Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one s own knowledge and belief revision
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10451/63912 |
Resumo: | Our lay theories suggest that people who are overconfident in their knowledge are less likely to revise that knowledge when someone else offers an alternative belief. Similarly, we might assume that people who are willing to revise their beliefs might not be very confident in their knowledge to begin with. Two studies with children aged 4-11 years old and college students call these lay theories into question. We found that young children were simultaneously more overconfident in their knowledge (e.g., believing they knew what chartreuse meant) and more likely to revise their initial beliefs (e.g., choosing another color after seeing a peer choose a different color) than older children and adults. These results bridge the metacognitive and epistemic trust literatures, which have largely progressed independently from each other. We discuss the potential causes and functions of the dissociation between the confidence with which beliefs are held and the revision of those beliefs across development. |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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7160 |
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Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one s own knowledge and belief revisionOverconfidenceBelief revisionMetacognitionEpistemic trustArroganceAge differencesOur lay theories suggest that people who are overconfident in their knowledge are less likely to revise that knowledge when someone else offers an alternative belief. Similarly, we might assume that people who are willing to revise their beliefs might not be very confident in their knowledge to begin with. Two studies with children aged 4-11 years old and college students call these lay theories into question. We found that young children were simultaneously more overconfident in their knowledge (e.g., believing they knew what chartreuse meant) and more likely to revise their initial beliefs (e.g., choosing another color after seeing a peer choose a different color) than older children and adults. These results bridge the metacognitive and epistemic trust literatures, which have largely progressed independently from each other. We discuss the potential causes and functions of the dissociation between the confidence with which beliefs are held and the revision of those beliefs across development.APARepositório da Universidade de LisboaHaga, SaraOlson, Kristina R.2024-04-03T11:51:08Z2017-122024-02-09T17:45:08Z2017-12-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10451/63912engHagá, S., & Olson, K. R. (2017). Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one’s own knowledge and belief revision. Developmental Psychology, 53(12), 2319-2332. https://doi.org/10.1037/dev00004331939-0599cv-prod-98392710.1037/dev00004332-s2.0-85032575767info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-11-20T18:28:02Zoai:repositorio.ul.pt:10451/63912Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openairemluisa.alvim@gmail.comopendoar:71602024-11-20T18:28:02Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one s own knowledge and belief revision |
title |
Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one s own knowledge and belief revision |
spellingShingle |
Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one s own knowledge and belief revision Haga, Sara Overconfidence Belief revision Metacognition Epistemic trust Arrogance Age differences |
title_short |
Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one s own knowledge and belief revision |
title_full |
Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one s own knowledge and belief revision |
title_fullStr |
Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one s own knowledge and belief revision |
title_full_unstemmed |
Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one s own knowledge and belief revision |
title_sort |
Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one s own knowledge and belief revision |
author |
Haga, Sara |
author_facet |
Haga, Sara Olson, Kristina R. |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Olson, Kristina R. |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Haga, Sara Olson, Kristina R. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Overconfidence Belief revision Metacognition Epistemic trust Arrogance Age differences |
topic |
Overconfidence Belief revision Metacognition Epistemic trust Arrogance Age differences |
description |
Our lay theories suggest that people who are overconfident in their knowledge are less likely to revise that knowledge when someone else offers an alternative belief. Similarly, we might assume that people who are willing to revise their beliefs might not be very confident in their knowledge to begin with. Two studies with children aged 4-11 years old and college students call these lay theories into question. We found that young children were simultaneously more overconfident in their knowledge (e.g., believing they knew what chartreuse meant) and more likely to revise their initial beliefs (e.g., choosing another color after seeing a peer choose a different color) than older children and adults. These results bridge the metacognitive and epistemic trust literatures, which have largely progressed independently from each other. We discuss the potential causes and functions of the dissociation between the confidence with which beliefs are held and the revision of those beliefs across development. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-12 2017-12-01T00:00:00Z 2024-04-03T11:51:08Z 2024-02-09T17:45:08Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/63912 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/63912 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Hagá, S., & Olson, K. R. (2017). Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one’s own knowledge and belief revision. Developmental Psychology, 53(12), 2319-2332. https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0000433 1939-0599 cv-prod-983927 10.1037/dev0000433 2-s2.0-85032575767 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
APA |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
APA |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mluisa.alvim@gmail.com |
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1817549276555771904 |