Delivered versus Mill Nonlinear Pricing in Free Entry Markets

• Autor(a) principal: Ferreira Jorge, Sílvia
• Data de Publicação: 2004
• Outros Autores: Pacheco Pires, Cesaltina
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83210
• topic: Delivered nonlinear pricing; Mill nonlinear pricing; Asymmetric information; Pricing regulation

This paper discusses a model where consumers simultaneously differ according to one unobservable (preference for quality) and one observable characteristic (location). In these circumstances nonlinear prices arise in equilibrium. The main question addressed in this work is whether firms should be allowed to practise different nonlinear prices at each location (delivered nonlinear pricing) or should be forced to set an unique nonlinear contract (mill nonlinear pricing). Assuming that firms can costless relocate, we show that the free entry long-run number of firms may be either smaller, equal, or higher under delivered nonlinear pricing. In addition, we show that delivered nonlinear pricing yields in the long-run higher welfare and, consequently, our results support the view that discriminatory nonlinear pricing should not be prohibited.