Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Outros Autores: | , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10451/59528 |
Resumo: | Political parties increasingly rely on self-regulation to promote ethical standards in office. The adoption of ethics self-regulation and its ability to induce change is likely to be a function of the responses from politicians and voters. Without external enforcement mechanisms, compliance requires support from legislators. In turn, if voters perceive self-regulation as cheap talk, officials have fewer incentives to acquiesce. The extent to which such efforts are rewarded by voters and supported by elected officials remains an open question. We examine this question in a paired conjoint experiment with elected officials and voters in Portugal and Spain. The results show that politicians support (and voters reward) financial disclosures, lobbying registries, and sanctions for MPs involved in corruption cases. Voters also reward term limits, and the effects are not moderated by ideological agreement. The findings suggest that parties can benefit from promoting transparency reforms and are not penalized by experimentation. |
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Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparencycorruptionfinancial disclosureslobbying registriesparty self-regulationtransparencyPolitical parties increasingly rely on self-regulation to promote ethical standards in office. The adoption of ethics self-regulation and its ability to induce change is likely to be a function of the responses from politicians and voters. Without external enforcement mechanisms, compliance requires support from legislators. In turn, if voters perceive self-regulation as cheap talk, officials have fewer incentives to acquiesce. The extent to which such efforts are rewarded by voters and supported by elected officials remains an open question. We examine this question in a paired conjoint experiment with elected officials and voters in Portugal and Spain. The results show that politicians support (and voters reward) financial disclosures, lobbying registries, and sanctions for MPs involved in corruption cases. Voters also reward term limits, and the effects are not moderated by ideological agreement. The findings suggest that parties can benefit from promoting transparency reforms and are not penalized by experimentation.SageRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPereira, Miguel MariaCoroado, SusanaSousa, Luis deMagalhães, Pedro C.2023-10-02T10:13:11Z20232023-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10451/59528engPereira, M. M., Coroado, S., Sousa, L. de, Magalhães, P. C. (2023). Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency. Party Politics, First published online September 28, 2023, DOI 10.1177/135406882312035281354-068810.1177/13540688231203528info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-08T17:08:48Zoai:repositorio.ul.pt:10451/59528Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:09:30.146211Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency |
title |
Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency |
spellingShingle |
Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency Pereira, Miguel Maria corruption financial disclosures lobbying registries party self-regulation transparency |
title_short |
Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency |
title_full |
Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency |
title_fullStr |
Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency |
title_full_unstemmed |
Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency |
title_sort |
Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency |
author |
Pereira, Miguel Maria |
author_facet |
Pereira, Miguel Maria Coroado, Susana Sousa, Luis de Magalhães, Pedro C. |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Coroado, Susana Sousa, Luis de Magalhães, Pedro C. |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pereira, Miguel Maria Coroado, Susana Sousa, Luis de Magalhães, Pedro C. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
corruption financial disclosures lobbying registries party self-regulation transparency |
topic |
corruption financial disclosures lobbying registries party self-regulation transparency |
description |
Political parties increasingly rely on self-regulation to promote ethical standards in office. The adoption of ethics self-regulation and its ability to induce change is likely to be a function of the responses from politicians and voters. Without external enforcement mechanisms, compliance requires support from legislators. In turn, if voters perceive self-regulation as cheap talk, officials have fewer incentives to acquiesce. The extent to which such efforts are rewarded by voters and supported by elected officials remains an open question. We examine this question in a paired conjoint experiment with elected officials and voters in Portugal and Spain. The results show that politicians support (and voters reward) financial disclosures, lobbying registries, and sanctions for MPs involved in corruption cases. Voters also reward term limits, and the effects are not moderated by ideological agreement. The findings suggest that parties can benefit from promoting transparency reforms and are not penalized by experimentation. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-10-02T10:13:11Z 2023 2023-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/59528 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/59528 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Pereira, M. M., Coroado, S., Sousa, L. de, Magalhães, P. C. (2023). Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency. Party Politics, First published online September 28, 2023, DOI 10.1177/13540688231203528 1354-0688 10.1177/13540688231203528 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Sage |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Sage |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799134650215432192 |