality in gain sharing may be moderated by social motives. The current study with professional negotiators (N = 88) focus on the effects of both outcome and process accountability on the negotiation processes in a prosocial climate. Results indicate that accountable negotiators tend to maximize the agreement’s value, thus suggesting a positive influence of the interaction of these two variables on the negotiation’s outcomes and processes. Non-accountable negotiators and negotiators held accountable only for outcome tend to get lower gains than those obtained by the negotiators under process accountability, although they are prone to divide gains more equitably. Theoretical implications of these results as well as its consequences for the negotiation practice in organizations are discussed.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011-01-01T00:00:00Z
2011
2017-08-30T17:04:59Z
2019-05-16T15:20:00Z
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10.14195/1647-8606_55_18
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação da Universidade de Coimbra.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação da Universidade de Coimbra.
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