Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Castel-Branco, Miguel Moraes
Data de Publicação: 2012
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/15551
Resumo: This dissertation presents a game theoretic approach to bidding fee auctions with independent private values. I analyze these auctions under two bidding window rules. In a sequential bidding auction the round moves forward immediately after a bid was submitted. In a multiple round auction, the round moves forward only after all players have submitted their action. Under the assumption that the bidders may either have a low value or a high value for the object, I show that multiple equilibria, with relevantly different characteristics, may arise under either rule. Moreover, the rule that maximizes the seller’s revenue depends on the the probability of a high value bidder.
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spelling Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctionsDomínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e GestãoThis dissertation presents a game theoretic approach to bidding fee auctions with independent private values. I analyze these auctions under two bidding window rules. In a sequential bidding auction the round moves forward immediately after a bid was submitted. In a multiple round auction, the round moves forward only after all players have submitted their action. Under the assumption that the bidders may either have a low value or a high value for the object, I show that multiple equilibria, with relevantly different characteristics, may arise under either rule. Moreover, the rule that maximizes the seller’s revenue depends on the the probability of a high value bidder.Branco, FernandoVeritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaCastel-Branco, Miguel Moraes2014-11-10T12:05:33Z2012-09-1720122012-09-17T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/15551enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-09-12T01:37:25Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/15551Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:12:58.029288Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions
title Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions
spellingShingle Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions
Castel-Branco, Miguel Moraes
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
title_short Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions
title_full Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions
title_fullStr Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions
title_full_unstemmed Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions
title_sort Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions
author Castel-Branco, Miguel Moraes
author_facet Castel-Branco, Miguel Moraes
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Branco, Fernando
Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Castel-Branco, Miguel Moraes
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
topic Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
description This dissertation presents a game theoretic approach to bidding fee auctions with independent private values. I analyze these auctions under two bidding window rules. In a sequential bidding auction the round moves forward immediately after a bid was submitted. In a multiple round auction, the round moves forward only after all players have submitted their action. Under the assumption that the bidders may either have a low value or a high value for the object, I show that multiple equilibria, with relevantly different characteristics, may arise under either rule. Moreover, the rule that maximizes the seller’s revenue depends on the the probability of a high value bidder.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-09-17
2012
2012-09-17T00:00:00Z
2014-11-10T12:05:33Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
format masterThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/15551
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/15551
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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