Bilateral monopolies and location choice

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Brekke, Kurt R.
Data de Publicação: 2004
Outros Autores: Straume, Odd Rune
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6935
Resumo: We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. Assuming a duopoly downstream market with input price bargaining, we find that the presence of input suppliers changes the locational incentives of downstream firms in several ways, compared with the case of exogenous production costs. Bargaining induces downstream firms to locate further apart, despite the fact that input prices increase with the distance between the firms. Furthermore, the downstream firm facing the stronger input supplier has a strategic advantage and locates closer to the market centre.
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spelling Bilateral monopolies and location choiceSpatial competitionLocation choiceBilateral monopoliesEndogenous production costsWe analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. Assuming a duopoly downstream market with input price bargaining, we find that the presence of input suppliers changes the locational incentives of downstream firms in several ways, compared with the case of exogenous production costs. Bargaining induces downstream firms to locate further apart, despite the fact that input prices increase with the distance between the firms. Furthermore, the downstream firm facing the stronger input supplier has a strategic advantage and locates closer to the market centre.Elsevier B.V.Universidade do MinhoBrekke, Kurt R.Straume, Odd Rune20042004-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/6935eng"Regional Science and Urban Economics". ISSN 0166-0462. 34:3 (May 2004) 275-288.0166-0462http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0166-0462(03)00046-2info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:49:48Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/6935Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:48:22.780910Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Bilateral monopolies and location choice
title Bilateral monopolies and location choice
spellingShingle Bilateral monopolies and location choice
Brekke, Kurt R.
Spatial competition
Location choice
Bilateral monopolies
Endogenous production costs
title_short Bilateral monopolies and location choice
title_full Bilateral monopolies and location choice
title_fullStr Bilateral monopolies and location choice
title_full_unstemmed Bilateral monopolies and location choice
title_sort Bilateral monopolies and location choice
author Brekke, Kurt R.
author_facet Brekke, Kurt R.
Straume, Odd Rune
author_role author
author2 Straume, Odd Rune
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Brekke, Kurt R.
Straume, Odd Rune
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Spatial competition
Location choice
Bilateral monopolies
Endogenous production costs
topic Spatial competition
Location choice
Bilateral monopolies
Endogenous production costs
description We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. Assuming a duopoly downstream market with input price bargaining, we find that the presence of input suppliers changes the locational incentives of downstream firms in several ways, compared with the case of exogenous production costs. Bargaining induces downstream firms to locate further apart, despite the fact that input prices increase with the distance between the firms. Furthermore, the downstream firm facing the stronger input supplier has a strategic advantage and locates closer to the market centre.
publishDate 2004
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2004
2004-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6935
url http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6935
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv "Regional Science and Urban Economics". ISSN 0166-0462. 34:3 (May 2004) 275-288.
0166-0462
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0166-0462(03)00046-2
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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