Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bode, Oana R.
Data de Publicação: 2021
Outros Autores: Ferreira, F, Ferreira, Fernanda
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/18073
Resumo: In the present paper we consider a differentiated-good Stackelberg model, when the follower firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. We assume that there can exist a technology transfer between innovator and non-innovator firm. The aim of this paper is three-fold: to do a comparison of the fixed-fee and royalty licensing cases, of the two-part tariff and royalty licensing cases, respectively of the two-part tariff and fixed-fee licensing cases, in order to state in which case is indicated for the innovator firm to license its technology. This comparison allows us to identify which licensing scheme is more profitable for the innovator (follower firm).
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spelling Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovatorIndustrial organizationGame theoryLicensingStackelberg competitionDifferentiated goodsInnovation sizeIn the present paper we consider a differentiated-good Stackelberg model, when the follower firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. We assume that there can exist a technology transfer between innovator and non-innovator firm. The aim of this paper is three-fold: to do a comparison of the fixed-fee and royalty licensing cases, of the two-part tariff and royalty licensing cases, respectively of the two-part tariff and fixed-fee licensing cases, in order to state in which case is indicated for the innovator firm to license its technology. This comparison allows us to identify which licensing scheme is more profitable for the innovator (follower firm).https://content.iospress.com/articles/journal-of-computational-methods-in-sciences-and-engineering/jcm204386Repositório Científico do Instituto Politécnico do PortoBode, Oana R.Ferreira, FFerreira, Fernanda2021-07-05T08:36:45Z20212021-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/18073eng10.3233/JCM-204386info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-09-27T01:46:05Zoai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/18073Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:37:41.994267Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
title Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
spellingShingle Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
Bode, Oana R.
Industrial organization
Game theory
Licensing
Stackelberg competition
Differentiated goods
Innovation size
title_short Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
title_full Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
title_fullStr Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
title_full_unstemmed Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
title_sort Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
author Bode, Oana R.
author_facet Bode, Oana R.
Ferreira, F
Ferreira, Fernanda
author_role author
author2 Ferreira, F
Ferreira, Fernanda
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico do Instituto Politécnico do Porto
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bode, Oana R.
Ferreira, F
Ferreira, Fernanda
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Industrial organization
Game theory
Licensing
Stackelberg competition
Differentiated goods
Innovation size
topic Industrial organization
Game theory
Licensing
Stackelberg competition
Differentiated goods
Innovation size
description In the present paper we consider a differentiated-good Stackelberg model, when the follower firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. We assume that there can exist a technology transfer between innovator and non-innovator firm. The aim of this paper is three-fold: to do a comparison of the fixed-fee and royalty licensing cases, of the two-part tariff and royalty licensing cases, respectively of the two-part tariff and fixed-fee licensing cases, in order to state in which case is indicated for the innovator firm to license its technology. This comparison allows us to identify which licensing scheme is more profitable for the innovator (follower firm).
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-07-05T08:36:45Z
2021
2021-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/18073
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/18073
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.3233/JCM-204386
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv https://content.iospress.com/articles/journal-of-computational-methods-in-sciences-and-engineering/jcm204386
publisher.none.fl_str_mv https://content.iospress.com/articles/journal-of-computational-methods-in-sciences-and-engineering/jcm204386
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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