Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Vareda, João
Data de Publicação: 2007
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82845
Resumo: We study the investment of a telecommunications incumbent in quality and in cost reduction when an entrant can use its network through unbundling of the local loop. We find that unbundling may lower incentives for quality improvements, but raises incentives for cost reduction. Therefore, it is not true that all types of investment are crowded out with unbundling. If the regulator can commit to a socially optimal unbundling price before investment, the incumbent makes both types of investment. In the absence of commitment, the incumbent will not invest, so that unbundling regulation may lower welfare as compared to no regulation.
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spelling Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost ReductionTelecommunications RegulationUnbundlingInvestmentsQuality upgradesCost reductionCommitmentWe study the investment of a telecommunications incumbent in quality and in cost reduction when an entrant can use its network through unbundling of the local loop. We find that unbundling may lower incentives for quality improvements, but raises incentives for cost reduction. Therefore, it is not true that all types of investment are crowded out with unbundling. If the regulator can commit to a socially optimal unbundling price before investment, the incumbent makes both types of investment. In the absence of commitment, the incumbent will not invest, so that unbundling regulation may lower welfare as compared to no regulation.Nova SBERUNVareda, João2019-10-01T13:01:50Z2007-112007-11-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/82845engVareda, João, Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction (November, 2007). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 526info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:36:48Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/82845Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:13.378410Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction
title Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction
spellingShingle Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction
Vareda, João
Telecommunications Regulation
Unbundling
Investments
Quality upgrades
Cost reduction
Commitment
title_short Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction
title_full Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction
title_fullStr Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction
title_full_unstemmed Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction
title_sort Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction
author Vareda, João
author_facet Vareda, João
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Vareda, João
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Telecommunications Regulation
Unbundling
Investments
Quality upgrades
Cost reduction
Commitment
topic Telecommunications Regulation
Unbundling
Investments
Quality upgrades
Cost reduction
Commitment
description We study the investment of a telecommunications incumbent in quality and in cost reduction when an entrant can use its network through unbundling of the local loop. We find that unbundling may lower incentives for quality improvements, but raises incentives for cost reduction. Therefore, it is not true that all types of investment are crowded out with unbundling. If the regulator can commit to a socially optimal unbundling price before investment, the incumbent makes both types of investment. In the absence of commitment, the incumbent will not invest, so that unbundling regulation may lower welfare as compared to no regulation.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2007-11
2007-11-01T00:00:00Z
2019-10-01T13:01:50Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82845
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82845
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Vareda, João, Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction (November, 2007). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 526
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
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institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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