Environmental taxation: privatization with different public firm’s objective functions

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Data de Publicação: 2016
Outros Autores: Ferreira, Flávio
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/9049
Resumo: In this paper, we study the effects of environmental taxes and privatization in a mixed market, by considering that the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels. We also compare the results obtained with the ones got when the public firm aims to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and the firm’s profit.
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spelling Environmental taxation: privatization with different public firm’s objective functionsIndustrial organizationGame TheoryCournot modelEnvironmentPrivatizationIn this paper, we study the effects of environmental taxes and privatization in a mixed market, by considering that the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels. We also compare the results obtained with the ones got when the public firm aims to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and the firm’s profit.Natural Sciences PublishingRepositório Científico do Instituto Politécnico do PortoFerreira, Fernanda A.Ferreira, Flávio2016-12-29T15:03:55Z20162016-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/9049eng1935-009010.18576/amis/100503metadata only accessinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-13T12:50:12Zoai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/9049Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:29:42.256191Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Environmental taxation: privatization with different public firm’s objective functions
title Environmental taxation: privatization with different public firm’s objective functions
spellingShingle Environmental taxation: privatization with different public firm’s objective functions
Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Industrial organization
Game Theory
Cournot model
Environment
Privatization
title_short Environmental taxation: privatization with different public firm’s objective functions
title_full Environmental taxation: privatization with different public firm’s objective functions
title_fullStr Environmental taxation: privatization with different public firm’s objective functions
title_full_unstemmed Environmental taxation: privatization with different public firm’s objective functions
title_sort Environmental taxation: privatization with different public firm’s objective functions
author Ferreira, Fernanda A.
author_facet Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Ferreira, Flávio
author_role author
author2 Ferreira, Flávio
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico do Instituto Politécnico do Porto
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Ferreira, Flávio
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Industrial organization
Game Theory
Cournot model
Environment
Privatization
topic Industrial organization
Game Theory
Cournot model
Environment
Privatization
description In this paper, we study the effects of environmental taxes and privatization in a mixed market, by considering that the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels. We also compare the results obtained with the ones got when the public firm aims to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and the firm’s profit.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-12-29T15:03:55Z
2016
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10.18576/amis/100503
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Natural Sciences Publishing
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