Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI—A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and 2016

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Schulze, Matthias
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i1.805
Resumo: This article analyzes two cryptography discourses dealing with the question of whether governments should be able to monitor secure and encrypted communication, for example via security vulnerabilities in cryptographic systems. The Clipper chip debate of 1993 and the FBI vs. Apple case of 2016 are analyzed to infer whether these discourses show similarities in their arguments and to draw lessons from them. The study is based on the securitization framework and analyzes the social construction of security threats in political discourses. The findings are that the arguments made by the proponents of exceptional access show major continuities between the two cases. In contrast, the arguments of the critics are more diverse. The critical arguments for stronger encryption remain highly relevant, especially in the context of the Snowden revelations. The article concludes that we need to adopt a more general cyber security perspective, considering the threat of cyber crime and state hacking, when debating whether the government should be able to weaken encryption.
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spelling Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI—A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and 2016Apple; cryptowar; discourse analysis; encryption; FBIThis article analyzes two cryptography discourses dealing with the question of whether governments should be able to monitor secure and encrypted communication, for example via security vulnerabilities in cryptographic systems. The Clipper chip debate of 1993 and the FBI vs. Apple case of 2016 are analyzed to infer whether these discourses show similarities in their arguments and to draw lessons from them. The study is based on the securitization framework and analyzes the social construction of security threats in political discourses. The findings are that the arguments made by the proponents of exceptional access show major continuities between the two cases. In contrast, the arguments of the critics are more diverse. The critical arguments for stronger encryption remain highly relevant, especially in the context of the Snowden revelations. The article concludes that we need to adopt a more general cyber security perspective, considering the threat of cyber crime and state hacking, when debating whether the government should be able to weaken encryption.Cogitatio2017-03-22info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i1.805oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/805Media and Communication; Vol 5, No 1 (2017): Post-Snowden Internet Policy; 54-622183-2439reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAPenghttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/805https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i1.805https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/805/805Copyright (c) 2017 Matthias Schulzehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSchulze, Matthias2022-12-20T10:57:55Zoai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/805Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:20:35.632095Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI—A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and 2016
title Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI—A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and 2016
spellingShingle Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI—A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and 2016
Schulze, Matthias
Apple; cryptowar; discourse analysis; encryption; FBI
title_short Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI—A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and 2016
title_full Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI—A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and 2016
title_fullStr Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI—A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and 2016
title_full_unstemmed Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI—A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and 2016
title_sort Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI—A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and 2016
author Schulze, Matthias
author_facet Schulze, Matthias
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Schulze, Matthias
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Apple; cryptowar; discourse analysis; encryption; FBI
topic Apple; cryptowar; discourse analysis; encryption; FBI
description This article analyzes two cryptography discourses dealing with the question of whether governments should be able to monitor secure and encrypted communication, for example via security vulnerabilities in cryptographic systems. The Clipper chip debate of 1993 and the FBI vs. Apple case of 2016 are analyzed to infer whether these discourses show similarities in their arguments and to draw lessons from them. The study is based on the securitization framework and analyzes the social construction of security threats in political discourses. The findings are that the arguments made by the proponents of exceptional access show major continuities between the two cases. In contrast, the arguments of the critics are more diverse. The critical arguments for stronger encryption remain highly relevant, especially in the context of the Snowden revelations. The article concludes that we need to adopt a more general cyber security perspective, considering the threat of cyber crime and state hacking, when debating whether the government should be able to weaken encryption.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-03-22
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i1.805
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dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/805
https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i1.805
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dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Matthias Schulze
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Matthias Schulze
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cogitatio
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cogitatio
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Media and Communication; Vol 5, No 1 (2017): Post-Snowden Internet Policy; 54-62
2183-2439
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