Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10451/25910 |
Resumo: | The questions ‘Do I know p?’ and ‘shall I take p as a reason to act?’ seem to belong to different domains — or so claims Ernest Sosa in his Judgment and Agency (2015), the latest version of his virtue epistemology. According to Sosa, we may formulate the first question in a purely epistemological way — a matter of knowledge “full stop” —, while the second one is necessarily intruded by pragmatic factors — a matter of “actionable knowledge”. Both should be answered, in his view, considering the reliability of my belief, but the former could be faced in total abstraction from my personal practical concerns. In this paper I dispute Sosa’s view, and claim that no purely epistemic level of knowledge “full stop” is conceivable, at least within a reliabilist framework. A case is put forward in order to show that some given belief may not be considered as reliable by itself, as a token, but always as a member of a type, belonging to some class of reference of other beliefs. And the relevant class of reference may only be chosen considering personal practical interests. |
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Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical DeliberationEpistemic rationalityPractical rationalityVirtue epistemologyPragmatic encroachmentAgent reliabilismThe questions ‘Do I know p?’ and ‘shall I take p as a reason to act?’ seem to belong to different domains — or so claims Ernest Sosa in his Judgment and Agency (2015), the latest version of his virtue epistemology. According to Sosa, we may formulate the first question in a purely epistemological way — a matter of knowledge “full stop” —, while the second one is necessarily intruded by pragmatic factors — a matter of “actionable knowledge”. Both should be answered, in his view, considering the reliability of my belief, but the former could be faced in total abstraction from my personal practical concerns. In this paper I dispute Sosa’s view, and claim that no purely epistemic level of knowledge “full stop” is conceivable, at least within a reliabilist framework. A case is put forward in order to show that some given belief may not be considered as reliable by itself, as a token, but always as a member of a type, belonging to some class of reference of other beliefs. And the relevant class of reference may only be chosen considering personal practical interests.Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de FilosofiaRepositório da Universidade de LisboaNavarro, Jesús2017-01-16T10:53:00Z2016-112016-11-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10451/25910eng0873-626Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-08T16:15:38Zoai:repositorio.ul.pt:10451/25910Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T21:42:39.419997Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation |
title |
Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation |
spellingShingle |
Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation Navarro, Jesús Epistemic rationality Practical rationality Virtue epistemology Pragmatic encroachment Agent reliabilism |
title_short |
Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation |
title_full |
Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation |
title_fullStr |
Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation |
title_full_unstemmed |
Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation |
title_sort |
Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation |
author |
Navarro, Jesús |
author_facet |
Navarro, Jesús |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Navarro, Jesús |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Epistemic rationality Practical rationality Virtue epistemology Pragmatic encroachment Agent reliabilism |
topic |
Epistemic rationality Practical rationality Virtue epistemology Pragmatic encroachment Agent reliabilism |
description |
The questions ‘Do I know p?’ and ‘shall I take p as a reason to act?’ seem to belong to different domains — or so claims Ernest Sosa in his Judgment and Agency (2015), the latest version of his virtue epistemology. According to Sosa, we may formulate the first question in a purely epistemological way — a matter of knowledge “full stop” —, while the second one is necessarily intruded by pragmatic factors — a matter of “actionable knowledge”. Both should be answered, in his view, considering the reliability of my belief, but the former could be faced in total abstraction from my personal practical concerns. In this paper I dispute Sosa’s view, and claim that no purely epistemic level of knowledge “full stop” is conceivable, at least within a reliabilist framework. A case is put forward in order to show that some given belief may not be considered as reliable by itself, as a token, but always as a member of a type, belonging to some class of reference of other beliefs. And the relevant class of reference may only be chosen considering personal practical interests. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-11 2016-11-01T00:00:00Z 2017-01-16T10:53:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/25910 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/25910 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
0873-626X |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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