GPS jammimg and spoofing using software defined radio
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10071/15244 |
Resumo: | The GPS is currently the most widely used and best known example of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and as a system relies on GPS positioning to make its next move, it is important to understand GPS vulnerabilities and acknowledge the threats like jamming and spoofing. Jamming and spoofing equipment can be openly purchased online at a low cost. The Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology is also bringing the flexibility and cost efficiency to a whole new level. This research aims to explore this technology by asking the following research questions: Is there a suitable combination of waveform, power and amplitude to disrupt the GPS signal? Is GPS jamming equally easy to accomplish in software as it is in hardware? Is GPS spoofing easier to accomplish in software? The study consists of two tests: a GPS jamming test where focus is to realize what combination of waveform, power and amplitude is able to jam the GPS signal and a GPS spoofing test where a HackRF One is used to fool a mobile. The results from the jamming test have shown that GPS jamming is easy to accomplish using different combinations as GPS signals have low received signal power. The spoofing test proved that it is capable to spoof a mobile with a fairly inexpensive SDR setup and freely available software. |
id |
RCAP_57b4edff5ceadc6c4fd249d9783042e2 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/15244 |
network_acronym_str |
RCAP |
network_name_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository_id_str |
7160 |
spelling |
GPS jammimg and spoofing using software defined radioGPSJammingSpoofingSoftware Defined RadioHackRF OneGPS Global Positioning systemTeste de softwareSinal digitalThe GPS is currently the most widely used and best known example of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and as a system relies on GPS positioning to make its next move, it is important to understand GPS vulnerabilities and acknowledge the threats like jamming and spoofing. Jamming and spoofing equipment can be openly purchased online at a low cost. The Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology is also bringing the flexibility and cost efficiency to a whole new level. This research aims to explore this technology by asking the following research questions: Is there a suitable combination of waveform, power and amplitude to disrupt the GPS signal? Is GPS jamming equally easy to accomplish in software as it is in hardware? Is GPS spoofing easier to accomplish in software? The study consists of two tests: a GPS jamming test where focus is to realize what combination of waveform, power and amplitude is able to jam the GPS signal and a GPS spoofing test where a HackRF One is used to fool a mobile. The results from the jamming test have shown that GPS jamming is easy to accomplish using different combinations as GPS signals have low received signal power. The spoofing test proved that it is capable to spoof a mobile with a fairly inexpensive SDR setup and freely available software.O Sistema de Posicionamento Global (GPS) é actualmente o melhor exemplo e o mais usado Sistema de Navegação Global por Satélite (GNSS) e como maior parte dos veículos atuais dependem do posicionamento do GPS para terem autonomia, é importante perceber as vulnerabilidades do GPS e reconhecer as ameaças como o bloqueio e o jamming. Equipamentos para bloquear e fazer spoofing podem ser comprados online a um preço acessível. A tecnologia Software Defined Radio (SDR) traz a flexibilidade e provoca uma ainda maior diminuição de custo. Esta investigação tem como objectivo explorar esta tecnologia respondendo às seguintes questões: Existe uma combinação de forma de onda, potência e amplitude adequada para perturbar o sinal GPS? O bloqueio do GPS é igualmente fácil de realizar em software como é em hardware? Fazer spoofing ao GPS é mais fácil de realizar em software? O desenvolvimento deste trabalho consiste em dois testes: um teste de bloqueio ao GPS onde o foco é perceber qual a combinação de forma de onda, potência e amplitude que consegue bloquear o sinal GPS e um teste de spoofing ao GPS onde o HackRF One é usado para "enganar" um telemóvel. Os resultados do teste de bloqueio mostraram que o bloqueio ao GPS é fácil de realizar usando diferentes combinações, devido à baixa potência de sinal recebido dos receptores de GPS. O teste do spoofing provou que é possível fazer spoof a um telemóvel com uma configuração SDR com um custo acessível.2018-02-23T13:54:19Z2017-12-14T00:00:00Z2017-12-142017-10info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.documentapplication/octet-streamhttp://hdl.handle.net/10071/15244TID:201785935engSilva, Diogo Alexandre Martins dainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-09T17:53:01Zoai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/15244Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:26:30.248534Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
GPS jammimg and spoofing using software defined radio |
title |
GPS jammimg and spoofing using software defined radio |
spellingShingle |
GPS jammimg and spoofing using software defined radio Silva, Diogo Alexandre Martins da GPS Jamming Spoofing Software Defined Radio HackRF One GPS Global Positioning system Teste de software Sinal digital |
title_short |
GPS jammimg and spoofing using software defined radio |
title_full |
GPS jammimg and spoofing using software defined radio |
title_fullStr |
GPS jammimg and spoofing using software defined radio |
title_full_unstemmed |
GPS jammimg and spoofing using software defined radio |
title_sort |
GPS jammimg and spoofing using software defined radio |
author |
Silva, Diogo Alexandre Martins da |
author_facet |
Silva, Diogo Alexandre Martins da |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Silva, Diogo Alexandre Martins da |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
GPS Jamming Spoofing Software Defined Radio HackRF One GPS Global Positioning system Teste de software Sinal digital |
topic |
GPS Jamming Spoofing Software Defined Radio HackRF One GPS Global Positioning system Teste de software Sinal digital |
description |
The GPS is currently the most widely used and best known example of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and as a system relies on GPS positioning to make its next move, it is important to understand GPS vulnerabilities and acknowledge the threats like jamming and spoofing. Jamming and spoofing equipment can be openly purchased online at a low cost. The Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology is also bringing the flexibility and cost efficiency to a whole new level. This research aims to explore this technology by asking the following research questions: Is there a suitable combination of waveform, power and amplitude to disrupt the GPS signal? Is GPS jamming equally easy to accomplish in software as it is in hardware? Is GPS spoofing easier to accomplish in software? The study consists of two tests: a GPS jamming test where focus is to realize what combination of waveform, power and amplitude is able to jam the GPS signal and a GPS spoofing test where a HackRF One is used to fool a mobile. The results from the jamming test have shown that GPS jamming is easy to accomplish using different combinations as GPS signals have low received signal power. The spoofing test proved that it is capable to spoof a mobile with a fairly inexpensive SDR setup and freely available software. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-12-14T00:00:00Z 2017-12-14 2017-10 2018-02-23T13:54:19Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
format |
masterThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10071/15244 TID:201785935 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10071/15244 |
identifier_str_mv |
TID:201785935 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document application/octet-stream |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1799134827919704064 |