Learning in bank runs

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Schliephake, Eva
Data de Publicação: 2021
Outros Autores: Shapiro, Joel
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/47027
Resumo: We examine a model in which depositor learning exacerbates bank runs. Informed depositors can quickly withdraw when the bank has low-quality assets. Uninformed depositors may decide to wait, which allows them to learn by observing informed depositors' actions. However, learning that the bank has low-quality assets will spark a run ex-post, which increases the incentives of uninformed depositors to run ex-ante. Moreover, when there are more informed depositors, uninformed depositors have a fear of missing out, which also makes preemptive runs more likely. Learning may, thus, increase the likelihood of panic runs and decrease surplus.
id RCAP_1ace88ff7b2ed1c4771fa8fedeba1caf
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/47027
network_acronym_str RCAP
network_name_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository_id_str 7160
spelling Learning in bank runsInformation-based bank runsWe examine a model in which depositor learning exacerbates bank runs. Informed depositors can quickly withdraw when the bank has low-quality assets. Uninformed depositors may decide to wait, which allows them to learn by observing informed depositors' actions. However, learning that the bank has low-quality assets will spark a run ex-post, which increases the incentives of uninformed depositors to run ex-ante. Moreover, when there are more informed depositors, uninformed depositors have a fear of missing out, which also makes preemptive runs more likely. Learning may, thus, increase the likelihood of panic runs and decrease surplus.Centre for Economic Policy ResearchVeritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaSchliephake, EvaShapiro, Joel2024-10-22T08:05:16Z2021-09-262021-09-26T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/47027enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-10-29T01:37:22Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/47027Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openairemluisa.alvim@gmail.comopendoar:71602024-10-29T01:37:22Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Learning in bank runs
title Learning in bank runs
spellingShingle Learning in bank runs
Schliephake, Eva
Information-based bank runs
title_short Learning in bank runs
title_full Learning in bank runs
title_fullStr Learning in bank runs
title_full_unstemmed Learning in bank runs
title_sort Learning in bank runs
author Schliephake, Eva
author_facet Schliephake, Eva
Shapiro, Joel
author_role author
author2 Shapiro, Joel
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Schliephake, Eva
Shapiro, Joel
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Information-based bank runs
topic Information-based bank runs
description We examine a model in which depositor learning exacerbates bank runs. Informed depositors can quickly withdraw when the bank has low-quality assets. Uninformed depositors may decide to wait, which allows them to learn by observing informed depositors' actions. However, learning that the bank has low-quality assets will spark a run ex-post, which increases the incentives of uninformed depositors to run ex-ante. Moreover, when there are more informed depositors, uninformed depositors have a fear of missing out, which also makes preemptive runs more likely. Learning may, thus, increase the likelihood of panic runs and decrease surplus.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-09-26
2021-09-26T00:00:00Z
2024-10-22T08:05:16Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/47027
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/47027
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centre for Economic Policy Research
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centre for Economic Policy Research
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mluisa.alvim@gmail.com
_version_ 1817548664256593920

Registros relacionados