Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2009 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15587 |
Resumo: | This paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction. |
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spelling |
Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanismsMulti-Unit auctionCommon value auctionDiscrete auctionGame theoryThis paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction.Springer VerlagRepositório da Universidade de LisboaAhlberg, Joakim2018-06-11T08:48:10Z2009-042009-04-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15587engAhlberg, Joakim (2009). "Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms". Portuguese Economic Journal, 8(1):3-141617-982X (print)10.1007/s10258-009-0042-zmetadata only accessinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:45:31Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/15587Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:01:11.628752Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms |
title |
Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms |
spellingShingle |
Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms Ahlberg, Joakim Multi-Unit auction Common value auction Discrete auction Game theory |
title_short |
Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms |
title_full |
Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms |
title_fullStr |
Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms |
title_full_unstemmed |
Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms |
title_sort |
Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms |
author |
Ahlberg, Joakim |
author_facet |
Ahlberg, Joakim |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Ahlberg, Joakim |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Multi-Unit auction Common value auction Discrete auction Game theory |
topic |
Multi-Unit auction Common value auction Discrete auction Game theory |
description |
This paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction. |
publishDate |
2009 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2009-04 2009-04-01T00:00:00Z 2018-06-11T08:48:10Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15587 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15587 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Ahlberg, Joakim (2009). "Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms". Portuguese Economic Journal, 8(1):3-14 1617-982X (print) 10.1007/s10258-009-0042-z |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
metadata only access info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
metadata only access |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer Verlag |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer Verlag |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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1799131100554985472 |