Voting as a war of attrition
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/28590 |
Resumo: | We study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of their preferences and may help to select the alternative correctly more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome reached. We vary the amount of feedback and the communication protocol available to voters: complete secrecy about the pattern of support; feedback about this support; public communication; and within-group communication. The feedback no-communication mechanism is worse than no feedback benchmark in all measures of welfare—the efficient alternative is chosen less often, waiting cost is higher, and thus net welfare is lower. Our headline result is that adding communication restores net efficiency, but in different ways. Public communication does poorly in terms of selecting the correct alternative, but limits the cost of delay, while group communication improves allocative efficiency, but has at best a moderate effect on delay. |
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Voting as a war of attritionVotingIntensity of preferencesSupermajorityConclaveFilibusterWar of attritionCommunicationWe study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of their preferences and may help to select the alternative correctly more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome reached. We vary the amount of feedback and the communication protocol available to voters: complete secrecy about the pattern of support; feedback about this support; public communication; and within-group communication. The feedback no-communication mechanism is worse than no feedback benchmark in all measures of welfare—the efficient alternative is chosen less often, waiting cost is higher, and thus net welfare is lower. Our headline result is that adding communication restores net efficiency, but in different ways. Public communication does poorly in terms of selecting the correct alternative, but limits the cost of delay, while group communication improves allocative efficiency, but has at best a moderate effect on delay.ElsevierVeritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaKwiek, MaksymilianMarreiros, HeliaVlassopoulos, Michael2019-11-06T15:14:05Z20192019-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/28590engKwiek, M., Marreiros, H., & Vlassopoulos, M. (2019). Voting as a war of attrition. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.0200167-268110.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.02085073820952000505643400008info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-14T01:36:11Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/28590Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:22:59.659167Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Voting as a war of attrition |
title |
Voting as a war of attrition |
spellingShingle |
Voting as a war of attrition Kwiek, Maksymilian Voting Intensity of preferences Supermajority Conclave Filibuster War of attrition Communication |
title_short |
Voting as a war of attrition |
title_full |
Voting as a war of attrition |
title_fullStr |
Voting as a war of attrition |
title_full_unstemmed |
Voting as a war of attrition |
title_sort |
Voting as a war of attrition |
author |
Kwiek, Maksymilian |
author_facet |
Kwiek, Maksymilian Marreiros, Helia Vlassopoulos, Michael |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Marreiros, Helia Vlassopoulos, Michael |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Kwiek, Maksymilian Marreiros, Helia Vlassopoulos, Michael |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Voting Intensity of preferences Supermajority Conclave Filibuster War of attrition Communication |
topic |
Voting Intensity of preferences Supermajority Conclave Filibuster War of attrition Communication |
description |
We study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of their preferences and may help to select the alternative correctly more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome reached. We vary the amount of feedback and the communication protocol available to voters: complete secrecy about the pattern of support; feedback about this support; public communication; and within-group communication. The feedback no-communication mechanism is worse than no feedback benchmark in all measures of welfare—the efficient alternative is chosen less often, waiting cost is higher, and thus net welfare is lower. Our headline result is that adding communication restores net efficiency, but in different ways. Public communication does poorly in terms of selecting the correct alternative, but limits the cost of delay, while group communication improves allocative efficiency, but has at best a moderate effect on delay. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-11-06T15:14:05Z 2019 2019-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/28590 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/28590 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Kwiek, M., Marreiros, H., & Vlassopoulos, M. (2019). Voting as a war of attrition. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.020 0167-2681 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.020 85073820952 000505643400008 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799131936886620160 |