Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Ahlberg, Joakim
Data de Publicação: 2009
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15587
Resumo: This paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction.
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spelling Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanismsMulti-Unit auctionCommon value auctionDiscrete auctionGame theoryThis paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction.Springer VerlagRepositório da Universidade de LisboaAhlberg, Joakim2018-06-11T08:48:10Z2009-042009-04-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15587engAhlberg, Joakim (2009). "Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms". Portuguese Economic Journal, 8(1):3-141617-982X (print)10.1007/s10258-009-0042-zmetadata only accessinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:45:31Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/15587Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:01:11.628752Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
title Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
spellingShingle Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
Ahlberg, Joakim
Multi-Unit auction
Common value auction
Discrete auction
Game theory
title_short Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
title_full Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
title_fullStr Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
title_full_unstemmed Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
title_sort Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
author Ahlberg, Joakim
author_facet Ahlberg, Joakim
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ahlberg, Joakim
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Multi-Unit auction
Common value auction
Discrete auction
Game theory
topic Multi-Unit auction
Common value auction
Discrete auction
Game theory
description This paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2009-04
2009-04-01T00:00:00Z
2018-06-11T08:48:10Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15587
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15587
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Ahlberg, Joakim (2009). "Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms". Portuguese Economic Journal, 8(1):3-14
1617-982X (print)
10.1007/s10258-009-0042-z
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv metadata only access
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv metadata only access
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
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reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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