The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game"
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/19020 |
Resumo: | This paper tries to explain differences in high education growth across European countries by using a coordination game (Stag Hunt) played by n candidates to college education. The payoff of enrolling in the university is positive only if there is "una nimity", i.e. if all candidates engage in higher education, being zero otherwise. This coordination requirement follows from the specialized nature of skills acquired through higher education, which can only be made profitable if each graduate is matched with graduate complementary specialists. This game has two strict Nash equilibria, where either all youngsters enter the university or none does. We show that the assessment of the factors that explain the differential growth of universities across countries is related with alternative ways of selecting a Nash equilibrium in the coordination game. By using empirical data, we can conclude that demographic trends and a cumulative causation factor play a major role in tertiary education growth, while the "wage premium" asso- ciated with college attendance also matters but is relatively secondary. "Tuition fees" and other direct financial costs do not appear to be a significant cause or hindrance of university development. |
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The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game"Higher EducationRegional DevelopmentCoordination GamesRisk DominanceThis paper tries to explain differences in high education growth across European countries by using a coordination game (Stag Hunt) played by n candidates to college education. The payoff of enrolling in the university is positive only if there is "una nimity", i.e. if all candidates engage in higher education, being zero otherwise. This coordination requirement follows from the specialized nature of skills acquired through higher education, which can only be made profitable if each graduate is matched with graduate complementary specialists. This game has two strict Nash equilibria, where either all youngsters enter the university or none does. We show that the assessment of the factors that explain the differential growth of universities across countries is related with alternative ways of selecting a Nash equilibrium in the coordination game. By using empirical data, we can conclude that demographic trends and a cumulative causation factor play a major role in tertiary education growth, while the "wage premium" asso- ciated with college attendance also matters but is relatively secondary. "Tuition fees" and other direct financial costs do not appear to be a significant cause or hindrance of university development.ISEG - REM - Research in Economics and MathematicsRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPontes, Jose PedroBuhse, Ana Paula2019-12-12T10:53:59Z2019-122019-12-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/19020engPontes, Jose Pedro e Ana Paula Buhse (2019). "The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game"". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão – REM Working paper nº 0105 - 20192184-108Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:48:32Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/19020Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:03:58.618050Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game" |
title |
The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game" |
spellingShingle |
The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game" Pontes, Jose Pedro Higher Education Regional Development Coordination Games Risk Dominance |
title_short |
The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game" |
title_full |
The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game" |
title_fullStr |
The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game" |
title_full_unstemmed |
The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game" |
title_sort |
The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game" |
author |
Pontes, Jose Pedro |
author_facet |
Pontes, Jose Pedro Buhse, Ana Paula |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Buhse, Ana Paula |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pontes, Jose Pedro Buhse, Ana Paula |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Higher Education Regional Development Coordination Games Risk Dominance |
topic |
Higher Education Regional Development Coordination Games Risk Dominance |
description |
This paper tries to explain differences in high education growth across European countries by using a coordination game (Stag Hunt) played by n candidates to college education. The payoff of enrolling in the university is positive only if there is "una nimity", i.e. if all candidates engage in higher education, being zero otherwise. This coordination requirement follows from the specialized nature of skills acquired through higher education, which can only be made profitable if each graduate is matched with graduate complementary specialists. This game has two strict Nash equilibria, where either all youngsters enter the university or none does. We show that the assessment of the factors that explain the differential growth of universities across countries is related with alternative ways of selecting a Nash equilibrium in the coordination game. By using empirical data, we can conclude that demographic trends and a cumulative causation factor play a major role in tertiary education growth, while the "wage premium" asso- ciated with college attendance also matters but is relatively secondary. "Tuition fees" and other direct financial costs do not appear to be a significant cause or hindrance of university development. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-12-12T10:53:59Z 2019-12 2019-12-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/19020 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/19020 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontes, Jose Pedro e Ana Paula Buhse (2019). "The development of higher education in Europe as a "coordination game"". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão – REM Working paper nº 0105 - 2019 2184-108X |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
ISEG - REM - Research in Economics and Mathematics |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
ISEG - REM - Research in Economics and Mathematics |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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