Union collusion and intra-industry trade
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2002 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6857 |
Resumo: | This paper analyses the scope for collusive behaviour within the context of an international duopoly supergame in which both firms and monopoly labour unions interact strategically. We find that the presence of unions, implying an endogenisation of production costs, dramatically alters the incentives for inter-firm collusion. There are, however, strong incentives for the unions to collude, raising the wage above the equilibrium level of the one-shot game. We propose two candidates for a Nash equilibrium of the supergame, in both of which the unions collude. The main result of the paper is that the presence of unions could actually promote intra-industry trade as an equilibrium outcome of the infinitely repeated game. |
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Union collusion and intra-industry tradeCollusionIntra-industry tradeLabour unionsThis paper analyses the scope for collusive behaviour within the context of an international duopoly supergame in which both firms and monopoly labour unions interact strategically. We find that the presence of unions, implying an endogenisation of production costs, dramatically alters the incentives for inter-firm collusion. There are, however, strong incentives for the unions to collude, raising the wage above the equilibrium level of the one-shot game. We propose two candidates for a Nash equilibrium of the supergame, in both of which the unions collude. The main result of the paper is that the presence of unions could actually promote intra-industry trade as an equilibrium outcome of the infinitely repeated game.Elsevier B.V.Universidade do MinhoStraume, Odd Rune2002-052002-05-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/6857eng"International Journal of Industrial Organization". ISSN 0167-7187. 20:5 (May 2002) 631-652.0167-7187http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:14:16Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/6857Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:06:34.243413Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Union collusion and intra-industry trade |
title |
Union collusion and intra-industry trade |
spellingShingle |
Union collusion and intra-industry trade Straume, Odd Rune Collusion Intra-industry trade Labour unions |
title_short |
Union collusion and intra-industry trade |
title_full |
Union collusion and intra-industry trade |
title_fullStr |
Union collusion and intra-industry trade |
title_full_unstemmed |
Union collusion and intra-industry trade |
title_sort |
Union collusion and intra-industry trade |
author |
Straume, Odd Rune |
author_facet |
Straume, Odd Rune |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Straume, Odd Rune |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Collusion Intra-industry trade Labour unions |
topic |
Collusion Intra-industry trade Labour unions |
description |
This paper analyses the scope for collusive behaviour within the context of an international duopoly supergame in which both firms and monopoly labour unions interact strategically. We find that the presence of unions, implying an endogenisation of production costs, dramatically alters the incentives for inter-firm collusion. There are, however, strong incentives for the unions to collude, raising the wage above the equilibrium level of the one-shot game. We propose two candidates for a Nash equilibrium of the supergame, in both of which the unions collude. The main result of the paper is that the presence of unions could actually promote intra-industry trade as an equilibrium outcome of the infinitely repeated game. |
publishDate |
2002 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2002-05 2002-05-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6857 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6857 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
"International Journal of Industrial Organization". ISSN 0167-7187. 20:5 (May 2002) 631-652. 0167-7187 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier B.V. |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier B.V. |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799132481582006272 |