LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN MORALITY AND POLITICS
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.2.1.86 |
Resumo: | Hypocrisy is necessary in politics, especially in democracies, but while hypocrisy can facilitate democratic cooperation, lying tends to undermine it. There are two basic alternative possibilities for how to think about political ethics. The first begins with universal moral principles that are then applied to politics as well as to other areas of life. In the second approach, instead, each activity or type of relationship has its own moral requirements. What is it about politics that makes hypocrisy and lying either morally legitimate or morally illegitimate? For the first approach, lying and hypocrisy are vices, whereas for the second, they may be considered as virtuous under certain circumstances. Hypocrisy is necessary because political relationships are relationships of dependence among people whose interests do not exactly coincide. To secure supporters and coalition partners requires a certain amount of pretense. The case of lying, however, is quite different due to three additional characteristics of political relationships: cooperation over time requires trust; accountability requires transparency; and consensus requires a shared sense of reality. Lying undermines all three. Thus, truthfulness is among the political virtues even if exceptions sometimes must be made. Today, “post-truth” politics (“New Lying”), threatens to create a dangerous indifference to the truth and a cynical, wholesale acceptance of political lying. |
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LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN MORALITY AND POLITICSMENTIRA E HIPOCRISIA NA MORALIDADE E NA POLÍTICALYING AND HYPOCRISY IN POLITICS AND MORALITY, WITH RUTH GRANTHypocrisy is necessary in politics, especially in democracies, but while hypocrisy can facilitate democratic cooperation, lying tends to undermine it. There are two basic alternative possibilities for how to think about political ethics. The first begins with universal moral principles that are then applied to politics as well as to other areas of life. In the second approach, instead, each activity or type of relationship has its own moral requirements. What is it about politics that makes hypocrisy and lying either morally legitimate or morally illegitimate? For the first approach, lying and hypocrisy are vices, whereas for the second, they may be considered as virtuous under certain circumstances. Hypocrisy is necessary because political relationships are relationships of dependence among people whose interests do not exactly coincide. To secure supporters and coalition partners requires a certain amount of pretense. The case of lying, however, is quite different due to three additional characteristics of political relationships: cooperation over time requires trust; accountability requires transparency; and consensus requires a shared sense of reality. Lying undermines all three. Thus, truthfulness is among the political virtues even if exceptions sometimes must be made. Today, “post-truth” politics (“New Lying”), threatens to create a dangerous indifference to the truth and a cynical, wholesale acceptance of political lying.A hipocrisia é necessária na política, especialmente nas democracias; mas enquanto a hipocrisia pode facilitar a cooperação democrática, a mentira tende a miná-la. Há duas alternativas básicas possíveis sobre como pensar acerca da ética política. A primeira parte de princípios morais universais que são depois aplicados à política assim como a outros domínios da vida. Ao invés, de acordo com a segunda abordagem, cada tipo de atividade ou relação apresenta requisitos morais próprios. Quais as características da política que fazem com que a hipocrisia e a mentira sejam, respetivamente, moralmente legítimas ou ilegítimas? De acordo com a primeira abordagem, a mentira e a hipocrisia são vícios, enquanto que para a segunda podem ser consideradas virtuosas em certas circunstâncias. A hipocrisia é necessária porque as relações políticas baseiam-se na dependência entre pessoas cujos interesses não coincidem exatamente. Para garantir apoiantes e parceiros de coligação é necessária uma certa dose de dissimulação. O caso da mentira, contudo, é bastante diferente devido a três características adicionais das relações políticas: a cooperação ao longo do tempo exige confiança; a prestação de contas requer transparência; finalmente, o consenso exige um sentido partilhado da realidade. A mentira mina todas. Por conseguinte, a veracidade pertence às virtudes políticas mesmo que, por vezes, seja preciso abrir exceções. Hoje em dia, a política da “Pós-Verdade” (a “Nova Mentira”), ameaça criar uma indiferença perigosa em relação à verdade e uma aceitação da mentira política a qualquer custo.Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho2023-09-29info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttps://doi.org/10.21814/eps.2.1.86eng2184-25822184-2574Grant, Ruth W.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-29T10:56:35Zoai:journals.uminho.pt:article/5278Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T01:58:42.009594Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN MORALITY AND POLITICS MENTIRA E HIPOCRISIA NA MORALIDADE E NA POLÍTICA |
title |
LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN MORALITY AND POLITICS |
spellingShingle |
LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN MORALITY AND POLITICS Grant, Ruth W. LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN POLITICS AND MORALITY, WITH RUTH GRANT |
title_short |
LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN MORALITY AND POLITICS |
title_full |
LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN MORALITY AND POLITICS |
title_fullStr |
LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN MORALITY AND POLITICS |
title_full_unstemmed |
LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN MORALITY AND POLITICS |
title_sort |
LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN MORALITY AND POLITICS |
author |
Grant, Ruth W. |
author_facet |
Grant, Ruth W. |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Grant, Ruth W. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN POLITICS AND MORALITY, WITH RUTH GRANT |
topic |
LYING AND HYPOCRISY IN POLITICS AND MORALITY, WITH RUTH GRANT |
description |
Hypocrisy is necessary in politics, especially in democracies, but while hypocrisy can facilitate democratic cooperation, lying tends to undermine it. There are two basic alternative possibilities for how to think about political ethics. The first begins with universal moral principles that are then applied to politics as well as to other areas of life. In the second approach, instead, each activity or type of relationship has its own moral requirements. What is it about politics that makes hypocrisy and lying either morally legitimate or morally illegitimate? For the first approach, lying and hypocrisy are vices, whereas for the second, they may be considered as virtuous under certain circumstances. Hypocrisy is necessary because political relationships are relationships of dependence among people whose interests do not exactly coincide. To secure supporters and coalition partners requires a certain amount of pretense. The case of lying, however, is quite different due to three additional characteristics of political relationships: cooperation over time requires trust; accountability requires transparency; and consensus requires a shared sense of reality. Lying undermines all three. Thus, truthfulness is among the political virtues even if exceptions sometimes must be made. Today, “post-truth” politics (“New Lying”), threatens to create a dangerous indifference to the truth and a cynical, wholesale acceptance of political lying. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-09-29 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.2.1.86 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.2.1.86 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
2184-2582 2184-2574 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799137071305064448 |