On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of Sociality
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2006 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82984 |
Resumo: | We consider a two-player game in which one player can take a costly action (i.e., to provide a favor) that is beneficial to the other. The game is infinitely repeated and each player is equally likely to be the one who can provide the favor in each period. In this context, equality matching is defined as a strategy in which each player counts the number of times she has given in excess of received and she gives if and only if this number has not reached an upper bound. We show that the equality matching strategy is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible. Furthermore, we show that the utility for each player is at least as high under equality matching as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible strategy of the same complexity. Thus, we rationalize equality matching as being an efficient way to achieve those properties. This result is applied to risk sharing in village economies and used to rationalize the observed correlations between individual consumption and individual income and between present and past transfers across individuals. |
id |
RCAP_9d552afd3fb7a13db801d65d3f8d96d3 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:run.unl.pt:10362/82984 |
network_acronym_str |
RCAP |
network_name_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository_id_str |
7160 |
spelling |
On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of SocialityEquality matchingPositive reciprocityNegative reciprocitySocial institutionsVillage economiesWe consider a two-player game in which one player can take a costly action (i.e., to provide a favor) that is beneficial to the other. The game is infinitely repeated and each player is equally likely to be the one who can provide the favor in each period. In this context, equality matching is defined as a strategy in which each player counts the number of times she has given in excess of received and she gives if and only if this number has not reached an upper bound. We show that the equality matching strategy is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible. Furthermore, we show that the utility for each player is at least as high under equality matching as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible strategy of the same complexity. Thus, we rationalize equality matching as being an efficient way to achieve those properties. This result is applied to risk sharing in village economies and used to rationalize the observed correlations between individual consumption and individual income and between present and past transfers across individuals.Nova SBERUNCarmona, Guilherme2019-10-02T15:46:09Z2006-06-162006-06-16T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/82984engCarmona, Guilherme, On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of Sociality (June, 2006). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 489info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:36:55Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/82984Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:15.834569Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of Sociality |
title |
On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of Sociality |
spellingShingle |
On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of Sociality Carmona, Guilherme Equality matching Positive reciprocity Negative reciprocity Social institutions Village economies |
title_short |
On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of Sociality |
title_full |
On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of Sociality |
title_fullStr |
On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of Sociality |
title_full_unstemmed |
On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of Sociality |
title_sort |
On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of Sociality |
author |
Carmona, Guilherme |
author_facet |
Carmona, Guilherme |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
RUN |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Carmona, Guilherme |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Equality matching Positive reciprocity Negative reciprocity Social institutions Village economies |
topic |
Equality matching Positive reciprocity Negative reciprocity Social institutions Village economies |
description |
We consider a two-player game in which one player can take a costly action (i.e., to provide a favor) that is beneficial to the other. The game is infinitely repeated and each player is equally likely to be the one who can provide the favor in each period. In this context, equality matching is defined as a strategy in which each player counts the number of times she has given in excess of received and she gives if and only if this number has not reached an upper bound. We show that the equality matching strategy is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible. Furthermore, we show that the utility for each player is at least as high under equality matching as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible strategy of the same complexity. Thus, we rationalize equality matching as being an efficient way to achieve those properties. This result is applied to risk sharing in village economies and used to rationalize the observed correlations between individual consumption and individual income and between present and past transfers across individuals. |
publishDate |
2006 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2006-06-16 2006-06-16T00:00:00Z 2019-10-02T15:46:09Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82984 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82984 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Carmona, Guilherme, On the Optimality of the Equality Matching Form of Sociality (June, 2006). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 489 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1799137981808771072 |