Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/18073 |
Resumo: | In the present paper we consider a differentiated-good Stackelberg model, when the follower firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. We assume that there can exist a technology transfer between innovator and non-innovator firm. The aim of this paper is three-fold: to do a comparison of the fixed-fee and royalty licensing cases, of the two-part tariff and royalty licensing cases, respectively of the two-part tariff and fixed-fee licensing cases, in order to state in which case is indicated for the innovator firm to license its technology. This comparison allows us to identify which licensing scheme is more profitable for the innovator (follower firm). |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovatorIndustrial organizationGame theoryLicensingStackelberg competitionDifferentiated goodsInnovation sizeIn the present paper we consider a differentiated-good Stackelberg model, when the follower firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. We assume that there can exist a technology transfer between innovator and non-innovator firm. The aim of this paper is three-fold: to do a comparison of the fixed-fee and royalty licensing cases, of the two-part tariff and royalty licensing cases, respectively of the two-part tariff and fixed-fee licensing cases, in order to state in which case is indicated for the innovator firm to license its technology. This comparison allows us to identify which licensing scheme is more profitable for the innovator (follower firm).https://content.iospress.com/articles/journal-of-computational-methods-in-sciences-and-engineering/jcm204386Repositório Científico do Instituto Politécnico do PortoBode, Oana R.Ferreira, FFerreira, Fernanda2021-07-05T08:36:45Z20212021-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/18073eng10.3233/JCM-204386info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-09-27T01:46:05Zoai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/18073Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:37:41.994267Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator |
title |
Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator |
spellingShingle |
Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator Bode, Oana R. Industrial organization Game theory Licensing Stackelberg competition Differentiated goods Innovation size |
title_short |
Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator |
title_full |
Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator |
title_fullStr |
Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator |
title_full_unstemmed |
Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator |
title_sort |
Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator |
author |
Bode, Oana R. |
author_facet |
Bode, Oana R. Ferreira, F Ferreira, Fernanda |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Ferreira, F Ferreira, Fernanda |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico do Instituto Politécnico do Porto |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Bode, Oana R. Ferreira, F Ferreira, Fernanda |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Industrial organization Game theory Licensing Stackelberg competition Differentiated goods Innovation size |
topic |
Industrial organization Game theory Licensing Stackelberg competition Differentiated goods Innovation size |
description |
In the present paper we consider a differentiated-good Stackelberg model, when the follower firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. We assume that there can exist a technology transfer between innovator and non-innovator firm. The aim of this paper is three-fold: to do a comparison of the fixed-fee and royalty licensing cases, of the two-part tariff and royalty licensing cases, respectively of the two-part tariff and fixed-fee licensing cases, in order to state in which case is indicated for the innovator firm to license its technology. This comparison allows us to identify which licensing scheme is more profitable for the innovator (follower firm). |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-07-05T08:36:45Z 2021 2021-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/18073 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/18073 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.3233/JCM-204386 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
https://content.iospress.com/articles/journal-of-computational-methods-in-sciences-and-engineering/jcm204386 |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
https://content.iospress.com/articles/journal-of-computational-methods-in-sciences-and-engineering/jcm204386 |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799131467158126592 |