Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: a game theory approach
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/11328/1751 |
Resumo: | Strong interconnections between family and business which are innate to family firms can prove to be the source of conflict. Of all conflicts, those between family members and especially between siblings erode the family’s harmony and can risk the firm’s continuity. The passing of the family firm’s control from the founders to the next generation is a critical stage for the family firm and can be a catalyst for conflict. This article extends the use of game theory in family firm succession to explicitly include the noneconomic factors related to the family dimension, focusing on the emotional cost of conflict resulting from sibling competition. The results show that this cost is fundamental in terms of successor selection. The article shows that the collaborative family outcome, which results from family members cooperating and acting as a unit, is better in promoting firm intergenerational succession and ensuring that the founder’s preferred child is appointed successor. |
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Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: a game theory approachConflictSibling competitionFamily firmSuccessionGame theoryCollaborative family outcomeStrong interconnections between family and business which are innate to family firms can prove to be the source of conflict. Of all conflicts, those between family members and especially between siblings erode the family’s harmony and can risk the firm’s continuity. The passing of the family firm’s control from the founders to the next generation is a critical stage for the family firm and can be a catalyst for conflict. This article extends the use of game theory in family firm succession to explicitly include the noneconomic factors related to the family dimension, focusing on the emotional cost of conflict resulting from sibling competition. The results show that this cost is fundamental in terms of successor selection. The article shows that the collaborative family outcome, which results from family members cooperating and acting as a unit, is better in promoting firm intergenerational succession and ensuring that the founder’s preferred child is appointed successor.2017-02-13T15:51:11Z2018-12-12T00:00:00Z2016-01-01T00:00:00Z2016info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11328/1751engJayantilal, ShitalBañegil Palacios, Tomás M.Jorge, Sílvia Ferreirainfo:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-06-15T02:10:01ZPortal AgregadorONG |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: a game theory approach |
title |
Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: a game theory approach |
spellingShingle |
Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: a game theory approach Jayantilal, Shital Conflict Sibling competition Family firm Succession Game theory Collaborative family outcome |
title_short |
Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: a game theory approach |
title_full |
Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: a game theory approach |
title_fullStr |
Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: a game theory approach |
title_full_unstemmed |
Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: a game theory approach |
title_sort |
Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: a game theory approach |
author |
Jayantilal, Shital |
author_facet |
Jayantilal, Shital Bañegil Palacios, Tomás M. Jorge, Sílvia Ferreira |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Bañegil Palacios, Tomás M. Jorge, Sílvia Ferreira |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Jayantilal, Shital Bañegil Palacios, Tomás M. Jorge, Sílvia Ferreira |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Conflict Sibling competition Family firm Succession Game theory Collaborative family outcome |
topic |
Conflict Sibling competition Family firm Succession Game theory Collaborative family outcome |
description |
Strong interconnections between family and business which are innate to family firms can prove to be the source of conflict. Of all conflicts, those between family members and especially between siblings erode the family’s harmony and can risk the firm’s continuity. The passing of the family firm’s control from the founders to the next generation is a critical stage for the family firm and can be a catalyst for conflict. This article extends the use of game theory in family firm succession to explicitly include the noneconomic factors related to the family dimension, focusing on the emotional cost of conflict resulting from sibling competition. The results show that this cost is fundamental in terms of successor selection. The article shows that the collaborative family outcome, which results from family members cooperating and acting as a unit, is better in promoting firm intergenerational succession and ensuring that the founder’s preferred child is appointed successor. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-01-01T00:00:00Z 2016 2017-02-13T15:51:11Z 2018-12-12T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11328/1751 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11328/1751 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
embargoedAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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1777302550736797696 |