Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Amaro de Matos, Joao
Data de Publicação: 2018
Outros Autores: Mergulhao, Joao
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.21314/JNTF.2018.038
Resumo: Funding: National Funds from FCT (grant nr. UID/ECO/00124/2013) and POR Lisboa (grant nr. LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 )
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spelling Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on boardinformation asymmetrydebt levelsocial networkscorporate boardsbankersFunding: National Funds from FCT (grant nr. UID/ECO/00124/2013) and POR Lisboa (grant nr. LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 )This paper contributes to the financial networks literature by providing evidence that well-connected bankers on the boards of directors of nonfinancial firms reduce information asymmetry between credit markets and firms. Although it is well known that the presence of bankers on these boards likely facilitates firms' capacity to increase their debt level, we clarify this statement in two different ways. First, we show that the impact of the presence of bankers on leverage is driven by firms with low levels of debt. For firms with high levels of debt this effect is not statistically significant. Second, the impact on the leverage ratio of the presence of bankers on the board is amplified the more connected these bankers are to the corporate world. In addition, the results are more pronounced for less transparent firms. Our findings suggest that the connectedness of bankers plays a key role in reducing information asymmetry. Bankers on boards of nonfinancial firms are associated with higher leverage ratios. The more connected the banker, the higher the leverage ratio. The higher the information asymmetry, the greater the impact of the banker's connectedness. Bankers facilitate the increase of leverage ratio only for low-debt firms. The more connected the banker, the larger the impact on the leverage ratio.NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)RUNAmaro de Matos, JoaoMergulhao, Joao2022-02-25T01:30:58Z2018-032018-03-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.21314/JNTF.2018.038eng2055-7795PURE: 4074430https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85059819262&origin=SingleRecordEmailAlert&dgcidhttps://doi.org/10.21314/JNTF.2018.038info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:21:13Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/38395Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:31:00.049343Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board
title Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board
spellingShingle Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board
Amaro de Matos, Joao
information asymmetry
debt level
social networks
corporate boards
bankers
title_short Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board
title_full Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board
title_fullStr Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board
title_full_unstemmed Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board
title_sort Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board
author Amaro de Matos, Joao
author_facet Amaro de Matos, Joao
Mergulhao, Joao
author_role author
author2 Mergulhao, Joao
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)
RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Amaro de Matos, Joao
Mergulhao, Joao
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv information asymmetry
debt level
social networks
corporate boards
bankers
topic information asymmetry
debt level
social networks
corporate boards
bankers
description Funding: National Funds from FCT (grant nr. UID/ECO/00124/2013) and POR Lisboa (grant nr. LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 )
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-03
2018-03-01T00:00:00Z
2022-02-25T01:30:58Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.21314/JNTF.2018.038
url https://doi.org/10.21314/JNTF.2018.038
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 2055-7795
PURE: 4074430
https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85059819262&origin=SingleRecordEmailAlert&dgcid
https://doi.org/10.21314/JNTF.2018.038
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
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collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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