Kantians, selfish and 'nice' agents: some implications for normative public policy
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 1999 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22874 |
Resumo: | In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning. |
id |
RCAP_1e96e98470f9df8d03e3eea000394401 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/22874 |
network_acronym_str |
RCAP |
network_name_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository_id_str |
7160 |
spelling |
Kantians, selfish and 'nice' agents: some implications for normative public policyVoluntary DonationsEthicsPublic GoodsReciprocityIn this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.ISEG - Departamento de EconomiaRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPereira, Paulo TrigoPontes, José Pedro2022-01-04T11:07:08Z19991999-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22874eng0874-4548info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:52:24Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/22874Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:07:11.438676Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Kantians, selfish and 'nice' agents: some implications for normative public policy |
title |
Kantians, selfish and 'nice' agents: some implications for normative public policy |
spellingShingle |
Kantians, selfish and 'nice' agents: some implications for normative public policy Pereira, Paulo Trigo Voluntary Donations Ethics Public Goods Reciprocity |
title_short |
Kantians, selfish and 'nice' agents: some implications for normative public policy |
title_full |
Kantians, selfish and 'nice' agents: some implications for normative public policy |
title_fullStr |
Kantians, selfish and 'nice' agents: some implications for normative public policy |
title_full_unstemmed |
Kantians, selfish and 'nice' agents: some implications for normative public policy |
title_sort |
Kantians, selfish and 'nice' agents: some implications for normative public policy |
author |
Pereira, Paulo Trigo |
author_facet |
Pereira, Paulo Trigo Pontes, José Pedro |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Pontes, José Pedro |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pereira, Paulo Trigo Pontes, José Pedro |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Voluntary Donations Ethics Public Goods Reciprocity |
topic |
Voluntary Donations Ethics Public Goods Reciprocity |
description |
In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning. |
publishDate |
1999 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
1999 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z 2022-01-04T11:07:08Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22874 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22874 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
0874-4548 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
ISEG - Departamento de Economia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
ISEG - Departamento de Economia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1799131164775022592 |