Does monetary punishment crowd out pro-social motivation? the case of hospital bed-blocking
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2008 |
Outros Autores: | , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/1822/7880 |
Resumo: | We study whether the use of explicit monetary incentives might be counter-productive. In particular, we focus on the effect of fining owners of long-term care institutions who prolong length of stay at hospitals. We outline a simple theoretical model, based on motivational crowding theory, deriving the conditions for explicit monetary incentives to have potentially counterproductive effects. In the empirical part, we exploit a natural experiment involving changes in the catchments areas of two large Norwegian hospitals. We find that bed-blocking is reduced when transferring long-term care providers from a hospital using monetary fines to prevent bed-blocking to a hospital not relying on this incentive scheme, and vice versa. We interpret these results as examples of monetary incentives crowding out agents’ intrinsic motivation, leading to a reduction in effort. |
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Does monetary punishment crowd out pro-social motivation? the case of hospital bed-blockingMotivation crowdingIntrinsic motivationMonetary punishmentHospital bed blockingWe study whether the use of explicit monetary incentives might be counter-productive. In particular, we focus on the effect of fining owners of long-term care institutions who prolong length of stay at hospitals. We outline a simple theoretical model, based on motivational crowding theory, deriving the conditions for explicit monetary incentives to have potentially counterproductive effects. In the empirical part, we exploit a natural experiment involving changes in the catchments areas of two large Norwegian hospitals. We find that bed-blocking is reduced when transferring long-term care providers from a hospital using monetary fines to prevent bed-blocking to a hospital not relying on this incentive scheme, and vice versa. We interpret these results as examples of monetary incentives crowding out agents’ intrinsic motivation, leading to a reduction in effort.NIPE – Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas – is supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology through the Programa Operacional Ciência e Inovação 2010 (POCI 2010) of the III Quadro Comunitário de Apoio (QCA III), which is financed by FEDER and Portuguese funds.Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)Universidade do MinhoHolmås, Tor HelgeKjerstad, EgilLurås, HildeStraume, Odd Rune20082008-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/7880engNIPE Working Paper series; 17info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:20:31Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/7880Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:13:39.559963Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Does monetary punishment crowd out pro-social motivation? the case of hospital bed-blocking |
title |
Does monetary punishment crowd out pro-social motivation? the case of hospital bed-blocking |
spellingShingle |
Does monetary punishment crowd out pro-social motivation? the case of hospital bed-blocking Holmås, Tor Helge Motivation crowding Intrinsic motivation Monetary punishment Hospital bed blocking |
title_short |
Does monetary punishment crowd out pro-social motivation? the case of hospital bed-blocking |
title_full |
Does monetary punishment crowd out pro-social motivation? the case of hospital bed-blocking |
title_fullStr |
Does monetary punishment crowd out pro-social motivation? the case of hospital bed-blocking |
title_full_unstemmed |
Does monetary punishment crowd out pro-social motivation? the case of hospital bed-blocking |
title_sort |
Does monetary punishment crowd out pro-social motivation? the case of hospital bed-blocking |
author |
Holmås, Tor Helge |
author_facet |
Holmås, Tor Helge Kjerstad, Egil Lurås, Hilde Straume, Odd Rune |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Kjerstad, Egil Lurås, Hilde Straume, Odd Rune |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Holmås, Tor Helge Kjerstad, Egil Lurås, Hilde Straume, Odd Rune |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Motivation crowding Intrinsic motivation Monetary punishment Hospital bed blocking |
topic |
Motivation crowding Intrinsic motivation Monetary punishment Hospital bed blocking |
description |
We study whether the use of explicit monetary incentives might be counter-productive. In particular, we focus on the effect of fining owners of long-term care institutions who prolong length of stay at hospitals. We outline a simple theoretical model, based on motivational crowding theory, deriving the conditions for explicit monetary incentives to have potentially counterproductive effects. In the empirical part, we exploit a natural experiment involving changes in the catchments areas of two large Norwegian hospitals. We find that bed-blocking is reduced when transferring long-term care providers from a hospital using monetary fines to prevent bed-blocking to a hospital not relying on this incentive scheme, and vice versa. We interpret these results as examples of monetary incentives crowding out agents’ intrinsic motivation, leading to a reduction in effort. |
publishDate |
2008 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2008 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/7880 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/7880 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
NIPE Working Paper series; 17 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799132575925534720 |