Coordination and development

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pontes, José Pedro
Data de Publicação: 2013
Outros Autores: Pais, Joana
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23239
Resumo: This paper addresses the issue of industrial development using a coordination game. Complementarities between transport infrastructure provision by the Government and consumer goods manufacturing firms, and among consumer goods firms themselves dictate the outcome: either the transport infrastructure (i.e., a highway) is not built and firms keep doing “home” production, thus supplying mainly nearby consumers and dispensing with a highway; or they switch to “factory” production, a more spatially centralized regime, where output must be sold over long distances, thus implying the construction of a highway. In relation to the existent literature, this paper presents two main innovations. Firstly, the two sources of linkage, namely cost linkage, through the provision of an indivisible input (the highway), and demand linkage, through the wage rise brought about by industrialization, are not treated separately, but they are integrated in the same model. Consequently, the game has now two levels of equilibrium selection. Secondly, the paper does not limit itself to checking that there can arise multiple Nash equilibria under certain circumstances, but itdiscusses methods for the selection of a unique outcome. Consequently, in addition to the classical Nash equilibria mentioned above, there is a third possible solution where the Government builds the highway but the consumer goods firms refrain from using it and stick to “home” production. Hence, the transport infrastructure becomes a “white elephant”
id RCAP_9a21e1cf2008c4095f84b5d7b53b8eeb
oai_identifier_str oai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/23239
network_acronym_str RCAP
network_name_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository_id_str 7160
spelling Coordination and developmentBig PushCoordination GamesEconomic DevelopmentEquilibrium SelectionThis paper addresses the issue of industrial development using a coordination game. Complementarities between transport infrastructure provision by the Government and consumer goods manufacturing firms, and among consumer goods firms themselves dictate the outcome: either the transport infrastructure (i.e., a highway) is not built and firms keep doing “home” production, thus supplying mainly nearby consumers and dispensing with a highway; or they switch to “factory” production, a more spatially centralized regime, where output must be sold over long distances, thus implying the construction of a highway. In relation to the existent literature, this paper presents two main innovations. Firstly, the two sources of linkage, namely cost linkage, through the provision of an indivisible input (the highway), and demand linkage, through the wage rise brought about by industrialization, are not treated separately, but they are integrated in the same model. Consequently, the game has now two levels of equilibrium selection. Secondly, the paper does not limit itself to checking that there can arise multiple Nash equilibria under certain circumstances, but itdiscusses methods for the selection of a unique outcome. Consequently, in addition to the classical Nash equilibria mentioned above, there is a third possible solution where the Government builds the highway but the consumer goods firms refrain from using it and stick to “home” production. Hence, the transport infrastructure becomes a “white elephant”ISEG - Departamento de EconomiaRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPontes, José PedroPais, Joana2022-01-24T14:30:55Z20132013-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23239engPontes, José Pedro e Joana Pais. 2013. “Coordination and development” . Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão. DE Working papers nº 29-2013/DE/UECE0874-4548info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:52:45Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/23239Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:07:30.925750Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Coordination and development
title Coordination and development
spellingShingle Coordination and development
Pontes, José Pedro
Big Push
Coordination Games
Economic Development
Equilibrium Selection
title_short Coordination and development
title_full Coordination and development
title_fullStr Coordination and development
title_full_unstemmed Coordination and development
title_sort Coordination and development
author Pontes, José Pedro
author_facet Pontes, José Pedro
Pais, Joana
author_role author
author2 Pais, Joana
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pontes, José Pedro
Pais, Joana
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Big Push
Coordination Games
Economic Development
Equilibrium Selection
topic Big Push
Coordination Games
Economic Development
Equilibrium Selection
description This paper addresses the issue of industrial development using a coordination game. Complementarities between transport infrastructure provision by the Government and consumer goods manufacturing firms, and among consumer goods firms themselves dictate the outcome: either the transport infrastructure (i.e., a highway) is not built and firms keep doing “home” production, thus supplying mainly nearby consumers and dispensing with a highway; or they switch to “factory” production, a more spatially centralized regime, where output must be sold over long distances, thus implying the construction of a highway. In relation to the existent literature, this paper presents two main innovations. Firstly, the two sources of linkage, namely cost linkage, through the provision of an indivisible input (the highway), and demand linkage, through the wage rise brought about by industrialization, are not treated separately, but they are integrated in the same model. Consequently, the game has now two levels of equilibrium selection. Secondly, the paper does not limit itself to checking that there can arise multiple Nash equilibria under certain circumstances, but itdiscusses methods for the selection of a unique outcome. Consequently, in addition to the classical Nash equilibria mentioned above, there is a third possible solution where the Government builds the highway but the consumer goods firms refrain from using it and stick to “home” production. Hence, the transport infrastructure becomes a “white elephant”
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013
2013-01-01T00:00:00Z
2022-01-24T14:30:55Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23239
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23239
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Pontes, José Pedro e Joana Pais. 2013. “Coordination and development” . Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão. DE Working papers nº 29-2013/DE/UECE
0874-4548
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv ISEG - Departamento de Economia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv ISEG - Departamento de Economia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1799131169082572800