Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/24987 |
Resumo: | This paper aims to assess whether firms tend to increase tax disclosure when the level of tax avoidance is higher. The paper proposes a new index based on hand-collected data from annual reports of firms listed on eight European stock exchanges, which made it possible to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary tax disclosures. The empirical results show that firms engaged in greater tax avoidance disclose more mandatory information regarding income tax, while they do not disclose voluntary tax-related information when corporate tax avoidance increases. Our results also highlight that IAS 12 does not inhibit firms from following different disclosure practices, as significant variability among countries was found. Stricter lookup tables may shape the variability in tax disclosures and may also limit tax avoidance practices to influence disclosure of mandatory information regarding income tax. |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?Corporate Tax AvoidanceIncome TaxesIAS 12DisclosureVoluntary DisclosuresMandatory DisclosureCorporate TransparencyThis paper aims to assess whether firms tend to increase tax disclosure when the level of tax avoidance is higher. The paper proposes a new index based on hand-collected data from annual reports of firms listed on eight European stock exchanges, which made it possible to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary tax disclosures. The empirical results show that firms engaged in greater tax avoidance disclose more mandatory information regarding income tax, while they do not disclose voluntary tax-related information when corporate tax avoidance increases. Our results also highlight that IAS 12 does not inhibit firms from following different disclosure practices, as significant variability among countries was found. Stricter lookup tables may shape the variability in tax disclosures and may also limit tax avoidance practices to influence disclosure of mandatory information regarding income tax.Inderscience OnlineRepositório da Universidade de LisboaBarros, VictorNeves, João Carvalho das2022-07-26T12:16:47Z20212021-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/24987engBarros, Victor and João Carvalho das Neves .(2020). "Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?". International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, Vol. 16.No. 4: pp. 354-392.1740-8008metadata only accessinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:54:37Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/24987Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:08:57.165428Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high? |
title |
Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high? |
spellingShingle |
Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high? Barros, Victor Corporate Tax Avoidance Income Taxes IAS 12 Disclosure Voluntary Disclosures Mandatory Disclosure Corporate Transparency |
title_short |
Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high? |
title_full |
Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high? |
title_fullStr |
Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high? |
title_sort |
Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high? |
author |
Barros, Victor |
author_facet |
Barros, Victor Neves, João Carvalho das |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Neves, João Carvalho das |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Barros, Victor Neves, João Carvalho das |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Corporate Tax Avoidance Income Taxes IAS 12 Disclosure Voluntary Disclosures Mandatory Disclosure Corporate Transparency |
topic |
Corporate Tax Avoidance Income Taxes IAS 12 Disclosure Voluntary Disclosures Mandatory Disclosure Corporate Transparency |
description |
This paper aims to assess whether firms tend to increase tax disclosure when the level of tax avoidance is higher. The paper proposes a new index based on hand-collected data from annual reports of firms listed on eight European stock exchanges, which made it possible to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary tax disclosures. The empirical results show that firms engaged in greater tax avoidance disclose more mandatory information regarding income tax, while they do not disclose voluntary tax-related information when corporate tax avoidance increases. Our results also highlight that IAS 12 does not inhibit firms from following different disclosure practices, as significant variability among countries was found. Stricter lookup tables may shape the variability in tax disclosures and may also limit tax avoidance practices to influence disclosure of mandatory information regarding income tax. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021 2021-01-01T00:00:00Z 2022-07-26T12:16:47Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/24987 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/24987 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Barros, Victor and João Carvalho das Neves .(2020). "Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?". International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, Vol. 16.No. 4: pp. 354-392. 1740-8008 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
metadata only access info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
metadata only access |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Inderscience Online |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Inderscience Online |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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