Voting as a war of attrition

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Kwiek, Maksymilian
Data de Publicação: 2019
Outros Autores: Marreiros, Helia, Vlassopoulos, Michael
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/28590
Resumo: We study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of their preferences and may help to select the alternative correctly more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome reached. We vary the amount of feedback and the communication protocol available to voters: complete secrecy about the pattern of support; feedback about this support; public communication; and within-group communication. The feedback no-communication mechanism is worse than no feedback benchmark in all measures of welfare—the efficient alternative is chosen less often, waiting cost is higher, and thus net welfare is lower. Our headline result is that adding communication restores net efficiency, but in different ways. Public communication does poorly in terms of selecting the correct alternative, but limits the cost of delay, while group communication improves allocative efficiency, but has at best a moderate effect on delay.
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spelling Voting as a war of attritionVotingIntensity of preferencesSupermajorityConclaveFilibusterWar of attritionCommunicationWe study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of their preferences and may help to select the alternative correctly more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome reached. We vary the amount of feedback and the communication protocol available to voters: complete secrecy about the pattern of support; feedback about this support; public communication; and within-group communication. The feedback no-communication mechanism is worse than no feedback benchmark in all measures of welfare—the efficient alternative is chosen less often, waiting cost is higher, and thus net welfare is lower. Our headline result is that adding communication restores net efficiency, but in different ways. Public communication does poorly in terms of selecting the correct alternative, but limits the cost of delay, while group communication improves allocative efficiency, but has at best a moderate effect on delay.ElsevierVeritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaKwiek, MaksymilianMarreiros, HeliaVlassopoulos, Michael2019-11-06T15:14:05Z20192019-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/28590engKwiek, M., Marreiros, H., & Vlassopoulos, M. (2019). Voting as a war of attrition. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.0200167-268110.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.02085073820952000505643400008info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-14T01:36:11Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/28590Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:22:59.659167Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Voting as a war of attrition
title Voting as a war of attrition
spellingShingle Voting as a war of attrition
Kwiek, Maksymilian
Voting
Intensity of preferences
Supermajority
Conclave
Filibuster
War of attrition
Communication
title_short Voting as a war of attrition
title_full Voting as a war of attrition
title_fullStr Voting as a war of attrition
title_full_unstemmed Voting as a war of attrition
title_sort Voting as a war of attrition
author Kwiek, Maksymilian
author_facet Kwiek, Maksymilian
Marreiros, Helia
Vlassopoulos, Michael
author_role author
author2 Marreiros, Helia
Vlassopoulos, Michael
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Kwiek, Maksymilian
Marreiros, Helia
Vlassopoulos, Michael
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Voting
Intensity of preferences
Supermajority
Conclave
Filibuster
War of attrition
Communication
topic Voting
Intensity of preferences
Supermajority
Conclave
Filibuster
War of attrition
Communication
description We study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of their preferences and may help to select the alternative correctly more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome reached. We vary the amount of feedback and the communication protocol available to voters: complete secrecy about the pattern of support; feedback about this support; public communication; and within-group communication. The feedback no-communication mechanism is worse than no feedback benchmark in all measures of welfare—the efficient alternative is chosen less often, waiting cost is higher, and thus net welfare is lower. Our headline result is that adding communication restores net efficiency, but in different ways. Public communication does poorly in terms of selecting the correct alternative, but limits the cost of delay, while group communication improves allocative efficiency, but has at best a moderate effect on delay.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-11-06T15:14:05Z
2019
2019-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/28590
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/28590
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Kwiek, M., Marreiros, H., & Vlassopoulos, M. (2019). Voting as a war of attrition. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.020
0167-2681
10.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.020
85073820952
000505643400008
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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