Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/11144/5683 |
Resumo: | Air transport has increased almost fifteen-fold worldwide in the last half-century (1970- 2019) and is expected to return to this trend in the next few years, after falling from 4.558 billion passengers in 2019 to 1.809 billion passengers in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Airport capacity has not kept pace with such growth and, therefore, more than two hundred major airports worldwide face capacity constraints and are “coordinated”. Efficient allocation of scarce airport capacity is critical for air traffic growth, as well as for the overall air transport dynamic efficiency. However, the allocation of airport slots in Europe and elsewhere is still ruled by administrative processes, based on the IATA Worldwide Slot Guidelines, which follow historical precedence (called “Grandfather Rights”) and time adjustments of historical slots. Several objections have been raised to the adoption of market mechanisms in slot allocation, as an alternative to administrative processes, and they are still rarely used. Despite often being suggested in the literature, the use of auctions for slot allocation has only been implemented in some local routes in China, and apparently this underemployment of auction mechanisms has been due to the reluctance of coordination authorities to face the risks that have been pointed out regarding airlines’ long-term route planning, the usage costs related to excess slots, origin-destination pairing, and competition distortions. However, scoring auctions have never been considered and our research shows that their properties combined with an appropriate auction design could overcome most of those objections and mitigate the associated risks. Furthermore, the current drop in air traffic provides an opportune window for the introduction of auctions as a mechanism for the allocation of airport slots with minimal risks of disruption to airline business models. |
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Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots?Air transportairport congestionslot allocationscoring auctionswinner determination ruleAir transport has increased almost fifteen-fold worldwide in the last half-century (1970- 2019) and is expected to return to this trend in the next few years, after falling from 4.558 billion passengers in 2019 to 1.809 billion passengers in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Airport capacity has not kept pace with such growth and, therefore, more than two hundred major airports worldwide face capacity constraints and are “coordinated”. Efficient allocation of scarce airport capacity is critical for air traffic growth, as well as for the overall air transport dynamic efficiency. However, the allocation of airport slots in Europe and elsewhere is still ruled by administrative processes, based on the IATA Worldwide Slot Guidelines, which follow historical precedence (called “Grandfather Rights”) and time adjustments of historical slots. Several objections have been raised to the adoption of market mechanisms in slot allocation, as an alternative to administrative processes, and they are still rarely used. Despite often being suggested in the literature, the use of auctions for slot allocation has only been implemented in some local routes in China, and apparently this underemployment of auction mechanisms has been due to the reluctance of coordination authorities to face the risks that have been pointed out regarding airlines’ long-term route planning, the usage costs related to excess slots, origin-destination pairing, and competition distortions. However, scoring auctions have never been considered and our research shows that their properties combined with an appropriate auction design could overcome most of those objections and mitigate the associated risks. Furthermore, the current drop in air traffic provides an opportune window for the introduction of auctions as a mechanism for the allocation of airport slots with minimal risks of disruption to airline business models.CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa2022-11-17T13:37:55Z2021-12-01T00:00:00Z2021-12info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11144/5683eng2184-898Xhttps://doi.org/10.26619/ERBE-2021.I.2.2Cardadeiro, EduardoGata, Joãoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-11T02:20:37Zoai:repositorio.ual.pt:11144/5683Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T01:34:06.644503Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots? |
title |
Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots? |
spellingShingle |
Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots? Cardadeiro, Eduardo Air transport airport congestion slot allocation scoring auctions winner determination rule |
title_short |
Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots? |
title_full |
Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots? |
title_fullStr |
Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots? |
title_sort |
Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots? |
author |
Cardadeiro, Eduardo |
author_facet |
Cardadeiro, Eduardo Gata, João |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Gata, João |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Cardadeiro, Eduardo Gata, João |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Air transport airport congestion slot allocation scoring auctions winner determination rule |
topic |
Air transport airport congestion slot allocation scoring auctions winner determination rule |
description |
Air transport has increased almost fifteen-fold worldwide in the last half-century (1970- 2019) and is expected to return to this trend in the next few years, after falling from 4.558 billion passengers in 2019 to 1.809 billion passengers in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Airport capacity has not kept pace with such growth and, therefore, more than two hundred major airports worldwide face capacity constraints and are “coordinated”. Efficient allocation of scarce airport capacity is critical for air traffic growth, as well as for the overall air transport dynamic efficiency. However, the allocation of airport slots in Europe and elsewhere is still ruled by administrative processes, based on the IATA Worldwide Slot Guidelines, which follow historical precedence (called “Grandfather Rights”) and time adjustments of historical slots. Several objections have been raised to the adoption of market mechanisms in slot allocation, as an alternative to administrative processes, and they are still rarely used. Despite often being suggested in the literature, the use of auctions for slot allocation has only been implemented in some local routes in China, and apparently this underemployment of auction mechanisms has been due to the reluctance of coordination authorities to face the risks that have been pointed out regarding airlines’ long-term route planning, the usage costs related to excess slots, origin-destination pairing, and competition distortions. However, scoring auctions have never been considered and our research shows that their properties combined with an appropriate auction design could overcome most of those objections and mitigate the associated risks. Furthermore, the current drop in air traffic provides an opportune window for the introduction of auctions as a mechanism for the allocation of airport slots with minimal risks of disruption to airline business models. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-12-01T00:00:00Z 2021-12 2022-11-17T13:37:55Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11144/5683 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11144/5683 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
2184-898X https://doi.org/10.26619/ERBE-2021.I.2.2 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa |
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reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799136818950569984 |