The European Parliament and Delegation to Comitology

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Héritier, Adrienne
Data de Publicação: 2008
Outros Autores: Moury, Catherine
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10071/716
Resumo: In this article we argue that that the delegation of implementing power to the Commission changes due to the fact that, under co-decision, two legislators (the Council and the EP) must agree to delegate. We first show that, with the introduction of co-decision in environmental policy, the legislators have relied more extensively on delegation. This indicates that the EP and the Council sought to save the political transaction costs associated with detailed legislation.. Moreover, the finding that increased delegation preceded the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty shows that the Council – anticipating its relative loss of power by having to share legislative power with the EP - was in a rush to delegate as much as possible to the Commission before the entry into force of co-decision. This is in accordance with a redistributive power-based bargaining argument according to which the Council prefers to delegate to the Commission, over which it has some control through comitology rather than sharing the legislative power with the EP. We also claimed that with increasing formal powers in comitology the EP will less oppose delegation. Our results support this hypothesis, but call for some qualification: the EP opposes delegation less, if the increase in competences is important. If, however, it is only minor, it does not lead to less opposition to comitology. Quite the contrary, the EP appears to be prompted to systematically introduce amendments to restrict the scope of delegation. Which in turn may be used as a leverage in future negotiations over the revising of the rules governing comitology.
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spelling The European Parliament and Delegation to ComitologyEuropean UnionImplementationComitologyDelegationPrincipal-agent theoryTransactions costsIn this article we argue that that the delegation of implementing power to the Commission changes due to the fact that, under co-decision, two legislators (the Council and the EP) must agree to delegate. We first show that, with the introduction of co-decision in environmental policy, the legislators have relied more extensively on delegation. This indicates that the EP and the Council sought to save the political transaction costs associated with detailed legislation.. Moreover, the finding that increased delegation preceded the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty shows that the Council – anticipating its relative loss of power by having to share legislative power with the EP - was in a rush to delegate as much as possible to the Commission before the entry into force of co-decision. This is in accordance with a redistributive power-based bargaining argument according to which the Council prefers to delegate to the Commission, over which it has some control through comitology rather than sharing the legislative power with the EP. We also claimed that with increasing formal powers in comitology the EP will less oppose delegation. Our results support this hypothesis, but call for some qualification: the EP opposes delegation less, if the increase in competences is important. If, however, it is only minor, it does not lead to less opposition to comitology. Quite the contrary, the EP appears to be prompted to systematically introduce amendments to restrict the scope of delegation. Which in turn may be used as a leverage in future negotiations over the revising of the rules governing comitology.CIES – ISCTE2008-11-04T11:21:14Z2008-01-01T00:00:00Z2008info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10071/716eng1647-0893Héritier, AdrienneMoury, Catherineinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-09T17:27:18Zoai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/716Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:12:10.743809Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The European Parliament and Delegation to Comitology
title The European Parliament and Delegation to Comitology
spellingShingle The European Parliament and Delegation to Comitology
Héritier, Adrienne
European Union
Implementation
Comitology
Delegation
Principal-agent theory
Transactions costs
title_short The European Parliament and Delegation to Comitology
title_full The European Parliament and Delegation to Comitology
title_fullStr The European Parliament and Delegation to Comitology
title_full_unstemmed The European Parliament and Delegation to Comitology
title_sort The European Parliament and Delegation to Comitology
author Héritier, Adrienne
author_facet Héritier, Adrienne
Moury, Catherine
author_role author
author2 Moury, Catherine
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Héritier, Adrienne
Moury, Catherine
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv European Union
Implementation
Comitology
Delegation
Principal-agent theory
Transactions costs
topic European Union
Implementation
Comitology
Delegation
Principal-agent theory
Transactions costs
description In this article we argue that that the delegation of implementing power to the Commission changes due to the fact that, under co-decision, two legislators (the Council and the EP) must agree to delegate. We first show that, with the introduction of co-decision in environmental policy, the legislators have relied more extensively on delegation. This indicates that the EP and the Council sought to save the political transaction costs associated with detailed legislation.. Moreover, the finding that increased delegation preceded the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty shows that the Council – anticipating its relative loss of power by having to share legislative power with the EP - was in a rush to delegate as much as possible to the Commission before the entry into force of co-decision. This is in accordance with a redistributive power-based bargaining argument according to which the Council prefers to delegate to the Commission, over which it has some control through comitology rather than sharing the legislative power with the EP. We also claimed that with increasing formal powers in comitology the EP will less oppose delegation. Our results support this hypothesis, but call for some qualification: the EP opposes delegation less, if the increase in competences is important. If, however, it is only minor, it does not lead to less opposition to comitology. Quite the contrary, the EP appears to be prompted to systematically introduce amendments to restrict the scope of delegation. Which in turn may be used as a leverage in future negotiations over the revising of the rules governing comitology.
publishDate 2008
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2008-11-04T11:21:14Z
2008-01-01T00:00:00Z
2008
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv CIES – ISCTE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv CIES – ISCTE
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
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