Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Brekke, Kurt R.
Data de Publicação: 2022
Outros Autores: Dalen, Dag Morten, Straume, Odd Rune
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376
Resumo: Two-part pricing (the Netflix model) has recently been proposed instead of uniform pricing for pharmaceuticals. Under two-part pricing the health plan pays a fixed fee for access to a drug at unit prices equal to marginal costs. Despite two-part pricing being socially efficient, we show that the health plan is worse off when the drug producer is a monopolist, as all surplus is extracted. This result is reversed with competition, as two-part pricing yields higher patient utility and lower drug costs for the health plan. However, if we allow for exclusive contracts, uniform pricing is preferred by the health plan. The choice of payment scheme is also shown to influence on the incentives to spend resources on drastic innovations relative to incremental, me-too innovations.
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spelling Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffsHealth plansPayment schemesPharmaceuticalsCiências Sociais::Economia e GestãoSocial SciencesScience & TechnologyTwo-part pricing (the Netflix model) has recently been proposed instead of uniform pricing for pharmaceuticals. Under two-part pricing the health plan pays a fixed fee for access to a drug at unit prices equal to marginal costs. Despite two-part pricing being socially efficient, we show that the health plan is worse off when the drug producer is a monopolist, as all surplus is extracted. This result is reversed with competition, as two-part pricing yields higher patient utility and lower drug costs for the health plan. However, if we allow for exclusive contracts, uniform pricing is preferred by the health plan. The choice of payment scheme is also shown to influence on the incentives to spend resources on drastic innovations relative to incremental, me-too innovations.FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (UIDB/03182/2020)ElsevierUniversidade do MinhoBrekke, Kurt R.Dalen, Dag MortenStraume, Odd Rune20222025-01-01T00:00:00Z2022-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376eng0167-629610.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.10261335316701https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629622000339info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:34:41Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/77376Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:30:25.158287Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs
title Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs
spellingShingle Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs
Brekke, Kurt R.
Health plans
Payment schemes
Pharmaceuticals
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
Social Sciences
Science & Technology
title_short Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs
title_full Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs
title_fullStr Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs
title_full_unstemmed Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs
title_sort Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs
author Brekke, Kurt R.
author_facet Brekke, Kurt R.
Dalen, Dag Morten
Straume, Odd Rune
author_role author
author2 Dalen, Dag Morten
Straume, Odd Rune
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Brekke, Kurt R.
Dalen, Dag Morten
Straume, Odd Rune
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Health plans
Payment schemes
Pharmaceuticals
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
Social Sciences
Science & Technology
topic Health plans
Payment schemes
Pharmaceuticals
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
Social Sciences
Science & Technology
description Two-part pricing (the Netflix model) has recently been proposed instead of uniform pricing for pharmaceuticals. Under two-part pricing the health plan pays a fixed fee for access to a drug at unit prices equal to marginal costs. Despite two-part pricing being socially efficient, we show that the health plan is worse off when the drug producer is a monopolist, as all surplus is extracted. This result is reversed with competition, as two-part pricing yields higher patient utility and lower drug costs for the health plan. However, if we allow for exclusive contracts, uniform pricing is preferred by the health plan. The choice of payment scheme is also shown to influence on the incentives to spend resources on drastic innovations relative to incremental, me-too innovations.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022
2022-01-01T00:00:00Z
2025-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376
url https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 0167-6296
10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102613
35316701
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629622000339
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
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