Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pereira, Miguel Maria
Data de Publicação: 2023
Outros Autores: Coroado, Susana, Sousa, Luis de, Magalhães, Pedro C.
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10451/59528
Resumo: Political parties increasingly rely on self-regulation to promote ethical standards in office. The adoption of ethics self-regulation and its ability to induce change is likely to be a function of the responses from politicians and voters. Without external enforcement mechanisms, compliance requires support from legislators. In turn, if voters perceive self-regulation as cheap talk, officials have fewer incentives to acquiesce. The extent to which such efforts are rewarded by voters and supported by elected officials remains an open question. We examine this question in a paired conjoint experiment with elected officials and voters in Portugal and Spain. The results show that politicians support (and voters reward) financial disclosures, lobbying registries, and sanctions for MPs involved in corruption cases. Voters also reward term limits, and the effects are not moderated by ideological agreement. The findings suggest that parties can benefit from promoting transparency reforms and are not penalized by experimentation.
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spelling Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparencycorruptionfinancial disclosureslobbying registriesparty self-regulationtransparencyPolitical parties increasingly rely on self-regulation to promote ethical standards in office. The adoption of ethics self-regulation and its ability to induce change is likely to be a function of the responses from politicians and voters. Without external enforcement mechanisms, compliance requires support from legislators. In turn, if voters perceive self-regulation as cheap talk, officials have fewer incentives to acquiesce. The extent to which such efforts are rewarded by voters and supported by elected officials remains an open question. We examine this question in a paired conjoint experiment with elected officials and voters in Portugal and Spain. The results show that politicians support (and voters reward) financial disclosures, lobbying registries, and sanctions for MPs involved in corruption cases. Voters also reward term limits, and the effects are not moderated by ideological agreement. The findings suggest that parties can benefit from promoting transparency reforms and are not penalized by experimentation.SageRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPereira, Miguel MariaCoroado, SusanaSousa, Luis deMagalhães, Pedro C.2023-10-02T10:13:11Z20232023-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10451/59528engPereira, M. M., Coroado, S., Sousa, L. de, Magalhães, P. C. (2023). Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency. Party Politics, First published online September 28, 2023, DOI 10.1177/135406882312035281354-068810.1177/13540688231203528info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-08T17:08:48Zoai:repositorio.ul.pt:10451/59528Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:09:30.146211Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency
title Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency
spellingShingle Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency
Pereira, Miguel Maria
corruption
financial disclosures
lobbying registries
party self-regulation
transparency
title_short Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency
title_full Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency
title_fullStr Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency
title_full_unstemmed Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency
title_sort Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency
author Pereira, Miguel Maria
author_facet Pereira, Miguel Maria
Coroado, Susana
Sousa, Luis de
Magalhães, Pedro C.
author_role author
author2 Coroado, Susana
Sousa, Luis de
Magalhães, Pedro C.
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pereira, Miguel Maria
Coroado, Susana
Sousa, Luis de
Magalhães, Pedro C.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv corruption
financial disclosures
lobbying registries
party self-regulation
transparency
topic corruption
financial disclosures
lobbying registries
party self-regulation
transparency
description Political parties increasingly rely on self-regulation to promote ethical standards in office. The adoption of ethics self-regulation and its ability to induce change is likely to be a function of the responses from politicians and voters. Without external enforcement mechanisms, compliance requires support from legislators. In turn, if voters perceive self-regulation as cheap talk, officials have fewer incentives to acquiesce. The extent to which such efforts are rewarded by voters and supported by elected officials remains an open question. We examine this question in a paired conjoint experiment with elected officials and voters in Portugal and Spain. The results show that politicians support (and voters reward) financial disclosures, lobbying registries, and sanctions for MPs involved in corruption cases. Voters also reward term limits, and the effects are not moderated by ideological agreement. The findings suggest that parties can benefit from promoting transparency reforms and are not penalized by experimentation.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-10-02T10:13:11Z
2023
2023-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10451/59528
url http://hdl.handle.net/10451/59528
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Pereira, M. M., Coroado, S., Sousa, L. de, Magalhães, P. C. (2023). Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency. Party Politics, First published online September 28, 2023, DOI 10.1177/13540688231203528
1354-0688
10.1177/13540688231203528
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Sage
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Sage
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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