On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10451/28335 |
Resumo: | Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these ontologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this is the strong intuition that an objective world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other arguments—such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the origin of conscious life, etc.—are also often cited. In this essay, I will argue that these objections against the plausibility of idealism are false. As such, this essay seeks to show that idealism is an entirely plausible ontology. |
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On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting CriticismsIdealismPhysicalismpanpsychismcosmopsychismMind-body problemSeveral alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these ontologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this is the strong intuition that an objective world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other arguments—such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the origin of conscious life, etc.—are also often cited. In this essay, I will argue that these objections against the plausibility of idealism are false. As such, this essay seeks to show that idealism is an entirely plausible ontology.Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de FilosofiaRepositório da Universidade de LisboaKastrup, Bernardo2017-07-12T22:49:13Z2017-052017-05-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10451/28335eng0873-626Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-08T16:20:01Zoai:repositorio.ul.pt:10451/28335Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T21:44:35.273664Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms |
title |
On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms |
spellingShingle |
On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms Kastrup, Bernardo Idealism Physicalism panpsychism cosmopsychism Mind-body problem |
title_short |
On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms |
title_full |
On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms |
title_fullStr |
On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms |
title_full_unstemmed |
On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms |
title_sort |
On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms |
author |
Kastrup, Bernardo |
author_facet |
Kastrup, Bernardo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Kastrup, Bernardo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Idealism Physicalism panpsychism cosmopsychism Mind-body problem |
topic |
Idealism Physicalism panpsychism cosmopsychism Mind-body problem |
description |
Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these ontologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this is the strong intuition that an objective world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other arguments—such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the origin of conscious life, etc.—are also often cited. In this essay, I will argue that these objections against the plausibility of idealism are false. As such, this essay seeks to show that idealism is an entirely plausible ontology. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-07-12T22:49:13Z 2017-05 2017-05-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/28335 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/28335 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
0873-626X |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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