„I think“ as form and action: Kant’s self beyond time and substance

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Jesus, Paulo Renato
Data de Publicação: 2015
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/11328/1636
Resumo: The qualitative determination of the relationships between time, substance and transcendental apperception reveals a complex labyrinth of trajectories. In the first Critique the three concepts circulate through one another without showing a perfect dialectical totality in which each of them could constitute a moment of mediation between the others. It appears that, instead of a stable dynamic triangle emerging, a double structural instability unfolds, specially if the triangle is observed from the vertex of transcendental apperception. This is due to the fact that not only does pure self break its traditionally strong ties with substance, but it also posits itself outside the sphere of time. Indeed, owing to its intellectual and logical nonphenomenal essence, transcendental apperception has no common measure with sensibility and sensible intuition. Furthermore, it cannot belong either to substance or to time, given that only a permanent sensible intuition can correspond to the concept of substance, and that only intuited phenomena can appear in the form of time. Now, by enjoying a state of exception, as the originating condition of the unity of all experience – that is, the common quality of all representations which consists in their being mine or being unified by and in myself –, transcendental apperception seems to be on the brink of becoming an unstable centre. Without activity, transcendental apperception is reduced to an empty formal concept or judgement, deprived of all mental effectiveness. On the other hand, however, if transcendental apperception does display a real and effective mental activity, as should be necessarily supposed, one must wonder whether and how the I think can be conceived simply as a timeless process and, what is more, as an absolutely disembodied, non-substantial, process, as though there were activity without any agent.
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spelling „I think“ as form and action: Kant’s self beyond time and substanceI. KantI thinkPhilosophy of PsychologyHistory of PsychologyA. BaumgartenC. WolffThe qualitative determination of the relationships between time, substance and transcendental apperception reveals a complex labyrinth of trajectories. In the first Critique the three concepts circulate through one another without showing a perfect dialectical totality in which each of them could constitute a moment of mediation between the others. It appears that, instead of a stable dynamic triangle emerging, a double structural instability unfolds, specially if the triangle is observed from the vertex of transcendental apperception. This is due to the fact that not only does pure self break its traditionally strong ties with substance, but it also posits itself outside the sphere of time. Indeed, owing to its intellectual and logical nonphenomenal essence, transcendental apperception has no common measure with sensibility and sensible intuition. Furthermore, it cannot belong either to substance or to time, given that only a permanent sensible intuition can correspond to the concept of substance, and that only intuited phenomena can appear in the form of time. Now, by enjoying a state of exception, as the originating condition of the unity of all experience – that is, the common quality of all representations which consists in their being mine or being unified by and in myself –, transcendental apperception seems to be on the brink of becoming an unstable centre. Without activity, transcendental apperception is reduced to an empty formal concept or judgement, deprived of all mental effectiveness. On the other hand, however, if transcendental apperception does display a real and effective mental activity, as should be necessarily supposed, one must wonder whether and how the I think can be conceived simply as a timeless process and, what is more, as an absolutely disembodied, non-substantial, process, as though there were activity without any agent.2016-11-06T22:36:09Z2015-01-01T00:00:00Z2015info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11328/1636engJesus, Paulo Renatoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-06-15T02:09:53ZPortal AgregadorONG
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv „I think“ as form and action: Kant’s self beyond time and substance
title „I think“ as form and action: Kant’s self beyond time and substance
spellingShingle „I think“ as form and action: Kant’s self beyond time and substance
Jesus, Paulo Renato
I. Kant
I think
Philosophy of Psychology
History of Psychology
A. Baumgarten
C. Wolff
title_short „I think“ as form and action: Kant’s self beyond time and substance
title_full „I think“ as form and action: Kant’s self beyond time and substance
title_fullStr „I think“ as form and action: Kant’s self beyond time and substance
title_full_unstemmed „I think“ as form and action: Kant’s self beyond time and substance
title_sort „I think“ as form and action: Kant’s self beyond time and substance
author Jesus, Paulo Renato
author_facet Jesus, Paulo Renato
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Jesus, Paulo Renato
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv I. Kant
I think
Philosophy of Psychology
History of Psychology
A. Baumgarten
C. Wolff
topic I. Kant
I think
Philosophy of Psychology
History of Psychology
A. Baumgarten
C. Wolff
description The qualitative determination of the relationships between time, substance and transcendental apperception reveals a complex labyrinth of trajectories. In the first Critique the three concepts circulate through one another without showing a perfect dialectical totality in which each of them could constitute a moment of mediation between the others. It appears that, instead of a stable dynamic triangle emerging, a double structural instability unfolds, specially if the triangle is observed from the vertex of transcendental apperception. This is due to the fact that not only does pure self break its traditionally strong ties with substance, but it also posits itself outside the sphere of time. Indeed, owing to its intellectual and logical nonphenomenal essence, transcendental apperception has no common measure with sensibility and sensible intuition. Furthermore, it cannot belong either to substance or to time, given that only a permanent sensible intuition can correspond to the concept of substance, and that only intuited phenomena can appear in the form of time. Now, by enjoying a state of exception, as the originating condition of the unity of all experience – that is, the common quality of all representations which consists in their being mine or being unified by and in myself –, transcendental apperception seems to be on the brink of becoming an unstable centre. Without activity, transcendental apperception is reduced to an empty formal concept or judgement, deprived of all mental effectiveness. On the other hand, however, if transcendental apperception does display a real and effective mental activity, as should be necessarily supposed, one must wonder whether and how the I think can be conceived simply as a timeless process and, what is more, as an absolutely disembodied, non-substantial, process, as though there were activity without any agent.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-01-01T00:00:00Z
2015
2016-11-06T22:36:09Z
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