The risk-taking channel of monetary policy

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bonfim, Diana
Data de Publicação: 2018
Outros Autores: Soares, Carla
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12500
Resumo: The literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy grew quickly, leading to scattered evidence. We examine this channel through different angles, exploring detailed information on loan origination and performance. Ex ante riskier borrowers receive more funding at the extensive margin when interest rates are lower. Ex post performance is independent of the level of interest rates at origination. Still, loans granted in periods of very low and stable interest rates show higher default rates once interest rates start to increase. Risk-taking is stronger among banks with lower capital ratios, suggesting that this channel may be linked to managerial incentives for risk-shifting.
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spelling The risk-taking channel of monetary policyexploring all avenuesrisk-taking channelmonetary policy transmissioncredit riskThe literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy grew quickly, leading to scattered evidence. We examine this channel through different angles, exploring detailed information on loan origination and performance. Ex ante riskier borrowers receive more funding at the extensive margin when interest rates are lower. Ex post performance is independent of the level of interest rates at origination. Still, loans granted in periods of very low and stable interest rates show higher default rates once interest rates start to increase. Risk-taking is stronger among banks with lower capital ratios, suggesting that this channel may be linked to managerial incentives for risk-shifting.NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)RUNBonfim, DianaSoares, Carla2022-02-26T01:31:08Z2018-102018-10-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12500eng0022-2879PURE: 5957897http://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85053682643&origin=SingleRecordEmailAlert&dgcidhttps://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12500info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:26:33Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/53889Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:32:42.099092Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The risk-taking channel of monetary policy
exploring all avenues
title The risk-taking channel of monetary policy
spellingShingle The risk-taking channel of monetary policy
Bonfim, Diana
risk-taking channel
monetary policy transmission
credit risk
title_short The risk-taking channel of monetary policy
title_full The risk-taking channel of monetary policy
title_fullStr The risk-taking channel of monetary policy
title_full_unstemmed The risk-taking channel of monetary policy
title_sort The risk-taking channel of monetary policy
author Bonfim, Diana
author_facet Bonfim, Diana
Soares, Carla
author_role author
author2 Soares, Carla
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)
RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bonfim, Diana
Soares, Carla
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv risk-taking channel
monetary policy transmission
credit risk
topic risk-taking channel
monetary policy transmission
credit risk
description The literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy grew quickly, leading to scattered evidence. We examine this channel through different angles, exploring detailed information on loan origination and performance. Ex ante riskier borrowers receive more funding at the extensive margin when interest rates are lower. Ex post performance is independent of the level of interest rates at origination. Still, loans granted in periods of very low and stable interest rates show higher default rates once interest rates start to increase. Risk-taking is stronger among banks with lower capital ratios, suggesting that this channel may be linked to managerial incentives for risk-shifting.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-10
2018-10-01T00:00:00Z
2022-02-26T01:31:08Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12500
url https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12500
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 0022-2879
PURE: 5957897
http://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85053682643&origin=SingleRecordEmailAlert&dgcid
https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12500
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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