Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Barros, Victor
Data de Publicação: 2021
Outros Autores: Neves, João Carvalho das
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/24987
Resumo: This paper aims to assess whether firms tend to increase tax disclosure when the level of tax avoidance is higher. The paper proposes a new index based on hand-collected data from annual reports of firms listed on eight European stock exchanges, which made it possible to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary tax disclosures. The empirical results show that firms engaged in greater tax avoidance disclose more mandatory information regarding income tax, while they do not disclose voluntary tax-related information when corporate tax avoidance increases. Our results also highlight that IAS 12 does not inhibit firms from following different disclosure practices, as significant variability among countries was found. Stricter lookup tables may shape the variability in tax disclosures and may also limit tax avoidance practices to influence disclosure of mandatory information regarding income tax.
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spelling Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?Corporate Tax AvoidanceIncome TaxesIAS 12DisclosureVoluntary DisclosuresMandatory DisclosureCorporate TransparencyThis paper aims to assess whether firms tend to increase tax disclosure when the level of tax avoidance is higher. The paper proposes a new index based on hand-collected data from annual reports of firms listed on eight European stock exchanges, which made it possible to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary tax disclosures. The empirical results show that firms engaged in greater tax avoidance disclose more mandatory information regarding income tax, while they do not disclose voluntary tax-related information when corporate tax avoidance increases. Our results also highlight that IAS 12 does not inhibit firms from following different disclosure practices, as significant variability among countries was found. Stricter lookup tables may shape the variability in tax disclosures and may also limit tax avoidance practices to influence disclosure of mandatory information regarding income tax.Inderscience OnlineRepositório da Universidade de LisboaBarros, VictorNeves, João Carvalho das2022-07-26T12:16:47Z20212021-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/24987engBarros, Victor and João Carvalho das Neves .(2020). "Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?". International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, Vol. 16.No. 4: pp. 354-392.1740-8008metadata only accessinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:54:37Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/24987Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:08:57.165428Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?
title Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?
spellingShingle Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?
Barros, Victor
Corporate Tax Avoidance
Income Taxes
IAS 12
Disclosure
Voluntary Disclosures
Mandatory Disclosure
Corporate Transparency
title_short Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?
title_full Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?
title_fullStr Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?
title_full_unstemmed Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?
title_sort Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?
author Barros, Victor
author_facet Barros, Victor
Neves, João Carvalho das
author_role author
author2 Neves, João Carvalho das
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Barros, Victor
Neves, João Carvalho das
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Corporate Tax Avoidance
Income Taxes
IAS 12
Disclosure
Voluntary Disclosures
Mandatory Disclosure
Corporate Transparency
topic Corporate Tax Avoidance
Income Taxes
IAS 12
Disclosure
Voluntary Disclosures
Mandatory Disclosure
Corporate Transparency
description This paper aims to assess whether firms tend to increase tax disclosure when the level of tax avoidance is higher. The paper proposes a new index based on hand-collected data from annual reports of firms listed on eight European stock exchanges, which made it possible to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary tax disclosures. The empirical results show that firms engaged in greater tax avoidance disclose more mandatory information regarding income tax, while they do not disclose voluntary tax-related information when corporate tax avoidance increases. Our results also highlight that IAS 12 does not inhibit firms from following different disclosure practices, as significant variability among countries was found. Stricter lookup tables may shape the variability in tax disclosures and may also limit tax avoidance practices to influence disclosure of mandatory information regarding income tax.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021
2021-01-01T00:00:00Z
2022-07-26T12:16:47Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/24987
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/24987
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Barros, Victor and João Carvalho das Neves .(2020). "Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?". International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, Vol. 16.No. 4: pp. 354-392.
1740-8008
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv metadata only access
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Inderscience Online
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Inderscience Online
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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instacron:RCAAP
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