Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376 |
Resumo: | Two-part pricing (the Netflix model) has recently been proposed instead of uniform pricing for pharmaceuticals. Under two-part pricing the health plan pays a fixed fee for access to a drug at unit prices equal to marginal costs. Despite two-part pricing being socially efficient, we show that the health plan is worse off when the drug producer is a monopolist, as all surplus is extracted. This result is reversed with competition, as two-part pricing yields higher patient utility and lower drug costs for the health plan. However, if we allow for exclusive contracts, uniform pricing is preferred by the health plan. The choice of payment scheme is also shown to influence on the incentives to spend resources on drastic innovations relative to incremental, me-too innovations. |
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Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffsHealth plansPayment schemesPharmaceuticalsCiências Sociais::Economia e GestãoSocial SciencesScience & TechnologyTwo-part pricing (the Netflix model) has recently been proposed instead of uniform pricing for pharmaceuticals. Under two-part pricing the health plan pays a fixed fee for access to a drug at unit prices equal to marginal costs. Despite two-part pricing being socially efficient, we show that the health plan is worse off when the drug producer is a monopolist, as all surplus is extracted. This result is reversed with competition, as two-part pricing yields higher patient utility and lower drug costs for the health plan. However, if we allow for exclusive contracts, uniform pricing is preferred by the health plan. The choice of payment scheme is also shown to influence on the incentives to spend resources on drastic innovations relative to incremental, me-too innovations.FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (UIDB/03182/2020)ElsevierUniversidade do MinhoBrekke, Kurt R.Dalen, Dag MortenStraume, Odd Rune20222025-01-01T00:00:00Z2022-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376eng0167-629610.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.10261335316701https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629622000339info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:34:41Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/77376Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:30:25.158287Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs |
title |
Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs |
spellingShingle |
Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs Brekke, Kurt R. Health plans Payment schemes Pharmaceuticals Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão Social Sciences Science & Technology |
title_short |
Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs |
title_full |
Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs |
title_fullStr |
Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs |
title_full_unstemmed |
Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs |
title_sort |
Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs |
author |
Brekke, Kurt R. |
author_facet |
Brekke, Kurt R. Dalen, Dag Morten Straume, Odd Rune |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Dalen, Dag Morten Straume, Odd Rune |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Brekke, Kurt R. Dalen, Dag Morten Straume, Odd Rune |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Health plans Payment schemes Pharmaceuticals Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão Social Sciences Science & Technology |
topic |
Health plans Payment schemes Pharmaceuticals Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão Social Sciences Science & Technology |
description |
Two-part pricing (the Netflix model) has recently been proposed instead of uniform pricing for pharmaceuticals. Under two-part pricing the health plan pays a fixed fee for access to a drug at unit prices equal to marginal costs. Despite two-part pricing being socially efficient, we show that the health plan is worse off when the drug producer is a monopolist, as all surplus is extracted. This result is reversed with competition, as two-part pricing yields higher patient utility and lower drug costs for the health plan. However, if we allow for exclusive contracts, uniform pricing is preferred by the health plan. The choice of payment scheme is also shown to influence on the incentives to spend resources on drastic innovations relative to incremental, me-too innovations. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022 2022-01-01T00:00:00Z 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
0167-6296 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102613 35316701 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629622000339 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
embargoedAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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